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The familiar sounds of ships announcing their departure were the only interruption 
to a warm August afternoon. The sound of my own departure had already been 
heard and I was browsing Dutch University sites to set sail to a new port. My life 
constantly navigates through ports, they harbor my rocks, the ones who keep the 
storms a far. 
That August afternoon, I decided I would knock at Prof. Herman Beck’s door and 
so I did, gaining a doctor, a father and the dearest of friends. As so, Tilburg University 
became my port of call, from which I’ve set sail through the world, from old 
Constantinople to Copenhagen.  
My beloved doktorvader, you have steadily steered me through the years, with 
the loving patience that only a Father can have. Relieved all my ill-placed commas 
and prescribed me with doses of bon courage. Brave from the start, never far apart. 
I am thankful to your family who shared with me the gift of God that you are, 
through the weekends and the holidays. Who shared with me your heart of Leo. You 
are my silent hero with undivided time to hear all my syllables. And every time I close 
your door, I hope that those book walls will protect you as good as you protect me.  
Wouter van Beek, the Pillars of Hercules will never be higher than your skillful 
strategy of drawing diagonal moves with words. Thank you for teaching me how to 
turn ‘long and complicated texts’ into ‘a simple and captivating melody’. Thank you 
for always chose to put your mask on, to dance and to fight for my story.  
Ad, you are the grace between my gaps, Christmas wrapped around my papers. 
A hug at every line that departed. A blue-pencil smile at every arrived paragraph. 
Thank you for being the Vic in my victories, the last crumble of my cookie.  
Karin, you have placed your hands above mine and shaped a green heart into 
my book of life. You are the soft summer breeze that keeps the best pages open. 
You are the warmth of the autumn, coloring new chapters. Your role, your story will 
always make me run close to you. This book travelled from my mind to your hands 
and you made it bloom into a thing of beauty. Ik ben zo trots dat ik jou vriend mag 
zijn. 
Maria José, the tides of the Cantabrico run deep in you, and just like them, you 
stream between the North and the South. You have been my compass. My fingers 
follow the maps you have already creased because I trust in you. Gràcies per tot. 
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Jan Jaap, mijn Ruiter, rāʼiʻ. You are the bonheur, the zoet and the zout. The Friday 
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times a day, so that I smile. Merci mon cher ami. 
Sjaak, your office was always my dugout, a sheltered place to create goals, to 
discuss the late sports results and to receive direct navigation points. Thank you for 
believing in me and for bringing our families together, in jouw dorpje.  
Odile, Piia, thank you for your wildish spirits that have paved the way to gender 
geniality, to digital daring but above all to scientific caring.  
Carine and Erna, thank you for the good of my mornings, the pauses between 
my thoughts, your hard work bellow the foam of the days. 
To all my dear colleagues, to the ones whose shadows are still there, to the ones 
who already left and to the ones who will never come back, thank you for our 
corridor conversations, for our community.  
Sunny, our friendship is written every day, filling in the empty spaces at lunch, 
and keeping time in a quiet zone. Worldwide. Worthwhile. Terimakasi. 
My Salafiyya port, Carmen Becker, Martijn de Koning, Joas Wagemakers, thank 
you for your initial push into the righteous path. 
Digital ports brought me the academic inspiration of Amarnath Amarasingam, 
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Nafees Hamid, Scott Atran, Moussa Bourekba, Tore Hamming and Keith Hayward.  
Digital ports also brought me, the man of the match, Peter R. Neumann who with 
just a few words changed my life, in yet another warm August afternoon. Danke 
schön. 
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and foreign fighters, St. Pauli and Porto. Thank you for being such a cool friend and 
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Next in line, the Pereira port. Football furthered our friendship, faith fostered us 
as a family. Muito obrigada, tamos juntos. 
Further, at sea, La Caletta, my safety harbor, where my chosen family welcomes 
me with thick prayers and thin layers of carasau. These people taught me how to 
read by the kind light of belief. Fino alla fine. 
Back to my first harbor, is Porto, salt of my existence where my auntie and father 
await every return of my words. My granite roots where my tears lay at the shores 
of my saudade. 
And then when all my ships were at sea, my boys light the way home. My son, 
my right without a wrong, thank you for waiting for just one more screenshot, for 
just one more sentence, for waiting at the mosques and at airports. Your little hand 
took me to great places. 
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1.1 Field significance  
Wolves are resilient species. They quickly adapt to new environments, striving and 
resisting throughout different kinds of grounds. Wolves are cursorial species. They 
run for as long and for as far as they need to capture their prey. Wolves run with 
wolves. They have and they cultivate strong social ties (Schuurman et al. 2017: 3): 
 
Social ties do more than contribute to the adoption of violent beliefs. Many of the 
individuals that we have come to think of as ‘lone wolves’ are, on closer inspection, 
better understood as alone largely and only with regard to the actual commission of 
the act of violence. For most lone actors, connections to others, be they virtual or 
physical, play an important and sometimes even critical role in the adoption and 
maintenance of their motivation to commit violence, as well as the practical skills that 
are necessary to carry out acts of terrorism. 
 
Terrorism continues to evolve in its many layers of definition, actors, typologies, 
motivations. And there are many unanswered questions and a significant gap in the 
literature in specific areas, including the radicalization of women in online environ-
ments and the utilization of Facebook as a radical violent environment. These ques-
tions relate to the dynamics aroused by online processes of engaging with violent 
contents and networks, and their relationship to terrorist attacks. The questions can 
be traced back as far as to Walter Laqueur’s considerations in 1999 (1999: 262, as 
cited in Conway et al. 2017: 8) and persist in present research. The questions can be 
framed as involving three categories of concerns (Conway et al. 2017): 
 
• adoption of extremist ideology – i.e. so-called (violent) online radicalization; 
• recruitment into violent extremist or terrorist groups or movements; 
• planning and preparation of attacks. 
 
From a gendered perspective, recent studies guided by Pearson and Winterbotham 
(2017: 67) and García-Calvo (2017: 6, 7) indicate that in comparison to male jihadists, 
women’s preferred space for engaging with processes of radicalization is the online 
space. The results in Spain are in this sense clear: from the 148 jihadist individuals 
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arrested between 2013 and 2016 (García-Calvo 2017: 3), 55.6% of the women 
radicalized online whereas only 30.8% of men (2017: 7) were exposed to online 
violent radicalization. There is a clear indication of an actual relationship between 
online activity and engagement with online violent extremism, but the data is 
confined to individuals who were arrested and more analysis is necessary to explain 
the online radicalization processes while they are still in progress. More work is 
necessary to harvest data that positions the individual’s stages of engagement with 
violent online contents. 
One fact is certain, IS created an extra ‘online territory of terror’ (Prucha 2011) 
with the specific task of keeping the jihadist ideology circulating, alluring and re-
cruiting an expanding audience. However, since 2016 all major social media platform 
administrations have been ‘disrupting Daesh’ (Conway et al. 2017), aiming to pre-
vent the consumption and dissemination of online violent contents. While these ac-
tions and preventive measures delivered effective results, Conway et al. (2017: 1) 
alerts that although the ability to produce and consume online violent contents may 
have decreased, it is not possible to guarantee for how long this situation will con-
tinue nor is it possible to completely disrupt jihadist digital archives. Nevertheless, 
every digital cloud has a silver lining because these jihadist digital archives will ena-
ble analysis on the reconstitution of social patterns, social trends, and organizational 
evolution, resulting in critical information for assessing future scenarios and for pro-
ducing preventive, predictive models. 
The year 2017 was pivotal in introducing a ‘differential disruption’ to ISIS online 
propaganda (Conway et al. 2017: 20). Indeed, several social media owner companies 
coordinated their strategies via the Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism con-
sortium as so to monitor, identify and ban violent content from their online plat-
forms. Particularly relevant for the current study, Facebook installed new and de-
tailed measures in June 2017 to outline their counter-violent extremism fight 
(Conway 2017: 15).  
Another significant disruption to IS’s field of action was the physical loss of the 
Caliphate. Manufactured and declared in June 2014, as a physical Islamic controlled 
land, the Islamic Caliphate was a place to where individuals could aspire to migrate 
and live under the ruling of a ‘pure’ Sharia government.  
However, in the case of Spain there is an actual physical territory that it is por-
trayed as worthy to fight for, the Al-Andalus (denomination of the Spanish territory 
and that includes parts of Portugal), as we will see in the next section. It is a historical 
space filled with the crucial emotion, bonding and religious affiliation to convince 
jihadists to act for the sake of its re-conquest.  
Continuing to explore the field significance, namely physical territory, it is im-
portant to consider the significance of the Moroccan milieu for the development of 
online radicalization processes and the subsequent terrorist attacks. A central posi-
tion is taken by the Spanish enclave territories of Ceuta and Melilla located in the 
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North of Morocco (see Figure 1.1), as they have historical connections to the devel-




















Figure 1.1  Central position of Spanish enclave territories of Ceuta and Melilla  
 
These jihadist ‘hotbeds’ are fed by poor social and economic conditions and by their 
proximity to Salafi-jihadist currents in Morocco. Their passage to Spain is facilitated 
by the extension of Spanish nationality, the easy geographical access via the Strait 
of Gibraltar, and the commonly understood need to migrate. As for the latter factor, 
there are both social-economic reasons (the search for jobs or better-qualified and 
better-paid positions) and political-religious reasons (the government’s treatment 
of the Salafi-jihadist movement). This situational context dates back to the 1980s 
and has helped the Salafi-jihadist ideology, as it ‘resonated well with broad sectors 
of the population who lived in crowded and poor neighborhoods and shantytowns’ 
(Boukhars 2005). In line with this reasoning, Pargeter (2008) argues that factors such 
as kinship and social networks, the implications of the regime’s action to combat 
Salafi-jihadist Imams, the feeling of social alienation and unfair treatment have been 
significant contributors to the uprising of violent extremism in the country. 
The terrorist attacks in Casablanca in 2003 executed by Al-Qaeda affiliated mem-
bers were the material culmination of all the above-mentioned factors and ‘marked 
the end of ‘Moroccan Exceptionalism’ (Hashas 2013; Palmer 2014). In other words, 
Rabat was no longer the poster regime in the fight against jihadist acts. Springing 
from these events, the Moroccan government proceeded to arrest several Salafi-
jihadist preachers and followers. The perceived unfair treatment of these prisoners, 
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the ban on creating their own political party, and internal disputes among the Salafi-
jihadist leaders ended up aggravating the problem of violent radicalization in Mo-
rocco (Masbah 2017).  
The migration flows from Morocco to Spain, in particular to Catalonia, that 
started in the 1970s and increased with the passage of time, implied the entrance 
of Salafi-jihadist Moroccan Imams and the spreading of their violent message. As a 
matter of fact, Catalonia, with its significant number of radicalized individuals, was 
already a selected target of jihadist terror since 1990 (Reinares & García-Calvo 2018: 
4).   
The attacks of 11 March 2004 in Madrid, the first jihadist strikes to succeed on 
Spanish territory, highlighted in a concrete way the dangerous liaison between 
Salafi-jihadist Moroccan preachers and the processes of radicalization in Spain. 
Years later, and after previous failed attempts such as the thwarted jihadist as-
sault on the metro of Barcelona in 2008, Catalonia became the epicenter of coordi-
nated jihadist acts. In the afternoon of the 17th of August 2017, a jihadist drove a 
van through the Ramblas area, in the center of Barcelona taking the lives of more 
than 13 people. Later that day, five men were killed by the police forces while trying 
to carry out another terrorist assault in Cambrils, a coastal town, circa 130km south 
of Barcelona, as shown on the map below (Figure 1.2). All of the involved jihadists 



















Figure 1.2  Locations of the jihadist attacks of August 20171 
                                                 
1 https://www.mirror.co.uk/news/world-news/they-were-good-guys-school-11013221 
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Online, IS claimed the authorship of the violent events and warned that Al-Andalus 
would persist as a jihadist target. Thus, both the online and physical fields continue 




In the summer of 2014, when ISIS2 (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) declared the 
constitution of its Caliphate in Syria and Iraq, Abu Tamima, or Saladine Guitone, a 
French-Moroccan foreign fighter with ties to Spain (presumably connected to 
Abdelhamid Abaaoud, leader of the Paris attacks) declared in a video message:3  
 
I say it to the world as a warning: We are living under the Islamic flag, the Islamic 
Caliphate.4 We will die for it until we liberate those occupied lands, from Jakarta to 
Andalusia. And I declare: Spain is the land of our forefathers and we are going to take 
it back with the power of Allah. 
 
Andalusia, as mentioned above, also sometimes referred by the name of ‘Al-Anda-
lus’ is an historical territory that covers large parts of what we today call Portugal 
and Spain (Reinares 2016: 14; Torres Soriano 2014). In fact, Spain represents in ji-
hadist ideology an occupied territory that should be recaptured and restored to its 
former glory of a Caliphate (Coolsaet 2005: 3), back in the time when much of the 
Iberian Peninsula was under the control of the Islamic Caliphate of Cordoba. 
The idea of conquering Al-Andalus and submitting it to an Islamic governance 
was first branded by the jihadist organization Al-Qaeda (Coolsaet 2005: 3) and in-
cluded in their propaganda machine as both a strategic military target and a reli-
gious obligation (Holbrook 2014: 159). Furthering down the tactical maneuver of 
transforming Spain into a geographical target, Al-Qaeda included in their list of 
claims, the political situation of Ceuta and Melilla (both Spanish enclaves in the 
North of Morocco) as a matter to be solved by war. 
This violent take on Al-Andalus resulted in the mind-set behind the Madrid train 
bombings of 2004 with its material authors naming themselves the ‘brigades in Al-
Andalus’. Thirteen years later, IS’s own violent take of Al-Andalus led to the terrorist 
events of 17 August in Barcelona and Cambrils, with the terrorists using the name 
of ‘Soldiers of the Islamic State in the lands of the Al-Andalus’. 
 
 
                                                 
2 The terms ISIS, IS and/or Daesh will be used intertwined throughout this book.  
3 https://www.memri.org/reports/jihad-and-terrorism-threat-monitor-jttm-weekend-sum-
mary-99  
4  As in the first note, the terms Khilafat, Khalifate or Caliphate will be used intertwined 
throughout this book. 













Figure 1.3  Screenshot from Facebook (13 April 2015) 
 
The claim was performed in a video message by Muhammed Yasin Ahram Perez, the 
son of Tomasa Perez, a Spanish female converted Muslim who migrated to Syria in 
December 2014 together with her children. Muhammed Perez, as seen in the above 
Facebook screenshot (Figure 1.3), had already communicated in April 2015 his wish 
that “at the streets of Cordoba the adhan will be heard again and the cathedral of 
Cordoba will be a mosque again, by the hands of the Islamic state … inshallah.”5 
The message expresses IS’s continuous reference to the ideological and historical 
importance of the area in the hope of attracting more Spanish-speaking individuals 
to join their jihadist networks. It is IS’s first Spanish-spoken message and its contents 
are a tailor-made message for the Spanish-speaking audience. Indeed, the jihadist 
contents endorsed by IS are tailor-made, constantly updated and available in all 
social media platforms. Once the potential jihadist is engaged in obtaining more 
information, the recruiters step in to offer ‘frame alignment’ (Neumann 2008: 75), 
between the potential jihadist perspective and the jihadist ‘master narrative’ 
(Bernardi et al. 2012: 34). In other words, the jihadist recruiters develop a coherent 
connection between their contents and their individual audience through a selected 
jihadist narrative. Jihadist narrative or ‘single narrative’ (Schmid 2014) is a commu-
nication system aiming at sharing, disseminating and promoting a coherent line of 
violent contents using for that purpose all manners and tools available. By creating 
their own IS-affiliated contents, online jihadists bring a new layer to the ‘single 
narrative’, the layer of the ‘singular narrative’, an online storytelling that adapts en-
tirely to the individual that is being aimed as target of recruitment. The story is then 
told to resonate the receiver’s own ‘motivational causes’ (Bjørgo 2005: 3) such as 
expectations and grievances (Ramakrishna 2007: 129; Sageman 2008: 41).  
                                                 
5 The quotes presented throughout the dissertation are my own Spanish translations to Eng-
lish. Arabic transliterations follow a plain system, that is to say they do not have diacritical 
marks, contrast between long or short vowels. However, Chapter 6 is an exception to this 
simplified system, as in here I follow Brill’s simple Arabic transliteration system.  
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While this is the general process on how online jihadist propaganda allures the 
Spanish-speaking individuals through the central theme of Al-Andalus, it is crucial 
to shed light on how Spanish-speaking female jihadists engage with jihadist mobi-
lization. 
 
1.3 ‘Degüello al policía’6 – A brief comparison of Spanish 
female terrorist mobilization 
 
The Madrid terrorist attacks of 11 March 2004 claimed by Al-Qaeda marked a shift 
in Spanish counter-terrorism strategy. Long before this jihadist plot, Spain was in 
arms with the Basque separatist group ETA (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna). 
While I was growing up during the 1980s and the 1990s in the North of Portugal, 
close to the Spanish border, it was frequent to hear the debates and the news about 
ETA, and of their terrorist activities, which were usually directed at police and security 
agents. Constituted at the ‘end of the nineteenth century’ (Reinares 2010: 466), ETA 
is responsible for devising several terrorist and guerilla strategies such as ‘kale 
borroka’ or ‘urban fight’ (Reinares 2001: 22) to achieve their goal of independence 
from Madrid’s government. Their members, or Patriotas de la Muerte (‘Patriots of 
Death’, Reinares 2001) were in the vast majority male and inserted in a ‘conservative 
gender rhetoric’ (Hamilton 2007: 3), yet due to ideological stances and socioeco-
nomic conditions women were able to construct their own space and role with the 
separatist group (2007: 3). Female engagement with ETA’s militancy would occur 
due to ‘close affective ties’ (Reinares 2010: 467), followed by a timeline evolution of 
their roles inside the organization. As so, in the first moment their roles would pri-
marily be framed in the recruitment narratives as the guardians of culture and lan-
guage (Hamilton 2007: 3), then as the mothers of the new generation of fighters, 
and then finally these gendered roles would evolve to active, direct and violent mil-
itary roles because of the lack of male fighters (Hamilton 2007: 3-4).  
ETA’s decades of terrorist activities in Spain have been the subject of academic 
studies. The findings have a scientific application that goes beyond the spectrum of 
nationalist terrorism. The contributions of the works of Reinares (2001, 2010) and 
Hamilton (2007) reveal, as a matter of fact, that the key categories of female mobi-
lization into ETA’s violent activities are similar to the ones found in female mobiliza-
tion into jihadist-inspired terrorist groups. In every step of the way they coincide 
and in both cases, empirical evidence supports the similarities between them 
because both emerge from particular cultures and subcultures, patriarchic 
principles, extremist ideology, romantic and emotional engagement, guardians and 
disseminators of critical knowledge, motivation to acquire a higher status, 
motherhood and violent military functions. 
                                                 
6 ‘I will behead the police man.’ Translation from Spanish. 
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There are indeed similarities between the constructed gendered roles within the 
two groups, between the processes of engagement, and of course, between their 
ground of action, Spain. 
The above elements of the jihadist mobilization process can all be observed in 
Samira Yerou, the first woman convicted in Spain, in the end of 2016 for jihadism 
activities (Mickolus 2016: 350; Reinares, Garcia-Calvo & Vicente 2017: 32). Because 
her case is so particular, her life and activities are explored in different moments of 
this study, inclusive the fieldwork developed in Rubi (Catalonia) where interviews 
were conducted with a group of Muslim women belonging to her community. 
Samira was born in Tetouan, Morocco (subculture and patriarchic principles) and 
after a first failed marriage, she moved to Rubi where she re-married a Spanish- 
Moroccan Muslim man. In the summer of 2013 and while on holidays in her 
hometown, she got in direct contact with Salafi-jihadist preachers who initiated her 
engagement with jihadist networks. When Samira returned to Rubi from her 
holidays in Tetouan, she carried in more than just luggage; she carried also the 
determination on proving herself as a female jihadist (motivation to acquire a higher 
status). Her proof of commitment to the jihadist cause was achieved when her son, 
at the time still a toddler said on the phone to a ISIS element: “I want to go with the 
muhajedeen”, “I’m going to cut the throat of a police man”, ‘deguello al policia’ in 
Spanish. 
Being a woman, a mother, mujahida (‘fighter’) and a muhajira (‘migrant’) Samira’s 
example is important for the empirical proof of this study as she represents a new 
gendered perspective of the evolution of women’s roles in the jihadist organization. 
Furthermore, the subjects of this study are Spanish-speaking jihadist women, which 
includes both Spanish and Moroccan nationalities, a combination that it is to be 
found in Samira, as well.  
This research focuses on conferring a description of the construction of online 
female-jihadist roles providing a better understanding on how “environmental, cog-
nitive, and relational mechanisms” (Tilly 2001: 24) illustrate the formation of female 
jihadist processes of engagement and recruitment. Therefore, the aim of this disser-
tation was to answer the following central question:  
 
How do Spanish-speaking jihadist women construct their online roles?  
 
Answering this question requires answering as well the following sub-questions:  
a) evaluating how female jihadists make sense of online jihadism ‒ sisterhood; 
b) determining the symbolic value of online spaces for violent extremist pro-
cesses; 
c) establishing how female jihadists foster online authority; 
d) analyzing imagery as an online recruitment strategy;  
e) settling the role of children in jihadist online messages ‒ motherhood;  
f) discerning online female jihadists’ roles; 
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g) estimating the social jihadist network structure and women’s roles within 
those structures. 
 
Indeed, social digital settings (environmental), online learning (cognitive) and virtual 
networks (relational) are less exposed categories of female radicalization trajecto-
ries. This study by exposing those categories offers therefore a specific contribution 
to the field of Jihadist Strategic Studies. 
Before introducing the next section entitled ‘Conceptual Issues’, a brief note stat-
ing that they will appear in the subsequent chapters and they will be further detailed 
in the manner that they best explain the subjects in cause. That means that there 
are theoretical and conceptual reappearances to provide a more independent read-
ing of the dissertation. 
 
1.4 Conceptual issues 
 
I will briefly approach the following conceptual issues in the manner that they best 
represent the purposes of the present study. They will be used in a descriptive and 
general manner to inform the collected data and to enable the task of specifically 
approach the online roles of Spanish-speaking jihadist females. A cautionary note 
on the complexity of the phenomena and on its theoretical challenges must be ad-
vanced, or as Hegghammer (2017: 5) announced: “(…) whatever we are dealing with 
is slippery and is not easily captured by existing terminology.” The phenomenon is 
complex due to the violent nature of its ideology and due to the legal consequences 
of its criminal activities. Paraphrasing Boaz Ganor (2002), “one woman’s jihadist is 
another woman’s religious fighter”, that is, all these concepts have the power to 
mean all, or nothing. In the grey area of inconclusiveness, these concepts find a 
space where their dark and ambivalent nature gives room to an enlightened and 
irrefutable argument. However, people find comfort in labels and so do scholars 
who try to build definition fences around porous and elusive terms. 
In the next section, I will discuss these ‘conceptual ridges’ (Atran 2004: 267) that 
move along the academic fault lines and their own ‘ideological fissures’ (Moghadam 
& Fishman 2011) blocking definition alignments.  
 
1.4.1 Radicalization 
Radicalization is the first contested concept that relates to terrorism in terms of 
background and in terms of absence of a consensual definition. In fact, both con-
cepts are a “concept-attrape-tout” (Ducol 2015: 127), that is stretched too thin while 
trying to cover a myriad of situations, events and individuals that do not fit in one 
single taxonomy. A brief review of the existing academic works about radicalization 
reflects its complexion, polarization and sensitiveness. Browsing through the titles 
on radicalization, we may find expressions that better translate the difficulty of the 
subject: The Trouble with Radicalization (Neumann 2013); ‘Radicalization what does 
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it mean’ (Mandel 2009); ‘The radicalization puzzle: A theoretical synthesis of 
empirical approaches to homegrown extremism’ (Hafez & Creighton 2015); ‘The 
concept of radicalization as a source of confusion’ (Sedgwick 2010); ‘Why 
conventional wisdom on radicalization fails: The persistence of a failed discourse’ 
(Githens-Mazer & Lambert 2010); ‘Exclusion or culture? The rise and the ambiguity 
of the radicalization debate’ (Hörnqvist & Flyghed 2012). Trouble, meaning, puzzle, 
confusion, failure and ambiguity are noticeable categories in these titles that offer 
plenty of discussion space. The wide-spread dimension of the meaning of 
radicalization leads as well to the distinction between cognitive and behavioral 
radicalization, that is acquiring radical knowledge and being actively involved in 
violent acts (Brandon & Vidino 2012: 9; Marone 2017: 8). The separation between 
having radical ideas and being actively engaged in violent activities is the major 
scientific discussion in the field of radicalization (Neumann 2008; Ashour 2009; 
Veldhuis & Staun 2009; Bartlett, Birdwell & King 2010; Dalgaard-Nielsen 2010; 
Ranstorp 2010; Borum 2011; Schmid 2014). 
The debate between following pathways or profiles7 to better define the in-
volvement to individuals with terrorism is extent and has different currents of opin-
ions. 
Notwithstanding these debates, I want to emphasize that ‘all radicalization is lo-
cal’ (Coolsaet 2016), supported by local stories, local cultural references and local 
cultural capital. Spanish-speaking female jihadists promote their violent messages 
with practices that have symbolic references to their local audience and that ulti-
mately distinguish them from other jihadist groups. This distinction creates bonding, 
reinforces close and enclosed relationships and structures social rankings. All cate-
gories are key to understand the engagement, the recruitment efforts, and the mo-
tivation to participate in jihadist networks. 
Online radicalization aiming at engaging in violent acts, conducted either indi-
vidually or via the recruitment of others, is the scope and the theoretical delimitation 
of the present thesis. In this sense, I will adopt the definition presented by Brian M. 
Jenkins (2007: 2-3), where he distinguishes recruitment from radicalization but most 
                                                 
7 Pathways (Moghaddam 2005; Precht 2007; Gill 2008; Horgan 2008; McCauley & Moskalenko 
2008; Silke 2008; Bowman-Grieve 2010; Lennings et al. 2010; Coolsaet 2011; Vidino 2011; 
Bakker, Grol & Weggemans 2013; Edwards & Gribbon 2013; Hegghammer 2013; Torok 2013, 
2015; Koehler 2014; Weggemans, Bakker & Grol 2014; Reed, De Roy van Zuijdewijn & Bakker; 
2015; Soufan & Schoenfeld 2016; Marone 2017), or profiles (Russell & Miller 1977; Crenshaw 
1988; Silke 1998, 2000, 2002; Borum 2003, 2011, 2013; Charlesworth 2003; Ellmann 2003; 
Horgan 2003; Taarnby 2003; Reinares 2004; Nesser 2005, 2012; Victoroff 2005; Bakker 2006; 
Speckhard & Akhmedova 2006; Conway & McInerney 2008; Jacques & Taylor 2008, 2013; 
Bakker & De Graaf 2010; Spaaij 2010, 2012; Kydd 2011; McCauley & Moskalenko 2011; 
Pantucci 2011; Rae 2012; Simon 2013; Gill, Horgan & Deckert 2014; Gill 2015; Van Vlierden 
2015; Gill et al. 2017). 
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importantly where the author encompasses all the key conceptual elements that will 
be analyzed throughout this study,  
 
Radicalization comprises internalizing a set of beliefs, a militant mindset that em-
braces violent jihad as the paramount test of one’s conviction. It is the mental pre-
requisite to recruitment. Recruitment is turning others or transforming oneself into 
a weapon of jihad. It means joining a terrorist organization or bonding with like-
minded individuals to form an autonomous terrorist cell. It means going operational, 
seeking out the means and preparing for an actual terrorist operation – the ultimate 
step in jihad.’ 
 
Applying the above concept of radicalization to the female jihadist study would de-
liver the approximate definition, radicalization involves recognizing Salafi-jihadism 
(set of beliefs), disseminating its principles in a constant manner (militant mindset), 
engaging with violent behaviors, belonging to jihadist networks and directly contribute 
to its terrorist goals. 
 
1.4.2 Terrorism 
Terrorism is the second “contested concept” (Schmid 2004: 378) in terms of legal, 
political, religious, academic and military frameworks and within those same frame-
works has produced countless works that in order to portray all the diverse catego-
ries have “climbed too high on the ladder of abstraction” (Weinberg, Pedahzur & 
Hirsch-Hoefler 2004: 787). 
Until the present time, there is still an absence of definition that englobes all its 
historical transformations (Laqueur 1987: 1) because as any social phenomena it is 
constantly evolving, changing tactics and introducing new elements to its definition, 
therefore making the “struggle to define terrorism (…) sometimes as hard as the 
struggle against terrorism itself” (Ganor 2002: 304). If distinguished as a social phe-
nomenon, Peter Neumann advanced three main features to characterize terrorism: 
that is structure, aim and method (Neumann 2009: 14-16). In contrast, if understood 
as a method, Neumann suggests a possible definition of terrorism: “the deliberate 
creation of fear, usually through the use (or threat of use) of symbolic acts of vio-
lence, to influence the behavior of a target group” (Neumann 2009: 8). Bruce 
Hoffman, determined the causality between religious terrorism and the increase of 
fatal terrorist attacks (2006a: 88) attributing it to its “transcendental dimension” 
(2006a: 88), to the legitimation of violence as “sacramental act or divine duty” 
(2006a: 88) and to a deadly “sense of alienation” (2006a: 89). 
Along these theoretical lines, Peter S. Henne conducted a quantitative study to 
evaluate the role of religious violence upon suicide terrorism and the conclusion 
clearly confirmed his hypothesis that religious terrorism is indeed deadlier than 
other politically driven terrorist acts (Henne 2012: 52). James Piazza considers these 
violent performances as a ‘purifying act’, and a way of publicly communicating their 
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support of their ideological values (Piazza 2009: 64). This radical use of moral stand-
ards and extreme use of religious violence (Hoffman 2006a: 87) was seen in the 
morning of 9/11 in the United States, when large-scaled terrorist attacks marked the 
surge of a “new terrorism” (Tucker 2001: 1) by the hands of Al-Qaeda. “New global 
terrorism” says Charles Kegley (2008: 90-91) because of the deep transformations in 
its aim (exponential increase of indiscriminate violence), in its structure (global net-
works) and its methods (different and more lethal weaponry and high-tech commu-
nication, immediate publicity). 
Other authors developed the argument of the ‘new terrorism’ to the post-9/11 
and to the advent of globalization (Neumann 2009: 48; Spencer 2006: 38) and in-
herent to it, the transition to a “new transnational superterrorism” (Stepanova 2008: 
100). In fact, the advent of the terrorist networks or “networked terrorism” (Tucker 
2001: 9), electronically connected, sharing a “kind of ethnic cyberspace” (Juergens-
meyer 2000: 197) with close-knit bonding (Juergensmeyer 2000: 211; Stepanova 
2008: 136) and a grassroots process of recruitment resulted in a “leaderless jihad” 
(Sageman 2008: viii) in clear contrast to Al-Qaeda’s hierarchical organization. 
However, it was in the fatidic morning of 11 March 2004 in Madrid, when the 
capital’s commuting trains where targeted by explosives, ‘Al-Qaeda’s revenge’ 
(Reinares 2016), that the concept of terrorism was altered once again. It altered the 
nature, the composition and the structure of both the terrorist threat and of the 
terrorist networks who were involved in the attacks (Reinares 2010: 100). Moreover, 
it gave a new boost to the jihadi terrorism allowing it to enter its third wave8 
(Coolsaet 2016: 19). The fourth wave that starts in 2012 with the Syrian war (2016: 












Figure 1.4  Screenshot from Facebook (27 March 2016) 
 
Women’s direct participation in jihadist activities, either as entrepreneurs, gun hold-
ers (Figure 1.4) or recruiters, will exercise an influence on how scholars approach the 
issue of terrorism. 
                                                 
8 The first wave corresponds to 1996-2001, the second ending in 2005 (Coolsaet 2016: 19). 
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1.4.3 Jihadism 
Jihadism is therefore the third concept representing a fragmented phenomenon 
(Brachman 2009: 9), divided through its ‘endogenous fault lines’, identity, locations, 
cultures, networks, activities and doctrines (Moghadam & Fishman 2011: 3, 234). 
The fourth wave of jihadi terrorism or jihadism brings together “individuals from 
different groups” (Reinares 2010: 100), “through kinship and friendship bonds” 
(Coolsaet 2016: 19). The 11 March attacks were authored by “various bands of 
radicals based in Spain” (Jordán 2014: 7), who linked to Al-Qaeda and whose 
elements had personal and family connections (2014: 7). Amer Aziz, a Moroccan 
residing in Spain was the ‘middle manager’ (Neumann, Evans & Pantucci 2011: 829) 
between Al-Qaeda (leadership) and the terrorist network (grassroots) that authored 
the 11 March attacks (Reinares 2012: 1). He was also part of the Abu Dahdah cell 
(Spanish Al-Qaeda filial) and he was “a protegee of Setmarian’s at the Al Ghuraba 
training camp” (Cruickshank & Ali 2007: 9). Setmarian, or al-Suri (as he was born in 
Syria) is a key figure to understand the evolution of jihadi terrorism. Indeed, the ‘pen 
Jihadist’ (Nesser 2011: 191) lived and got married in Spain where he was accused of 
recruiting and training individuals to join Al-Qaeda. He later was considered the 
mastermind behind the ‘architecture of global jihad’ (Lia 2008) by introducing new 
strategies to the jihadist cause (Lentini 2013: 41-42). Chief among them, the urban 
guerrilla categories of ‘light gang warfare’, ‘urban terrorism’ (Abu Musab al-Suri 
2004) and the long lasting cornerstone category of ‘individual terrorism’ 
(Cruickshank & Ali 2007: 8). Al-Suri’s ‘Islamic jihadist manifesto’ (Lacey 2008) is be-
lieved by scholars and police forces to have been the inspiration to the Madrid at-
tacks and to the subsequent attacks of London, in July 2005. There were more ideo-
logical inspirations behind the 11 March operations, among them the Jordan, 
scholar, Abu Mohammed al-Maqdisi, Ibn Taymiyya and Mohammed Ibn Abd al-
Wahhab, thus reinforcing the influence of the doctrines of Wahhabism and Salafism 
(Nesser 2011: 31-34). Since the cell that attacked Madrid was largely composed by 
Moroccan jihadists (Alonso & Rey 2007: 581), it is logical that these were their points 
of reference. As a matter of fact, Wahhabism and Salafism entered Morocco through 
Saudi sponsorship and developed as an “endogenous radical Islamist ideology” 
(Alonso & Rey 2007: 573) that was directed to form a strict belief and practice of 
Salafi-jihadism (Alonso & Rey 2007: 580). 
Zooming into this specific concept, Salafi-jihadis are those who pursue Salafism, 
an Islamic current of thought built upon the core center theme of returning to the 
pious behavior of the Companions of the Prophet, or “(…) a philosophy that believes 
in progress through regression” (Maher 2016: 7). Salafism is a generic denomination 
that conceals a wide subset of ideological categories that differ in terms of strategy, 
propaganda (quietists or purists), political elections (politicos) and endogenous ji-
had (jihadis) but that subscribes jihad as a permissible Islamic principle 
(Wagemakers 2012a: 9). In the strict vision of Salafi-jihadis “(…) Jihad should not just 
be waged against invading or aggressive non-Muslim enemies but should also be 
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used in a revolutionary way against the ‘apostates’ rulers in their own midst” 
(Wagemakers 2012a: 9). However, Salafi-jihadists retrieve the spectrum of “intra-
Muslim violence” (Maher 2016: 76) by employing the legal Islamic act of excommu-
nication, or takfir, to expel the “nominal Muslims” from the “genuine Muslims” 
(Hafez 2010: 22), thus the individual is expelled because he was no longer a proper 
believer (Sedgwick 2012: 366). He is declared impure and “his blood is forfeit” (Kepel 
2006: 31). It is an ideological and self-contradicting strategy to religiously support 
violent acts that otherwise would not be theologically acceptable (Hafez 2010: 20).  
Women’s own emic definition of violent jihad is constructed upon the mandatory 
religious principle of exerting individual jihad. More than a women’s right to fight, 
the women understand jihad as their own duty to fight for, either in the role of 
disseminators, brokers or recruiters to the jihadist movement. 
 
1.4.4 Violence 
All concepts do find common ground on the subjective notion of legitimate use of 
violence, that in the field of religion finds another layer of subjectivity as they are 
viewed as “battles for justice” (Selengut 2003: 20). In a study from Schmid and 
Jongman (1988: 5), the authors came to the conclusion that violence represented 
83.5% of the defining categories of political terrorism. In turn, French sociologist, 
Farhad Khosrokhavar, worked with the principle that the culture of violence is 
“deeply ingrained in the jihadists’ minds” (Khosrokhavar 2016: 60) and religiously 
justified by the idea of a perpetual war between the Self and the Other. Violence in 
the Salafi-jihadist current is the relevant definition to this study. It encounters its 
reasoning in selected passages of the Qur’an (Moghadam 2008), and in scholars 
such as the ones from Saudi Arabia who “(…) provided the ideological justification 
for violence” (Al-Sarhan 2015: 190). The Spanish academic Rogelio Alonso also at-
tributes intellectual credits to radical theological Islamic sources to the validation, of 
a violent identity and a violent lifestyle (Alonso 2012: 473).  
When speaking in terms of identity, ‘many young second-generation Muslims 
born or raised in Western European countries’ are more prone to be allured by ‘in-
ward-looking Salafist congregations’ (Reinares 2017: 73) in social environments that 
include homes, mosques or prisons. Mark S. Hamm who developed a thorough 
study (2013) on the processes of radicalization in prisons has alerted to the critical 
ideological role of Salafi-jihadism in terrorist mobilization. A corollary the author 
designates by “prison Islam” (Hamm 2013: 60). Indeed, Hamm argues that ‘cultural 
communes’ that is, segregation, aggregation in jail wings by ethnicity (2013: 109) 
together with poor prisoner’s conditions and the circulating message of ‘prison Is-
lam’ are vital factors to the conversion of inmates to violent principles. Furthermore, 
‘prison Islam’, or jail wing jihadism, as I frame it, “provides a safe haven for gang 
members who have absolutely no interest in faith” (Hamm 2013: 145). If we take into 
consideration that returned jihadists are arrested upon their arrival in Europe, we 
can assess the magnitude which jail wing jihadism may reach in the coming years.  
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On the one side, on the ideological level, IS (and the terrorist cells affiliated to 
them) stands aligned with the Salafi-jihadist group, on the other side, on the 
operative level, they represent extreme violence and jihad in its defensive and 
offensive dimensions (Bunzel 2015b: 10). Prior to the declaration of the institution 
of the Islamic State in June 2014, Hans Kippenberg (2011: 164) had already advanced 
that the declaration of an Islamic state would be surrounded by the violent 
conviction that it “(…) is the execution of a divine commandment, and the believer 
is not responsible for the consequences that then ensue.” Nevertheless, in the words 
of (Lia 2015: 35-37) the lethality of the Islamic state “(…) is not necessarily suicidal 
behavior by religious fanatics (…)” but a tactic “(…) for future territorial expansion 
(…).” In fact, “the primary aim of the jihad is not, (…), the conversion by force of 
unbelievers, but the expansion – and also defense – of the Islamic state” (Peters 
1977: 3). To better sum up IS’s ideology and the state-of-the-art of the concept of 
jihadism, the words of Peter Nesser (2011: 174) apply perfectly to the present study, 
and more importantly they coincide with the perception of the women here 
portrayed: 
 
Sunni Muslim militant ideologies and movements calling for armed struggle ‘in the 
cause of God’ (jihad fisabil Allah), aiming to defend Muslim territories, to establish 
Islamic Emirates, and to re-establish the Caliphate.  
 
Female jihadists aligned with IS’s take on jihad in the path of God, but they carved 
their own way and their own meaning of violence. They are not the brides but the 
bridge-builders of jihadist networks. They are violent online jihadist entrepreneurs 
who deliberately run with the wolves. 
 
1.4.5 Digital jihadism 
Three years after the publication of the above-mentioned definition of jihad by Peter 
Nesser, the Caliphate was re-established and declared active. However, the most 
expressive part of the Caliphate continues to be its ‘online territories of terror’ 
(Prucha 2011), its virtual form of existence (Winter 2015a) and perpetuation of its 
violent propaganda, “between the sword and the pen” (Torres Soriano 2012: 782).  
A prior work by Dutch scholar Ruud Peters (1979: 119) named the last type as 
djihad al-lisan or djihad al-qalam (‘jihad of the tongue’ or ‘jihad of the pen’). ‘Jihad 
of the pen’ relates to djihad al-da’wa (‘peaceful educational jihad for non-Muslims’) 
and to djihad al-tarbiyah (‘educational jihad among Muslims’). Al-Qaeda’s or IS’s 
doctrines have however retrieved its original peaceful character and have attributed 
it a violent religious symbolism fastened with the principle of being an individual 
obligation (jihad fard al-ayn). Furthermore, “loyalty and disavowal” to the jihadist 
norms is common to both jihadist fighters and “internet jihobbyists” (Brachman 
2009: 22) as both types “obsess about the ways in which they can better apply al-
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Wala wal-Bara in their daily lives” (Brachman 2009: 22). In fact, internet, namely so-
cial media platforms have fostered ‘violent radical milieus’ since 2004 when al-
Zarqawi (Jordanian jihadist affiliated with Al-Qaeda) moved the fields of battle to 
the fields of bytes (Conway 2012: 6). For that reason, it adds the digital dimension 
to the three ‘constitutive dimensions’ elaborated by Armborst (2009: 52) of active 
dimension, discursive dimension and military dimension. By this logic, jihadism 
gained an unlimited territory with continuous production and a global audience that 
act as pull factors to engage more individuals. Those who indeed engage in jihadist 
networks have a ‘loose affiliation as media mujahideen’ (Fisher 2015) “and the 
distinction between supporter and membership is blurred” (Winter 2017: 9). 
Nevertheless, they are considered and rewarded as full-fledged physical jihadist 
fighters (Winter 2017: 12-14). Hence, online jihadist narratives through its “simplicity, 
plasticity and virtual” nature (Filiu 2011: 201) assure the omnipresence of jihadism 
online. 
Women as documented in the example above are confident in their roles of 
propagating digital jihad and through it recruiting other women to the jihadist 
cause. They have established their own digital method of alluring, grooming and 
recruiting new elements to the jihadist networks. 
 
1.4.6 Ritualization of jihad 
The main categories of Islamic rituals are the ‘shahada’, or the declaration of faith 
by which one becomes officially a Muslim, the ‘salat’ or prayer (performed five times 
a day), the ‘zakat’, the act of giving to the poor people of the Muslim community, 
‘sawm’, fasting, and ‘hajj’, the pilgrimage to the holy city of Mecca in Saudi Arabia.  
The Islamic rituals can be studied in the basis of three principles: spiritual sub-
mission, body conformity and purity. Blood determines family ties, birth and death. 
It purifies or stains the individual, it shapes rituals and it represents violence. The 
sanctity of blood is frequently depicted in the images of the dead jihadists where 
the bloody spilling reflects their highest physical religious tribute (Amrani 2015: 51). 
The images as the one below (Figure 1.5) serve the purpose of praising the death 











Figure 1.5  Screenshot from Facebook (23 June 2016) 
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The ‘ritualized body’ was defined by Catherine Bell as “a body invested with the 
‘sense’ of ritual” (1992: 98), the ‘ritualized body’ is in her vision a product of the 
dynamic relationship between ritualization and the ‘structuring environment’ (1992: 
98). Online space is the ‘structuring environment’ where ritualization occurs and pro-
duces the online ‘ritualized body’, however the task of describing the online embod-
ied is a theoretical challenge. 
Following online body representations and the communication through physical 
manifestations, Nanako Hayami questions “the significance of the ritualized body in 
the contemporary society” (2004: 5). He directs the answer to applications such as 
the ‘emotion icons’, symbols that represent ‘human facial expressions of feelings’ 
(2004: 6) because “even in the absence of the physical human face, the importance 
of the face remains.” 
Indeed, the representation of embodied in an online space is the subject of the 
works of Christine Hine. The author considers that ‘being online’ is another example 
of the “embodied ways of being and acting in the world” (Hine 2015: 14) and there-
fore “the Internet user is an embodied user” (2015: 43). David Bell (2001) in his book 
on cyber culture addresses the online body presence (2001: 156) with the terms 
‘digital meat’ and ‘the flesh made code’.  
According to the Islamic dogma, the performance of the rituals is anticipated by 
the act of voluntarily submitting (‘ibada’) them to the will of Allah, in other words, 
the believer engages the worship activities with the feeling of wanting to obey the 
divine laws.  
The feeling of obedience and respect for the rituals is succeeded by the physical 
ability to perform all the five pillars of Islam. The believer needs to have a sane body 
to the extent that Islamic jurisprudence dispenses people who have body disabilities 
or problems. At the same time, the body discipline required to execute the prayers 
is also an instrument to conform mind and spirit to the sake of the faith. The respect 
for and of the body is inserted in Islamic living via the Qur’an and maybe seen in 
themes such as funeral rites or the covering of intimate parts of the body (‘awra’). 
The last principle, the principle of purity (‘tahara’) concerns mind, physique and 
environment in a more specific form, all Muslims should have pure intentions (‘niya’), 
pure bodies (‘ghusl’) and a pure Islamic community (‘umma’). Here enter the 
utterances of jihad and of martyrdom as commands of Allah that belong to the ‘rit-
ual-purity’ themes (Gauvain 2013: 169). The linkage between purification rituals, 
blood and jihad shape the justification that the Salafi-jihadist ideology was in need 
to promote religious violence. 
I borrow the term ‘ritualization’ as defined by Catherine Bell (2009) because she 
achieved the grand task of analyzing and interrelating all relevant ritual theories and 
developing a holistic approach to ritual studies from which she developed the term 
‘ritualization’. It relates to the online performance developed by Spanish-speaking 
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jihadist women and to their digital strategy to foster power and authority relation-
ships with their audience, by distinguishing what is sacred and profane (Bell 2009: 
74).  
It is important to assess the role that religious arguments play online in a differ-
ent manner than offline, and why do they serve as an online tool for promotion of 
processes of radicalization and recruitment in predominant female digital environ-
ments. 
 
1.5 Local stories, local networks 
 
The above review of conceptual issues is a critical selection of notions and corre-
spondent theoretical frameworks that define and delimit the scope of this study. The 
concepts have the general purpose of providing the reader with contextualization 
and tools for understanding the online roles and stories of Spanish-speaking female 
jihadists. 
I begin with a transnational story. There is considerable and generalized interest 
in IS as a general category referring to all jihadist groups. The transnational story of 
IS becomes the transnational story of current jihadism in general. However, that is 
incorrect, some groups are rivals, others cooperate, and at times, alliances and 
rivalries change and invert their initial status. In that sense, during my research I 
encountered data stating the online connections between Spanish-Moroccan ji-
hadists with the Free Syrian Army group and with the Ahrar al-Sham group, among 
other jihadist factions operating in the territories of the Caliphate. In fact, there are 
different kinds of jihadist groups and IS represents one faction of the global jihadist 
movement. Within IS there are several subgroups that are distinguished by different 
aspects, such as ethnicity or language. Reinares and García-Calvo (2018: 5) mention 
the ‘francophone cadre’ that promotes a transnational connection between French-
speaking jihadists and the jihadist attacks in Spain in 2017. The convergence of these 
jihadists with Spanish-speaking jihadists was visible in their joint presence in the 
Emni structure of IS. Emni was the ‘intelligence’ gathering service and it was “the 
crucial cog in the group’s terrorism machinery” (Callimachi 2016) and direct involve-
ment in terrorist attacks around the globe (Vidino, Marone & Entenmann 2017: 66). 
One example of the practical results of this linguistic connection can be observed in 
the online role played by Guitone (as seen in Chapter 1, Section 1.2). As a French-
Moroccan foreign fighter who was fluent in several languages, including Spanish, 
Guitone produced videos and online stories that continue to be sources of ‘inspira-
tion’ for other jihadists. His social status was objectified in his appearance (good 
looking young man), embodied in his foreign-fighter behavior (he was the individual 
that other jihadists wanted to be around) and later immortalized in his death (ac-
cording to witness reports he died ‘bravely’ on the battlefield). His online media role 
due to his social status keeps on being determinant to bring together the ‘franco-
phone cadre’ jihadists with the Spanish-speaking jihadists, using for that purpose 
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the argument of their common ethnicity link, to Morocco. As it was previously men-
tioned in Section 1.2, in one of Guitone’s videos he threatened Spain and promoted 
the re-conquest of the lands of Al-Andalus. What is remarkable about this video is 
that Guitone speaks in Spanish, a deliberate act to engage Spanish-speaking ji-
hadists, and invoked kinship (‘nuestros abuelos’, our grandparents in Spanish) to 
establish the emotional bonding between his audience and his message. 
It is therefore important to observe how language co-determines subcultural 
capital (social status), how it correlates with the flow of information (social interac-
tion) and how it structures networks (social hierarchies). The higher the density and 
the cohesion of the network, the more it relies on ‘local linguistic norms’ (Beyer & 
Schreiber 2017) to communicate and share local experiences and stories. 
The use of Spanish is an important delimitation of the scope of my research. On 
the one hand, this was an intentional decision as little research has focused on Span-
ish-speaking jihadists. On the other hand, Spanish is also intentionally used as a 
jihadist tool, because it is employed by jihadist women to unify and expand their 
audience. As is well known, the Moroccan language situation is complex, with sev-
eral actively used languages and dialects that are not understandable to everyone. 
Therefore, in the same way that jihadist propaganda is disseminated in English to 
capture a wider group of people on social media platforms, the Spanish jihadist 
women use a lingua franca to expand their audience. The strategy aims in general 
at including all Moroccan women living in Spain but also, and in particular, at in-
cluding Spanish women and among them, first and foremost Spanish women who 
converted to Islam. The strategy also allows reaching out to Latin-American Face-
book users who share the knowledge and the use of the Spanish language. 
As a result, Spanish is being employed as an efficient linguistic tool for commu-
nication and the recruitment of other women into the Spanish-Moroccan Jihadist 
Network. 
In the specific case of this study, ability to speak Spanish, having Moroccan eth-
nicity, having a migration background and knowledge of local shared stories char-
acterize this specific network in terms of their subcultural capital. In the expression 
of Ken Gelder (2005: 187) “subcultural capital confers status on its owner in the eyes 
of the beholder” and combined with network communication skills ensures the 
transfer of information among individuals. In other words, subcultural capital con-
fers online social ranking to female jihadists, and their selected social media plat-
forms generate networks of power and knowledge (Gelder 2005: 188). It is therefore, 
important to understand how they achieve that status and how this status is used for 
engagement and recruitment into online processes of radicalization. 
Before we advance into the specific mechanisms of engagement and online re-
cruitment it is important to note that these processes breed social structures that 
reflect ‘real world’ acquaintances, based on trust and honor codes. They contribute 
to the formation of a dense, closed network with strong emotional bonding and 
strong ties.  
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Online group identity construction in the Spanish-Moroccan Jihadist Network 
was based on sharing posts on local cultural products and in repeated online per-
formances that reinforced the distinctive features of their local network and rein-
forced their cohesion. However, I have to point out that once in the Caliphate, 
women would be ‘hidden’ and their presence could only be inferred by gendered 
categories such as birth (photos of newborn babies) or food (preparation of meals 
as a primarily female task). 
Birth was displayed in multiple posts with men holding their newborn babies. It 
was to them important to present a new generation of fighters being born in the 
Caliphate, a clear online propaganda gimmick to positively advertise life in their 
controlled territory. Indeed, men would be showcased smiling, cuddling, proudly 
posing alongside their babies, and/or alongside small children. Among the Spanish-
Moroccan jihadists, these emotive displays of babies and/or children would be 
without direct violent references. But the same could not be said for example about 
the Tunisian jihadists who were eager to picture their babies and/or children 
surrounded by hand-grenades and weapons. 
Food, understood as a cultural product, was also differentiating jihadists and 
their shared stories. For example, Nutella’s availability in the Caliphate was not 
relevant to the Spanish-Moroccan jihadists, as they did not have previous cultural 
references to it, in opposition to jihadists who were coming from France, or Belgium. 
For Spanish-Moroccan jihadists it was important, at the end of the week, to post 
images of steaming trays of couscous, a reference to the Moroccan custom of eating 
this traditional plate, every Friday after the ‘al-jumm’ah’ prayer. Other common food 
imagery reflecting local cultural products in the Spanish-Moroccan Jihadist Network 
would be mint tea, bread and barbeques. French female jihadists, on the other hand, 
would display photos of crêpes, and Dutch female jihadists of the national favorite 
licorice candy, ‘dropjes’.  
Football was revealed as another important and male cultural category. Those 
who had not yet travelled to the Caliphate territory would post pictures of games 
and tag the foreign fighters who had already left. It was also frequent to see profile 
names and images indicating a football club affiliation (Real Madrid and Barcelona 
were the most popular), admired football players (usually from the Spanish Football 
League) or preferred football coaches (Jose Mourinho as the ‘special one’). Although 
France, The Netherlands and Belgium are also known for their predilection of foot-
ball, I did not encounter similar posts among their jihadists. 
Fishing and swimming were other sports-related male categories that appeared 
frequently in Spanish-Moroccan jihadists’ Facebook accounts. Activities that they 
used to engage in before their migration seemed to carry a symbolic meaning for 
them, and contributed to their group bonding function. The constant tagging be-
tween those who had not yet migrated and those who were already in the Caliphate 
was important for promoting and maintaining a sense of normalcy of life in a war 
scenario, a sense of bridging the online and real worlds, and above all a perpetuation 
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of local performances. Upon their enactment, these local performances reproduced 
local stories and strengthened network cohesion because they resonate familiar sit-
uations using familiar language. It is a clear soft power strategy with direct recruit-
ment impact. At the same time, some of them, reflect gendered online constructs 
and offer a glimpse of the actual life of these women after their migration. 
In what refers to literature on subcultural capital, there is a gap concerning the 
Spanish-Moroccan Jihadist Network. In the specific case of the Moroccan contingent 
that was estimated by the local authorities to number circa 1,500 foreign fighters, 
publications on the matter are not abundant. Moreover, these publications are nor-
mally based on secondary sources or focused on ‘push and pull factors’ that explain 
the roots of jihadist affiliation and the routes Moroccan jihadists followed until they 
became part of IS’s network structure (Mashab 2015). Empirical studies on the daily 
life and online activities of these fighters, as well of the Spanish-speaking fighters, 
are only represented in two publications, ‘Nuestros Jihadistas – part I’, ‘Nuestros 
Jihadistas – part II’, by the investigative journalist Chema Gil (J.M.G. Garre) in 2014, 
proving the valuable of the present thesis. 
While subcultural capital, local cultural products and shared language distinguish 
jihadist groups from each other, support their local stories and build up strong ties 
among them, it would be useful for future studies to consider the stories that re-
turned foreign fighters bring with them and share with like-minded people.  
It is useful to discuss this problematic in the context of the next waves of ji-
hadism. Picking up where we left off in Section 1.4.3, with the concept of a fourth 
wave of jihadism, we can advance to those new waves. According to Neumann 
(2016: 173), a new fifth wave came to shore in 2014 when the war against IS became 
a global enterprise and its consequences were deeply felt by Counterterrorist Forces 
in Europe (Neumann 2016: 174). Now that the physical war is no longer that signif-
icant, a new set of problems emerged from the (possible) return of foreign fighters 
to Europe. Legal, social, intelligence and security problems aggravate the already 
complex work of counter-terrorism services.  
Consequently, critical reflections will also be necessary to grasp the amplitude of 
the breaking wave caused by the return of foreign fighters to domestic European 
soil. As the report of the AIVD (General Intelligence and Security Service) suggests, 
the return of female jihadists is a ‘threat not to be underestimated’ for three reasons 
(AIVD 2017: 8): 
 
1. They were in the combat zone for a longer time; 
2. They were exposed to jihadist ideology longer; 
3. They have a bigger international jihadist network. 
 
The added challenge is the acute need to contextualize the (mis)use and (mis)inter-
pretation of Islamic terms, the ‘live-streaming’ ability of IS to produce current, up-
dated violent contents, and the persistent gap in the literature on online gender 
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jihadism. This last point leads us to the next section where I propose a new branch 
of terrorism studies. 
 
1.6 Gender jihadi strategic studies 
 
Finally, this study in a general sense is an empirical exploitation of the subject of 
online gender jihadism. Deconstructed into separate units, gender jihad and online 
jihad have been the object of previous scientific studies; however, the study of online 
gender jihad is still limited in number of produced studies.9 It is of course important 
to note in between these works the ones that actually attribute agency to the jihadist 
women online and those who identify them as passive participants. 
In May 2004, just after the Madrid jihadist attacks, the Norwegian scholars, 
Brynjar Lia and Thomas Hegghammer (2004: 369), suggested in a co-written article 
that more attention should be given to the genre of online jihadist militant literature.  
In the line of the suggestion of Lia and Hegghammer, this dissertation contrib-
utes in general to the genre of online jihadism studies and gives a more specifically 
contribution in order to create a new topic of study, the online gender jihadist stra-
tegic studies. The topic may further the existent knowledge on how female online 
jihadist roles are an important part of the asymmetrical jihadist militant strategy. 
As any strategy studies, gaining direct intelligence on the enemy, or ‘skyping 
with the enemy’ (Erelle 2015) are crucial because “knowledge must become capa-
bility” (Von Clausewitz 1984: 147). However, in order to establish reliable scientific 
productions, future studies should keep the empirical methodological trajectory, 
that is they have to keep on being supported by primary data. Along these meth-
odological lines, online gender jihadist strategic studies, as any other new branch of 
research, will have the capability of generating original methodologies, results and 
of opening up new venues of discussion.  
 
1.7 Facebook – Newsfeed update 
 
Facebook was chosen as the digital environment for this study because of the few 
available studies and the corresponding gap in the literature. Even to this day, the 
great majority of academic works tend to be anchored on Telegram and/or Twitter. 
In terms of the literature produced in 2017 on digital jihadism, we can see that most 
studies have looked mostly at Twitter. 
Facebook is more than an online space constructed as sacred, as it will be dis-
cussed in Chapter 2, Section 3. Facebook is, similar to Twitter, an official administra-
                                                 
9 Al-Lamia, Hoskins & O’Loughlin 2012; Halverson & Way 2012; Bloom 2013; Pearson 2015; 
Alexander 2016; Conway 2016; Huey & Witmer 2016; Manrique et al. 2016; Peladeau 2016; 
Witmer 2016. 
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tive province of the Online Caliphate, a ‘wilayat’ (Pearson 2017: 5). Online, its mem-
bers declared their own allegiance, ‘baqiya’, to IS ideology and activities on several 
occasions, by posting photos of themselves against the background of IS’s black 
banner, with the right hand indexed finger raised indicating their belief in the one-
ness of God (tawhid). This is a ritualistic performance which explains why, after any 
jihadist inspired terrorist attacks, academics rush to find evidence of this meaningful 
moment as it will attribute authorship of the attack to IS. 
Another important aspect, and inherent limitation to conducting research on 
Facebook, is the fluctuation of the number of active members online. Due to the 
sensitive and violent character of the contents that are produced, shared or com-
mented on by Spanish-speaking jihadist women, two scenarios occur on Facebook. 
On the one hand, their accounts are subjected to temporary and/or permanent dis-
ruptions but on the other hand, the female users anticipate this and open simulta-
neous accounts. This second scenario, multiple accounts being managed by one 
singular user, is in general easily verified because the user explicitly identifies herself 
and announces the opening of new accounts in order to keep the same ‘friends’ 
and/or ‘followers’.  
The variation of numbers of users represented in the research mirrors the evolu-
tion of Facebook as a social media platform, the constraints of surveillance and cen-
sorship, and increased online control of violent content production and dissemina-
tion. Despite the technical disruptions of jihadist content, an important notion 
emerges from this context: the coherence, consistency and continuity of the core 
violent message. These communication features step up their ‘online resilience’, the 
strive to keep, preserve and manage an online active presence in spite of the also 
coherent, consistent and continuous efforts by Facebook administrators to delete 
them and to halt their viral online dissemination. 
Allied to the notion of ‘online resilience’ is the notion of ‘online survivability’: 
leaving a digital footprint that surpasses the longevity of the Facebook account. In 
a nutshell, online jihadist profiles may be long gone but the contents that promote 
processes of radicalization will still be available online to allure and engage others. 
The silver lining is that this digital archive also aids researchers in their task of con-
ducting reflexive practices with the objective of achieving preventive, predictive and 
prescriptive analysis.  
In order to better grasp the online roles of Spanish-speaking female jihadists on 
Facebook, I have combined techniques emanating from Digital Ethnography with 
elements of Grounded Theory. The combination of Virtual Ethnography and 
Grounded Theory was labeled ‘virtual grounded theory’ by Carmen Becker, who con-
ducted online research on Dutch and German Salafist forums (Becker 2013: 72). Al-
though I agree with the concept, I prefer to name it Digital Grounded Theory.  
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Nevertheless, and as other authors suggest, “there is no grand theory of radical-
ization that can explain all processes (…) the soundest approach in trying to under-
stand radicalization is a multidisciplinary one” (Vidino, Marone & Entenmann 2017: 
77). 
Taking this in mind, we can adopt the view that “ethnography as an approach is 
always methodologically flexible and adaptive, regardless of its context” (Varis 2017: 
61) and that these are advantages “of particular use to us now, considering the 
speed and scope of change that digitalization has brought to social interaction” 
(Varis 2017: 63). 
The Grounded Theory principle that “all is data” (Glaser 2001: 145) implies the 
inclusion of previous literature on the subject being studied, hence the continuing 
impact of the key classical works that have created theories that have withstood the 
test of times and that in our case above all withstood the test of terrorism’s fast 
evolution. Literature review has been inserted into the various chapters, and refer-
ences were selected to illustrate their specific scopes. Nevertheless, there is a rec-
ognized gap on literature related to the nexus of gender and violence in general 
and on online gendered violence in particular. In 2015, Edwin Bakker and co-author 
Seran de Leed addressed the literature gap in the title of their article, labelling it as 
‘under researched’. A year later, the problem remained (Conway 2016: 13), and 2017 
brought no visible changes in the opinion of Pearson (2017: 4), “Studies on how 
gender factors in online radicalization are still in their infancy, and there are calls for 
further research." 
In the specific case of Spain, one crucial reference to the concepts of gender-
violence-digital is the work of Carola García-Calvo (2017), ‘There is no life without 
jihad and no jihad without hijrah’: The jihadist mobilisation of women in Spain, 2014-
2016’.  
Related to the fast pace of jihadism is the idea that ‘all is data at all time’, mean-
ing that practicing digital ethnography implies being aware of the “24-hour news 
cycle” (Conway et al. 2017: 22) of online jihadist production. It also implies immers-
ing oneself in the data to know “what is going on in the research scene is the data” 
(Glaser 2001: 145), being online to “read and watch on the screen (...) all the time, 
even on the go” (Varis 2017: 63). These mobile and digital practices require being in 
the field in a disciplined, frequent and “sensorily embodied” (Postill & Pink 2012: 
128) way in order to capture the immediacy feature inherent to jihadism.  
However, the urgent pace of jihadism should not impose a fast pace of academic 
analysis. Time is needed for reflective practices that encompass this historical pre-
sent phenomenon in the optimal way. In June 2017, the following sentence was 
valid, “51 successful attacks throughout Europe and North America from June 2014, 
when the Caliphate was declared, until June 2017” (Vidino, Marone & Entenmann 
2017: 15). Fast-forward a couple of months and the number of jihadist attacks in-
creased to 55 (assuming the authors did not included the stabbings in London, on 
the 3rd of June 2017). The number of occurrences and the reduced time distance 
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between them are producing profound changes in society, “as some of the details 
and even core facts of many of the attacks that have taken place in the West over 
the last three years are still unknown, not just to academics and analysts but also to 
law enforcement and intelligence agencies” (Vidino, Marone & Entenmann 2017: 
21). 
The motivations, the causes and the processes surrounding jihadism as a current 
violent phenomenon are not entirely disclosed, nor fully understood, thus empiri-
cally based analysis seemed a fitting, sensitive and maximally comprehensive ap-
proach. Throughout the various chapters, I will mention the methodological steps 
that were employed to approach Facebook as an online field of research. 
This unique online field is dynamic and complex and thus a singular method 
approach would deliver a monochromatic analysis and would never give us a com-
prehensive study. There are of course pitfalls in employing a multimodal approach, 
such as the dispersion of techniques, the effort needed to execute all methods per-
fectly and with equal dedication, and the necessity to prove the validity of new meth-
odological designs. True to the matter, new methodological designs are the fruit of 
the researcher’s own identity, the capacity to seize the scientific opportunities, the 
courage to select different paths, and the creativity to generate new forms to harvest 
data in the least expected fields. 
By noting the methodological limitations I experienced while conducting re-
search on Facebook, I will further the understanding of this online environment and 
highlight its potential for both research possibilities and new digital ethnographic 
practices. The sum of the application of these methods, practices and creative solu-
tions may in general inspire new scientific venues for digital ethnography, and in 
particular, it may prompt the surge of more studies centered primarily on Facebook. 
 
1.8  The structure of the dissertation 
 
These introductory considerations bring us to the foundational principles that have 
guided the structure of the present thesis. Though various sub-topics will appear, 
the overarching theme is that the online radicalization processes of Spanish-speak-
ing female jihadists are built upon violent Salafi-jihadist beliefs that promote terror-
ism. In Chapters 3 to 7, I have indicated each time the role of this ideology in the 
processes of online radicalization. 
As the screenshot in Figure 1.6 shows, the invitations to Salafist groups were 
unspectacular and lacked any specific violent ideological attributes. They attract an 
audience by inviting them to learn more about ‘true’ Islamic principles. 
Significantly, Salafi-jihadism is a neologism according to Shiraz Maher (2016: 16), 
a Western construction that reinforces security measures. The same can be said 
about jihadism and terrorism as both serve the need to label criminal acts against 
society. Indeed, as previously mentioned, there are different classifications of Salafi-
jihadism: for some it is a violent branch of Salafism that endorses terrorism, while 
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for others it is a social movement that rebels against Western societies and that 













Figure 1.6  Screenshot from Facebook (October 2014) 
 
However, in whatever category it may fall, “anyone who goes looking for potential 
terrorists will find them among the Salafists” (Neumann 2016: 5). To which I will add: 
“they will find them among the Salafi-jihadist supporters”, a sentence that I heard 
frequently when I conducted a new fieldwork incursion in Spain in October 2017. I 
intentionally chose to interview two leading figures of Muslim communities who 
were not in any way connected with Morocco. Both (one a Mauritanian Imam and 
the other a Spanish converted woman) were outspoken in their criticism of Salafi-
jihadist Imams in Spain, to whom they attributed full responsibility for disseminating 
violent messages to their followers. With the terrorist attacks of August 2017 still 
very fresh in their minds, their testimony and opinion were clearly infested by emo-
tion and repudiation of Salafi-jihadist sermons. This leads us to the conclusion that 
both digital data as well as the ‘real-world’ data that were collected at the beginning 
of this study keep their analytical value. 
Taking this into consideration, the structure of the thesis displays on the one 
hand the chronological elaboration of this research, and on the other hand a time-
line of the online processes of radicalization of Spanish-speaking jihadist women 
that are anchored in Salafi-jihadist ideology. The online processes of radicalization 
could be synthetized in Figure 1.7. 
As it happens, we will observe the life-cycle events that transform these women 
from ‘online okhti’ (Login and Learning) to ‘online recruiters’, while at the same time 
pondering how they position themselves in the digital environments (Liking), how 
they construct their online authority (Lecturing and Luring) and how they make sense 
of their biographical stand as mothers and educators and their own pursuit of vio-
lence (Leading).  
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In the final phases of the process of online radicalization (Linking), the women 
perform their roles as jihadist entrepreneurs, recruiting new individuals and con-
necting them to the jihadist networks. This ties up perfectly, in terms of chronolog-
ical sequence, with the existent literature that focuses on data emerging from ar-


















Figure 1.7  The online processes of radicalization 
 
The dissertation is divided into seven chapters and a conclusion, and follows the 
chronological development of female online jihadist roles. As a matter of fact, the 
structure mirrors the chronological development of the research project, a timeline 
that basically coincides with the ‘real time’ online process of radicalization of Span-
ish-speaking jihadist women in general, and in particular, with the process of Samira 
Yerou. The story of Samira, the first Spanish woman convicted for her jihadist role 
and her activities in a jihadist network, is shared with the objective of offering a real 
case scenario that the readers can relate to the different chapters, hence gaining a 
privileged insight into the subject. Chapter 3 to Chapter 7 include a page that 
contains a simulation of a Facebook timeline to display the chronological sequence 
of the chapters and the related situational context. 
After the completion of the methodological part, and the situational survey, I 
move on to the ethical implications of doing online research on such a sensitive 
subject.  
It is noteworthy to point out the decision to conduct digital and classic ethno-
graphic incursions and as so to illustrate the intrinsic value of multimodal ap-
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phases of jihadism as we know it today, that is, the pre-Caliphate phase, the Cali-
phate and the downing of the Caliphate phase. 
In fact, using a multimodal methodological approach I evaluated and assessed 
the representative moments and the mechanisms these women pursue to engage 
jihadist roles, from the moment that they have an open account on a social media 
platform and start to participate in online activities, up to the moment that they 
construct their own online jihadist roles as brokers and entrepreneurs within their 
networks. 
The chapters examine how women make made sense of their online jihadist roles 
and activities, how they assume control of their messages and of their own violent 
path to God. In specific, the chapters examine how the female online jihadist prop-
aganda persuades Spanish-speaking women to be involved with jihadist networks 
and to pursue violent jihadist objectives. 
In the conclusion, I will reflect upon the empirical findings, the results, the hope 
for impact of this study on further expansion of the field of online gender jihadism, 
and possible intervention strategies. 
Academic works are valid as long as they offer analytical tools and pragmatic 
measures that have valorization potential. Hence, I use the last two sections of the 
conclusion to reflect on intervention strategies. Understanding society means un-
derstanding the limitations of our knowledge. 
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Login – Gaining access to the field 
2.1 Digital Grounded Theory  
My dissertation is set to bridge the gap on how women become online jihadist en-
trepreneurs and therefore to disclose the mechanisms and contents that bring suc-
cess to their violent goals. The alliance between online and offline fields of research 
provided a wide range of information and facilitated the triangulation of my data. I 
could in fact test the consistency, or not, between contents and narratives used in 
both fields (online and offline) in order to initiate processes of violent radicalization. 
Thus, a robust data collection was systematically collected during the period of five 
years delivering a unique insight into the underdeveloped theme of women as ji-
hadist agents. Hence, and following the dynamic lines of Grounded Theory methods, 
‘steady movement between concept and data’ (Lawrence & Tar 2013: 30) was per-
formed, in both fields, offline and online, in order to code, compare, clarify, and 
control the results. 
Grounded Theory was designed by Glaser and Strauss (1967) with the purpose 
of developing a suitable method for empirical studies. It is founded on the principle 
that data informs the theory from the moment that the researcher identifies the 
main question of the study. Figure 2.1 exemplifies the trajectory when using this 














Figure 2.1. Spanish-speaking female jihadist digital analysis 
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The first step implies that the researcher enters the field (step 1) without pre-defined 
ideas or assumptions. The second step (step 2) is the most challenging: to find Face-
book accounts that fit the jihadist affiliation criteria and that will allow the process 
of snowball sampling. 
In the following step (step 3), the researcher’s default attitude will be to assume 
that “all is data” (Glaser 2001: 145), from the visual aspects to the preferred forms of 
texts, all contents, all profiles, all online accounts contain meaningful social and be-
havioral patterns. That gives rise to a large data set, which needs to be filtered and 
assessed (step 4) according to its relevance to the scope of the research. Another 
strategy to collect data on Facebook is to trace and collect social metadata, tags, 
likes, sharing, and lists of friends (step 5). The patterns that emerge from the col-
lected data, deliver critical codes (step 6) to analyze the online female jihadist roles 
(step 7) and to confirm in a conservative way the validity of their Facebook accounts 
as jihadist online profiles (step 8). Once these processes of engaging with violent 
extremism were determined and the profiles were validated, it is time to structure 
their jihadist network (step 9). The last step (step 10) is to conserve and keep data 
that will not be useful in the context of the research and that may be relevant in 
future studies. 
 
2.2 Digital jihadist profiles 
It comes with the territory while conducting Digital Ethnography that the researcher 
will be confronted with the perennial question about the authenticity of the inform-
ants. I find it interesting as ‘deception and detection’ are even found on the scientific 
study of natural sciences (Barnes 1994: 57) and they are for sure part of social sci-
ences (1994: 59). There is of course, an element of ‘fiction’ (Geertz 1968: 154) in all 
performances, offline and online. But ‘it is this fiction–fiction, not falsehood, that lies 
at the heart of successful anthropological field research (…).’ Moreover, I was inter-
ested in learning about the meaning of their online performance on Facebook, the 
authenticity of their online production. Authenticity is as so, here understood in its 
emic sense, that is how these women perspective their online jihadist performance 
and the meaning they attribute to it. 
Although the focus of this dissertation were female jihadists, I have also regis-
tered their interactions with male jihadists. The decision led to a better characteri-
zation of the data on female jihadists and to the inclusion of data concerning male 
children and male teenagers. I have only come across data concerning female chil-
dren while conducting digital research on Tumblr, thus this is a clear and significant 
knowledge gap in jihadist Studies. 
Once the observed individuals would match the criteria to be considered ji-
hadists, their list of ‘friends’ (in the cases it was possible) was exhaustively analyzed 
reaching to a total of 72,665 profiles. A time-consuming task, especially when done 
manually, and simultaneously a task to be completed in a short time considering 
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that these types of accounts tend to be blocked/deleted also in a short period of 
time. The 72,665 profiles were analyzed to see if they could match the criteria and 
then they would be added to the network (snowball sampling method).  
The number of informants varied according to the situational context that was 
playing at the time of the research. In the pre-Caliphate period and until the decla-
ration of the institution of the Caliphate in the summer of 2014, the number of open 
profiles or individuals willing to talk about their jihadist affiliation was at the highest 
on Facebook.  
After the Paris attacks of 13 November 2015, the number of open profiles, or of 
people willing to share their jihadist views, went down compared to the previous 
period. From then on, the only possible way to carry out my research was through 
the monitoring of public profiles accounts on Facebook. At the same time, many 
women at this stage of the events changed their privacy status from public to pri-
vate. The women who maintained their profiles as public irrespective of the evolving 
situational context are the ones who perform online propaganda dissemination 
roles and who, for that reason, must keep reaching out to a wide online audience. 
At this moment of my research, it made sense to try to visualize the entire Span-
ish-speaking jihadist network. That meant, of course, including male Facebook users 
who were part of this network. 
From the sum of profiles, a conservative universe of 360 active profiles were con-
sidered as the most suitable sample group in accordance to the scope of the re-
search. By conservatively, I mean I included only profiles that could be confirmed as 
sharing, producing, or consuming jihadist ideology in a consistent and frequent 
manner, and whose social metadata clearly indicated their jihadist affiliation. 
To come to that number, I started with the first Spanish-speaking jihadist woman 
I had encountered on Facebook and whose online profile matched all featured items 
of the criteria exemplified in Chapter 3. I continued to filter and to design her lines 
of relationships in order to achieve a clear visualization of the online Spanish-Mo-
roccan Jihadist Network. Once the visualization was complete, I gained thorough 
understanding of the importance of the sample of these 360 people and their con-
nections to the terrorist attacks that occurred in Europe.  
The limitations, such as possible loss of data not collected on time, or profiles 
that were overviewed, are the natural result of using only manual methods of profile 
selection and of it being a one-person task. In the end, a considerable amount of 
data was archived with a preliminary attribution of a code and it will be the basis of 
future analysis.  
After repeatedly employing the method of snowball sampling throughout fe-
male jihadist accounts on Facebook, I started to come across the same profiles, 
meaning not only that this method applied to this specific group performing in this 
specific social media platform had exhausted its potential subjects but that it had 
also exhausted the coverage of their contents. What follows in the table below is a 
representation of the grand codes and their respective sub-themes who provide 
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orientation to understand the structure of the Spanish-speaking jihadist message 
circulating online. 
 
Table 2.1 Visualization of coding 
 
Gender Caliphate Digital Religion Profiles Networks 
Women 
Men 









Communications Facebook Hijra Gender Clusters 
 Italian Weaponry Facilitators 
 Male 
 Female 
Salafism Location Roles 
 French Transports  Female issues 
 Clothing 
 Advices 
Education Extra notes 
 Portuguese 
 
Administration Telegram Prayer Profession  
 British 
 
Location Twitter Advice Migration 
status 
 
 South-American Free Syrian Army 
Ahrar al-Sham 
Surveillance Sacred texts Family ties  
 North-American Children   Last post  
 African 
 
Cookery   Language  






 Group photos 
    
 
In order to answer the main research question, on how do Spanish-speaking jihadist 
women construct their online roles, I have attempted to make sense of the contents 
produced, shared and consumed by jihadist women and to make sense of online 
environments as both ‘radical milieus’ (Conway 2012: 4) and as ‘sacred spaces’. Thus, 
that led to how they used the digital affordances to construct their online religious 
authority roles. 
As a matter of fact, digital affordances and online environments promoted the 
development of online female roles that in any other offline social context would be 
more difficult to achieve. Therefore, Facebook with its direct communication skills 
and communication exchanges made it possible for this particular set of population 
to gather themselves as a sisterhood with the digital concrete goals of disseminating 
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violent jihadist contents in order to engage and recruit new elements to the Global 
Jihad Front. 
As so, I will analyze how jihadist women exploit the digital affordances of Face-
book to establish robust ‘online networking skills’ (Hsieh 2012) that produce tight 
bonding, bridging and highly praised social capital that is reflected upon traditional, 
face-to-face relationships. In the regard of Wellman and Gulia (1997: 10) online 
communities have identical ‘strong ties’ that promote ‘frequent, companionable and 
voluntary’ contact among the participants. 
 
2.3 Digital participation 
Before I delve into the importance of digital affordances, it is important to discuss 
the digital participation of Spanish-speaking female jihadists. First of all, they have 
to overcome cultural and religious obstacles that sanction spaces were inter-gender 
relationships are possible. Second, they have to overcome the economic circum-
stance of being able to afford the costs of smart technology devices and internet 
connection. Third, they have to overcome the educational obstacle of having 
enough computer, media and digital literacy in order to navigate through the dif-
ferent online systems. 
The combination of computer literacy (capacity to work with computers and/or 
laptops), media literacy, or the evolving dynamic between discourse, skills and au-
thority (Livingstone 2004: 12) and digital skills (how individuals ‘engage with infor-
mation and communication technologies’ to achieve their goals (Hargittai & 
Walejko 2008: 252)) has indeed increased the digital participation of the female ji-
hadists represented in this study. However, digital participation, easier access to 
technologies and digital affordances, as Hargittai and Hinnant (2008: 618) have sug-
gested, will not deliver, per se, a solution to ‘potential sources of inequality’, nor to 
the digital divide experienced by female jihadists.  
Despite these obstacles, female jihadists have bridged digital inequality and have 
generated social regard, belonging, knowledge among their digital connections, a 
fact that can be explainable via their ‘strong motivations’ (Van Deursen et al. 2017: 
471) to attain their jihadist objectives.  
Those strong motivations were part of Samira Yerou’s staircase to mobilization. 
Her process of radicalization began in Tetouan, in a low-tech, local and face-to-face 
operation, a back-to-basics move, the type of strategy employed before the internet 
age (Hoffman 2006b: 1) when local mosques, prisons had the monopoly of the mo-
bilization activities (Neumann & Rogers 2007: 33-39).  
When Samira returned to Rubi, according to the Spanish court documents, she 
acquires a tablet computer and a Samsung smartphone. Both devices have high-
tech applications that give the users the possibility to install the latest social software 
with communication and interactive online applications. A smart-tech process of 
mobilization assuring a fast, steady and continuous stream of jihadist contents while 
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at the same time providing the user with an ‘embodied, embedded and everyday 
life’ (Hine 2015) jihadist experience. The amount of time spent online is proportional 
to the speed of radicalization of the individual, which was exactly what these devices 
meant for Samira, the experience of being constantly online, to become a touch-
screen jihadist, constantly under the ideological influence of the jihadist narrative 
and under the surveillance of her IS regular contacts. Being frequently online results 
in offline social isolation, a condition that is ‘critical for normalizing behaviors’ (Torok 
2013: 6), namely behaviors that involve acceptation and justification of extreme vio-
lence. Stern and Berger (2015) understand this behavioral path as similar to ‘create 
a new human being’ who includes violence as a normalized behavior. Violent be-
havior includes more than aggressive acts; it also includes aggressive communica-
tion. ISIS communication strategy has indeed revealed its power to ignite “an unu-
sually high level of stimulation to those who might already be prone to violence” 
(Berger & Morgan 2015: 59). The proof of Samira’s commitment to violence in the 
name of the jihadist cause was sealed over a phone conversation where she made 
her son say to her ISIS contact: ‘I will cut the throat of a police agent.’ This part of 
the behavior normalization process is denominated by Mbakwe and Cunliffe as 
“grooming” (2007: 224), (…) “’grooming’ in this context defines a normalizing pro-
cess, diminishing the user’s resistance to the violent narrative.”  
  
2.4 Digital grooming 
Grooming is a common strategy employed by jihadist recruiters not only upon pos-
sible jihadist candidates but also directed to researchers and to analysts. The groom-
ing strategy initiated with the call to Islam (Da’wa) considered a duty to all Muslims 
and taken to a higher level of mandatory actions by the Salafi-jihadist scholars 
(Carvalho 2014). 
I have witnessed it first hand in my online contacts with a female jihadist recruiter. 
First, she guided the conversation to inquire about my right intentions (‘niya’) to-
wards Islam. My answer was ‘to gain more knowledge’, ‘to further my education’ 
which she considered a pre-disposition to accept the true religion, Islam, and there-
fore she recommended important basic readings, Qur’an, Hadiths. The second step 
was to question me about what I learned so far from those readings, re-direct the 
learning process to the ‘right, pure path of the Salafs’ and to question about my 
personal life. The third step was to answer my questions on jihad (open questions 
about the theological Islamic definition of the term) by sending me PDF documents 
with relevant literature (‘Join the Caravan’ being the most frequent). A clear indica-
tion that in her mind frame jihad and jihadism were intertwined and that they were 
equally part of the Islamic religious literature. When confronted with the fact that 
jihad and jihadism are separate concepts, she would dismiss it as ‘Western media 
propaganda’ and forward my attention to important scholars from the classic Ibn 
Taymiyya to al-Ghazzali. The fourth step was to integrate closed discussion groups 
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either via Facebook messaging, Skype or WhatsApp. The condition to enter these 
debate groups was to be a Muslim or to become one directly (everyone needed to 
write the ‘shahada’, the Muslim declaration of faith in their first intervention). I re-
fused to do so which meant the end of her attempt to allure me into her network. A 
prominent member of a Spanish-Moroccan Islamic Association in Catalonia revealed 
to me in a Skype interview that a parallel process of grooming was followed by the 
Salafi-jihadist Imams in Tetouan. According to the same source, the Imams are de-
veloping jihadist narratives to mobilize women on two fundaments, the Qur’an and 
the fatwa of Qaradawi, that women should be prepared to physically engage in the 
jihadist battle. The Imams share the opinion of the Egyptian scholar that women are 
less obvious subjects of suspicion and consequently women are receiving military 
training before departing to Syria. The whole process is taking between 1 to 4 years 
depending on the motivation and progress of the individual.  
The arguments above exposed about the process of radicalization of Samira ad-
vocate the value of conducting offline fieldwork, to have direct contact with the so-
cial context, the physical structures and the individuals that are part of the Muslim 
communities in Spain, more concretely in Catalonia. The access to ‘local cultures’, 
‘local narratives’ offers a private and particular lens to understand the roots and the 
routes of terrorism as illustrated in the next section. 
 
2.5 Gaining access to the field 
2.5.1 From Rubi to Rabat – ‘The roots and the routes of terrorism’  
 
In May 2014, I did fieldwork in Catalonia visiting Mosques, Islamic centers and in-
terviewing Muslim and non-Muslim citizens. The aim of the research was to go be-
yond the Salafism presence in Catalonia and to reach a wider perspective of what it 
means to be a Muslim in the Spanish society, hence getting a more defined scenario 
on real ‘root causes’ (Bjørgo 2005; Forest 2005; Newman 2006; Pedahzur 2006; 
Richardson 2006; Pick, Speckhard & Jacuch 2009; Veldhuis & Staun 2009; Canna 
2011; Schmid 2013; Aziz 2016) of extremism. 
The female community online did not match with the one I was observing offline 
in Catalonia, at least not in terms of their shared views on violence and meaning of 
jihad. A similar experience that Keeney (2011: 544) described about his own ethno-
graphic fieldwork in Ceuta. On the same line of arguments of Keeney (2011), my 
research took a month, which, as the author defends, is unique when conducting 
terrorism studies and enough if the scope of the study is narrow and if the core site 
of research is online. To that, I can add that the contacts developed during this pe-
riod were afterwards continued and followed-up online delivering more data and 
granting more research results. Indeed, online communications follow-up resulted 
in another critical contact, a young Moroccan man, living in Catalonia and working 
at a local Islamic institution who agreed to have lengthy conversations on Skype. 
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The detailed information he gave on the recruitment of young women in Morocco 
was determined to understand much of the online narrative and the formation 
























Figure 2.2. Location of Rubi – Catalonia 
 
Once in the region, gaining access to the local Imams as a non-Muslim woman was 
possible by using convenience-sampling methods. More exactly, using my football 
network was the key to open the doors of the Mosques in Catalonia. ‘Player X from 
Morocco that plays now in Barcelona is an acquaintance since he was 10 years old.’ 
The sentence repeated at the entrance of almost all Mosques was the ‘log-in’ pass-
word. Football is a shared culture phenomenon that runs close to Moroccan and 
Spanish jihadists, as we have seen previously. A question of ritualistic sacrifice (to-
wards a common good and goal), ritualistic violence (pain, injuries, blood), discipline 
(control), delimitations (time and space) and group’s bonding are all part of both 
the football and the jihadist environment.  
Although Salafism in its strict interpretation condemns any activities related with 
football, from its practice, to supporting teams or watching it (Wagemakers 2016: 
173-174), the truth is that football is a recurrent topic of online contents. Inde-
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pendently of the religious restrictions, football and foreign fighters are an overlap-
ping cultural phenomenon that keeps on having an impact among the foreign fight-
ers. The impact is visible in their Facebook accounts: from the images of professional 
football players or clubs being used as profile pictures (preferences for Real Madrid, 
Barcelona and Manchester United), to the organization of football matches among 
themselves in the Caliphate, to the discussion of the latest results and performances 
of their local home teams, or to the bigger-than-life debate on who is the best player 
of the world. 
Remarkably, accessibility to Salafi preachers, small mosques, or the entrance at 
the Mosque of Reus (visited by M. Atta, leader of 9/11 attacks) was possible due to 
the emotional attachment Spanish-Moroccan communities have to football. Being 
in direct contact with the football world, I knew about this emotional attachment, 
the same as I knew upfront the points in common that I had with Muslim women 
and that would enable me to approach and interview them with greater ease. 
Relatability and knowledge of the local narratives are vital anchors to construct 
trust and respect during the first encounters. Trust is of course a sensitive matter 
when interviewing people that are under police scrutiny. Catalonian Mosques have 
long been battered by surveillance, suspicion and Salafi-jihadist association. As so, 
Muslim communities in Spain are endogamous, closed and not keen on contacts 
with strangers. A clear example of it is the difficulty to find the current location of 
the mosques or praying spaces, even if Spanish law requires their official registra-
tion. 
According to the Organic Law of Religious Freedom, Ley Orgánica de Libertad 
Religiosa (7/1980), autonomous regions have full legislative powers in what concerns 
urban planning and funding. Therefore, specific construction and legality of each of 
the mosques or places of worship will depend on the specific legal implementation 
by regional and local administrations. To add to it, article 84 1.c) of Ley 7/1985 stip-
ulates that religious organizations only need to communicate their existence and 
place of gathering to the local authorities, an official registration at the Ministry of 
Justice is not necessary. In practice, that means that most of the addresses indicated 
in 2014 by the Observatorio were incorrect.  
Countless times, I asked: ‘Where can I find the Mosque?’ And countless times, 
local police included would answer, ‘I do not know for sure.’ ‘I think I saw some 
women dressed as Muslims around that place.’  
In fact, in 2016 the number of Muslims in Spain had reached 1.9 million 
(1,919,141) of which 42% (804,017) were Spanish, while 58% (1.11 million) of the 
Muslim population was foreign, according to the exploitation of the census of the 
Muslims in Spain made by the Andalusian Observatory, the autonomous body of 
the Union of Islamic Communities of Spain10 (UCIDE). The study revealed that the 
community with the highest number of Muslim citizens was Catalonia with 515,482 
                                                 
10 http://ucide.org/sites/default/files/revistas/estademograf16.pdf 
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Muslims in total, from which 182,304 were Spanish and 333,178 were foreigners. 
Barcelona was the province of Catalonia with the highest number of Muslims, 
324,483 in total. 
The data collected during the fieldwork in Catalonia was treated and analyzed 
with the use of grounded-theory methods. The interviews and the field observation 
generated important codes and subsequent categories that unequivocally directed 
to root-cause theories of radicalization, as we can see from the graphic below: 
 
Table 2.2 Root causes of radicalization in Rubi 
 
Text Code Category 
“99% is about behavior, education. Reinforcing the importance of 
good behavior and better education. The remaining 1% is about 
religion.” 
“Our sermons are very modern, no radical or extremist references 
on them. The ‘khutba’ is open to anyone who wants to listen to it.” 
Preaching Religion 
“Why talking only about violence? Jihad is to push us into being 
good.” “The second aspect of jihad, he continued to answer, is to 
fight with the Qur’an, to show how society must be.” 
“Jihad is not an attack you first send a message so that the others 
convert as they did in the times of the Prophet by sending warn-
ings. It is only acceptable a jihad through words, that is to try to 
educate and talk, no violence or terrorism are permitted.” 
Violence Jihad 
“The mosques here are always changing place, they get together 
in different apartments, houses. I cannot tell you where they are 
because women here do not go to mosques. Only men attend the 
prayers.” 
“The community is rather scattered right now she said, due to all 
constant changes of location and the disagreement on where to 
place a new Mosque. People just divided themselves between dif-
ferent spaces. You will not find many people here, especially not 
women.” 
Hidden women Gender 
“The problems of most Muslims in Europe is their lack of educa-
tion, we need to educate them, to correct them, with need to rein-
force the importance of behaving good with other people.” 
“We need more Muslim people in higher places, with higher edu-
cation.” 
Behavior Education 
“There is a huge crisis, you know? Our men work in commerce, 
stores, restaurants, and some of us also need to do cleanings.” 
“We cannot forget the context of poverty here in Spain that goes 





“People stop me in the street to tell me to take my scarf, to insult 
me, why don’t they focus instead in the young people at the park 
using drugs?” 
“I have no idea where the Mosque is…There was one here but now 
I do not know anymore where it is.. I do not see so many Mus-
lims…I have no contact with them…” 
Integration Social 
identity 
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Text Code Category 
“If the Alcaide (Mayor) was Moroccan it would be better and it 
would be more functional to be able to have political seats.” 
“Political participation should be also higher, we never get in-





“Islam online is a sea, there is a lot of things to benefit from and a 
lot of things that are not good. The internet can be good to edu-
cate, to give knowledge. I use Facebook and YouTube.” 
“I think it is important to get information if you find the right pray-
ers. There can be a reasonable use of the internet and I know that 
some of our believers use it for that purpose.” 
Islam online Technology 
“We have been saving with a lot of sacrifice (some of us even 
starve) to offer money to build this ‘cultural space’. We would like 
to have a true Mosque but it is not possible in Spain.” 
“In the industrial area there is a small, provisional space, until the 






In another perspective, gaining the trust of the mosque leaders leads to another set 
of snowball sampling as they indicated me other individuals that could and would 
help me further my research.  
While tracing my fieldwork map, I decided that it was valuable to do research in 
Rubi, a town located North-West from Barcelona, since it had been previously 
signed as a Salafist community.  
The Mosque, a simple pale-green building was located in the industrial side of 
the town and at the time of my arrival, there were circa 30 women (with ages ranging 
from 20 to 60 years old) inside of the Mosque for their weekly Classic Arabic lessons. 
‘Being closer to the language of God’, ‘understanding better the Qur’an’ are some 















Figure 2.3  Rubi Islamic Center  
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I was asked if I had a preference to speak with the Imam or their ‘alima’ (a Muslim 
woman with high theological knowledge). I opted for the alima who was more than 
willing to give me her own advice and opinions on jihad. According to her: “Jihad is 
not an attack, you first send a message, as they did in the times of the Prophet by 
sending warnings, so that the others convert. It is only acceptable a jihad through 
words, that is to try to educate and talk, no violence or terrorism are permitted.” 
I have applied the results of my offline fieldwork in Rubi to Bjørgo’s theory of the 
‘roots of terrorism’ (2005: 3, 4) to test the local female community on their potential 
of engaging in the jihadist narrative. Bjørgo defends that the causes of terrorism can 
be found in four different categories, accelerator causes (technology), trigger causes 
(events), structural causes (globalization) and motivational causes (grievances). Here 
below, I contrapose Bjørgo’s root causes of terrorism with four categories that re-
sulted from my interviews with the Muslim women, at the Mosque in Rubi. 
 
Table 2.3 Bjørgo’s root causes of terrorism 
 
Accelerator causes Trigger causes Structural causes Motivational causes 
Use of technology 
Participation in the 
Syrian conflict 
Social inequality Personal grievances 
Facebook, 
Youtube, Skype 
“We cannot say it is a 
pure case of jihad.” 
“We would like to 
have a true Mosque 
but it is not possible in 
Spain.” 
“Our men work in 
commerce, stores, res-
taurants and some of 
us also need to do 
cleanings.” 
 
Three overall conclusions can be distinguished from Table 2.3, the fact that the fe-
male Muslim community of Rubi is engaged in bringing together their members to 
educate them in Classic Arabic (direct access to the sacred Islamic texts), in offering 
them religious guidance (presence of the female scholar) and to debate local and 
global questions exemplifies their will to acquire knowledge through legitimate 
sources.  
On the other side, the digital fluency of the community was low in terms of ac-
quired skills and participation. Only the young women were sporadically online and 
their platform of choice was Skype to get in contact with relatives living in Morocco, 
or in other parts of Europe, followed by Facebook. They did complain about their 
urban exclusion, poor education levels, poor political participation yet with a shared 
responsibility perspective, that it was also their task to fight these problems within 
the community and to reach out to the non-Muslim society. As a result, the ‘roots 
of terrorism’ in Rubi cannot be targeted in the local community at a group level, at 
least. An individual prone to engage in the jihadist narrative would not have found 
support in May 2014 to his/hers process of radicalization among the female com-
munity of Rubi. 
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Actually, the individuals who reside in Spain and wish to encounter offline 
sources of jihadist narrative are obliged to follow other routes to find a space of 
radicalization, or to attend the non-surveilled ‘garage mosque’s sermons’. The po-
lice-controlled Spanish Mosques, Imams and ‘khutbas’ (sermons) issue politically 
correct and coordinated statements that openly condemned jihadist discourses and 
activities.  
Although it is a fact that Salafi-jihadist proponents are in higher numbers in the 
Catalan region (Moreras & Tarres 2014: 161) than in the rest of the Spanish territory, 
the fact is that offline jihadist mobilization still follows the route of Morocco, due to 
the already referred rigorous monitoring of official Mosques, sermons and Imams in 
Spain. Neumann and Rogers (2007) had already reached the same conclusion in 
their report about European mosques and hubs of radicalization.  
What is striking is that counter-terrorist forces are still following the protocol of 
keeping the Mosques and the Imams under deep surveillance, a strategy that in-
stead of diminishing the jihadist mobilization is just relocating it on one hand, into 
the other side of the Mediterranean where jihadist organizations like IS have more 
freedom of movements. On the other hand, this security strategy is promoting the 

















Figure 2.4  Garage mosque in the center of Tarragona 
 
By these ‘garage’ expressions, I mean the unofficial locations of gathering, led by 
individuals whose views on Islam are far from mainstream or moderate. 
Online, I have also interviewed moderate Muslim individuals who were not in 
tune with jihadist contents, to gather a varied, ample sample of population. This was 
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important not only to have a control group but to distance my research from ‘ho-
mogenization bias’ (Keeney 2011: 35), meaning receiving similar answers and ob-
serving similar attitudes towards jihadism.  
 
2.5.2 The construction of a sacred space on Facebook 
This dissertation discusses the female digital jihadist roles on Facebook and takes 
into consideration how this online platform is utilized as a space for the ritualization 
of violence. For that reason, the situational context involving the everyday life of 
Muslim women in Catalonia plays a distinctive role in the process of transforming 
Facebook into a sacred space. 
In the first place, we shall see why, among the possible root causes to engage 
with online extremism, the absence of Mosques or Muslim centers has a significant 
impact on these women’s lives. ‘Social environment and widespread grievances’ 
(Newman 2006: 750) as seen in the above section allied with close-knit social net-
works, proximity to Salafi-jihadist ideology, online acquaintance and regular contact 
with violent religious propositions (Alonso & Reinares 2006: 179, 195) frame the 
general setting that leads to jihadist recruitment. 
Specifically for Catalonia, the lack of spaces to pray in, or their remote locations 
in industrial areas, have created the phenomenon of ‘garage Islam’, that is the reli-
ance on unofficial, inadequate places to gather Muslim believers for Friday’s ser-
vices. These improvised places cannot accommodate large crowds nor incorporate 
the mandatory gender division by offering a separate space for women. Therefore, 
women are forced to perform their communal prayers in the seclusion of their 
homes and need to debate, pose questions or gain religious knowledge in the digital 
public sphere. Due to its digital affordances, Facebook becomes the preferred space 
for these women to pursue their religious learning processes and to perform online 
rituals. 
As a matter of fact and as seen in the previous point, ritualization takes place 
within a specific and delimited stage of performance. Facebook, in the context of 
the Spanish-speaking jihadist women, is the central stage for violent and wrongful 
ritualization of jihad. In what follows, I will attempt to demonstrate how these 
women developed the process of making sense of Facebook as a sacred space, and 
furthermore how this sacred space has become a place of violent ideological pro-
duction. 
‘MashaAllah okthi’, ‘now we are one’ reads the comment on a photo of a female 
dressed as a suicide bomber carrying a baby on her left arm and a modified rifle on 
the right arm. The photo was posted in October 2013 and was to be found in a 
public Facebook profile. After that, several female users engaged in a series of com-
ments, all praising the woman and some expressing their wish to be or to imitate 
her in both roles, mother and fighter: “may Allah bless you sisters. (…) inschaAllah 
[sic] the day of the jihad will arrive.” 
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Here we enter the realm of attributing a violent nature and a compulsory status 
to jihad, an emic perspective that represents how these women make sense of jihad 
and that does not correspond to the Islamic theological perspective on the matter. 
In this study, jihad and violence are not considered interchangeable concepts but it 
is important to emphasize that for these women jihad and violence are synonyms.  
This communicative practice enters an echo chamber on Facebook and other social 
media, which intensifies this belief and the religious legitimacy.  
Next, we should look at the mechanisms that enable Facebook to become a sa-
cred space where violent contents are endorsed, shared and accepted as religious 
commandments. 
The first phase of the user’s interaction on Facebook is, paraphrasing Varis (2015: 
58), a ‘religious construct’ molded by the perception that female users have of this 
platform. Being a Muslim woman online translates into bringing a ‘further normative 
layer on communication practices’ (Varis: 2015: 59) into the online space, in order to 
make them acceptable and in conformity with Islamic social rules of engagement. 
The women transfer those norms that belong to the public sphere into their own 
online performances. They log in to Facebook with the same veneration with which 
they enter the Mosque and with the exact same aim, to gain religious knowledge. 
There are abundant examples of the alliance between religious construct and nor-
mative layer, for example, refraining themselves from posting photos of their faces, 
employing religious expressions in Arabic, quoting the Qur’an or the hadiths, main-
taining polite manners in their communications, and above all avoiding any interac-
tion with Facebook male users. The religious conformity of their online actions pro-
motes the perception and acceptation of Facebook as a sacred space. Indeed, both 
the perception that they are attending a sacred online space for religious knowledge 
consumption, and acceptance of this as normal provide symbolic mechanism that 
makes possible the introduction of religious violence as justifiable content. Once the 
cognitive acceptance and the emotional bonding are in motion, the second phase 
can start. 
The second phase corresponds to the ‘ideological construct’ (Varis 2015: 58) 
when jihadist content is shaped into a militant ideology with political goals under 
the cover of Islamic legitimization. Violent ideology becomes the foundation that 
sustains and channels personal grievance into jihadist mobilization. However, draw-
ing on Jocelyn Viterna’s theory (2006) as presented in her article ‘Explaining 
women’s mobilization into the Salvadoran Guerrilla Army’, a dominant jihadist iden-
tity and the integration into a jihadist network do not necessarily imply its occur-
rence, although it increases the possibility (2006: 5).  
In a third phase, Facebook, understood as a sacred space, promotes an ‘identity 
construct’, when the female user assumes an online jihadist identity. Over time, this 
starts to prevail over any other identity she may have. In fact, Viterna (2006: 6) men-
tions this singular situation where one of the personal female identities (mother, 
wife, believer, fighter) becomes stronger than the other personalities. However, 
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there are also differences between Viterna’s (2006) case study and that of the Span-
ish-speaking jihadist women. In El Salvador, ‘biographical availability’ (Viterna 2006: 
15), that is to say ‘motherhood, family completeness, age at mobilization’ constitute 
factors that prevent engagement with violent ideology, but in the case of Samira 
Yerou for example, none of these obstacles were stronger than her will to be an 
active member of a jihadist network. None of her other roles stopped her from trying 
to migrate to Syria with her infant son. Thus, the combination of various factors 
influence women’s decisions to participate in the jihadist networks. These include 
the process of transforming Facebook into a sacred space, identity-molding mobi-
lizing networks (Viterna 2006: 2), personal vulnerability (Peresin & Cervone 2015: 7), 
various root causes, and the attractiveness of the feeling one belongs to an online 
community. 
 
2.5.3 Ethical reflections 
When I departed to Reus, I had in mind the advices both my Supervisors, Prof. 
Herman Beck and Prof. Wouter van Beek had given me in terms of best practices 
and ethical conduct during fieldwork research. The same advices they gave to me 
when conducting online research, as on both sides the human interaction is the 
common element. I have always defined myself as a born and raised Catholic who 
was conducting research for the purpose of obtaining a PhD degree, not a conver-
sion. In frequent occasions, both online and offline I would be asked to consider 
conversion to Islam. What I always found interesting from the online invitations for 
conversion was the ritualization of the ‘shahada’, or the profession of faith: writing 
it or taping it in a video and then post it on my Facebook wall and have people 
commenting or liking it, was the necessary process to make the ritual valid. It is a 
‘ethically ambiguous situation’ (Geertz 1968: 151), I try to know more about their 
online activities while they try to persuade me to convert, for both, achieving those 
goals would be a primary gain. Ethnographic research is just as a Facebook relation-
ship status, ‘it’s complicated’. 
On the other hand, I would also present myself, my university affiliation, the ob-
jectives of my research and to ask their permission to observe, collect and storage 
their online activities. I had never questioned the ethical procedure, nor seen the 
danger of it until the Paris attacks of 2015. However, some of the women that I had 
been in contact with at the initial phase of my online research were connected with 
individuals involved in the terrorist attacks than unfolded in Europe from 2015 to 
2016. Jihadism in itself carries a threat that has had different violent feasible results. 
The situation implicates, of course, concerns with personal safety, and direct contact 
with these individuals ‘retains an element of danger’ (Schuurman & Eijkman 2013: 
3) that has to be taken into consideration.  
In 2015 and after meeting with the then recently founded Ethics Committee of 
Tilburg University, several steps were taken to synchronize my work with the delib-
erations of the Code of Ethics. My previous work was unofficially reviewed, discussed 
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and generally approved in the following informal discussions. Although the Ethics 
Committee had decided not to concede any ethics clearance to research done be-
fore their constitution, it was still an important validation of my work. On the other 
side, the Committee gained deep and direct insight to research, digital methods and 
digital storage, archive and safeguard of sensitive data related to sensitive and cur-
rent subjects. Officially, it was decided that I would no longer conduct any interviews 
or use participant observation methods to collect more data and that I would follow 
an invisible observation method.  
Furthermore, it was also determined that in case I would see a situation that 
could represent an effective danger I would have to report it. To define what repre-
sents an effective danger is highly complex when we cannot engage with the subject 
to clarify the intentions and meanings of online contents. Although, for example 
there are abundant software programs to execute content analysis (Comerda and 
Navanti, to quote two Dutch examples), the truth is that these programs still lack 
the manual and human skills to understand and contextualize language styles, cul-
tural nuances and religious connotations. A simple example of such complexity was 
for example, a Dutch jihadist writing to a Dutch foreign fighter: “Finish them.” No 
context offered, no answer, no comments or thread. Thus, for all we know it could 
be something important to follow up or it could just be a reference to a popular war 
game. Such a sense of responsibility comes more pungently when the object of 
research is a phenomenon that keeps on repeating itself in a short period of time. 
On the one side, the huge amount of data available, collected and stored that accu-
mulates very fast, and on the other side the imperative of searching back into the 
archives to find relevant information that could relate to the events.  
The circumstances and the timing of having to limit my research to ‘invisible 
observation’ resulted from extreme violent situations, from liability, safety and se-
curity notions. Invisible observation applied to criminal subjects resembles in several 
aspects to police work therefore keeping the research on the tip of his/her toes to 
distance him/herself from a simple monitoring activity. Even though the process has 
similar stages in both academic and police world, the difference lays in the results. 
The first aiming at scientific output, the second on defining and arresting suspects.  
Nevertheless, there is an important impact resulting from doing research that 
involves two different legal frameworks, Spanish and Dutch that raises the complex-
ity of the researcher’s ethical considerations. While conducting digital ethnography 
in Spanish-speaking online and offline spaces, I needed to be aware of the Spanish 
Law on what constitutes an act of jihadism. 
As so, the Spanish Law, Ley Orgánica 2/2015 (30 March 2015) reads as follows: 
 
The act of accessing in an usual manner a website that has contents directed to pro-
mote recruitment to a terrorist organization. 
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On the other side of the screen, I was conducting research from a laptop with an IP 
address located in The Netherlands. As so, the Dutch Law on online criminal activi-
ties reports to Computer Criminality III, a., Articles 137c to 137e, of the Dutch Crim-
inal Code that enounces the following:  
 
‘The Netherlands comprehensive action program to combat jihadism’: N) 29.b. Pro-
ducers and distributors of online jihadist propaganda and the digital platforms that 
they abuse, are identified. 
 
The complexity of the jihadist phenomenon allied with the multidimensional legal 
framework associated with it brings up the urgency of the collaboration between 
well-informed and trained professionals. 
At the end, invisible observation was the safest, most ethical possibility to over-
come all concerns and obstacles that emerged in the late phase of data collection 
of this research. I chose to collect the data from public contents and public profiles 
and it was interesting to see the abundance of data available in this format. Keeping 
their profiles and contents open (instead of private) is an intentional action to reach 
a broader audience. The lack of direct interaction with these individuals is a meth-
odological limitation and to overcome it, more time-consuming triangulation tech-
niques to produce conservative confirmation of data are necessary. As Geertz (1968: 
151) best said it: “This pressure springs from the inherent moral asymmetry of the 
fieldwork situation.” 
It also gives a timely opportunity to analyze the individual different stages of 
radicalization whereas in the past most of the primary data was about former and/or 
convicted terrorists, never from the phases prior to it, when the individuals were 
actively engaged with violence. Parallel to that, I searched equally for counselling 
from colleagues on the matter. The opinions were diversified according to their ge-
ographical origins and academic affiliations. All of them agreed however on the par-
ticularities and sensitivity of the subject and the difficulties to rule what would be 
the most ethical procedure in my case. My conclusion was that the collection and 
subsequent analysis of the public posts, while handled anonymously, were too val-
uable to ignore in a scientific approach. 
Hence, social media enabled the research with the unique opportunity to acquire 
critical primary data furthering terrorism studies but also in the present case further-
ing religious studies. 
A final note on the use and reproduction of jihadist-affiliated contents during 
this dissertation is necessary to emphasize that they are here to serve the purpose 
of illustrating and discussing a complex, sensitive and violent phenomenon. 
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2.6 Concluding notes  
Developing a methodology to analyze online female jihadists required a multimodal 
approach that came with challenges. First of all, those challenges derive from a con-
ceptual framework that has no consensus in its main terms: jihadism terrorism, reli-
gious violence. Secondly, from opposite methods of research between religious and 
terrorism studies, to which a curve ball was thrown by adding Digital Ethnography. 
Finally, the gender scope or better yet, the female scope to analyze areas that are 
predominantly seen as male dominant ones. Gender dimension of Islamic belonging 
may explain both the acceptance of violence as a purifying, mandatory individual 
ritual but it also justifies the extension of the jihadist identity to the roles confined 
to women by Islam. Moreover, gender dimension of Islam needs to be zoomed in 
into the ethnic dimension/diversity within the Islamic world and within the diaspora 
in Europe. Problem with gender studies is their inherent duality man-woman, which 
leads to comparisons that offer no acute image of the individual roles. Comparisons, 
based for example on how many foreign fighters are in fact female, will give an 
inferior percentage, but in a social network system the function of the role, that is 
the quality of the performance, is far more important to its vitality than the number.  
By bridging all the areas together this research paves the way to further innova-
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‘Okhti’ online. Spanish Muslim women engaging 
online jihad ‒ A Facebook case study11 
Abstract  
Digital reality is becoming increasingly relevant as an online space where Muslim 
women gain a new religious and social role by accepting the expression of jihad 
through violence. Until now, the study of online radicalization in Spain has been 
focusing on the male perspective, therefore it is important to analyze Muslim 
women’s online jihadist participation. Facebook, due to its easy, cheap access and 
interactive way of connecting with other people through a digital channel, is grow-
ing in popularity among Muslim women in Spain. 
As so, it is important to examine how women understand jihad in a general man-
ner, how they live and enact jihad on Facebook, how they embrace the jihadist 
recruitment online and most importantly how they transfer this role from online to 
offline reality. 
 
3.1  Introduction 
 
‘Okhti’12 online is a digital sisterhood aiming firstly at sharing and spreading jihadist 
contents, secondly at supporting the jihadist conflict scenarios and thirdly at achiev-
ing a jihadist role. Jihad is perceived and performed by Spanish Muslim women on 
Facebook under their feminine perspective, as sisters, mothers, wives and as women. 
Despite the feminine aspect, violence is present through photos, images and videos 
but also through comments and declarations. These declarations sign their intention 
to transfer their online jihadists’ performances into real war scenarios. Furthermore, 
the online active role of the okhti associated with the changes on the Global Jihad 
                                                 
11 Adapted from the published article: Carvalho, C. (2014) ‘Okhti’ Online. Spanish Muslim wo-
men engaging online Jihad. A Facebook case study. Online Heidelberg Journal of Religions on 
the Internet 6: 24-41. 
12 ‘Okhti’ is the most used Arabic transliteration of ‘my sister’ by my informants on Facebook. 
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Front13 is transforming women’s independency on social and religious level. How-
ever, the most important factor in this transformation has been the interference of 
modern Islamic academics as well as the online sheikhs who are enhancing the role 
of women in the jihadist fight issuing fatwas (legal opinions) ruling in favor of the 
okhti right to participate in the jihad fight. 
Online sites offer Muslim women knowledge, information and a space to share, 
to question and to debate Islamic texts and practices while at the same time being 
able to manage the privacy of their online activities and interactions. Fruit of these 
online performances and fruit of the equal right of online intervention, Muslim 
women are also able to reclaim an active and egalitarian role for themselves. They 
perceive it as being justified in the Qur’an, in selected passages such as this one, 
 
O mankind! Be dutiful to your Lord, Who created you from a single person [Adam), 
and from him (Adam) He created His wife [Hawwa (Eve)], and from them both He 
created many men and women and fear Allah through whom you demand your mu-
tual (rights), and (do not cut the relations of) the wombs (kinship). Surely, Allah is Ever 
an All-Watcher over you. (Surah Al-Nisa [4:1]) 
 
However, the most important change on gender jihadism was brought up by the 
Syrian War to the Global Jihad Front. In fact, a new perspective on women’s agency 
is being transformed online and challenging what was once a strict male perfor-
mance.  
Anthropologist and author of The Politics of Piety, Saba Mahmood (2005: 8) de-
fines agency as: 
 
(…) the capacity to realize one’s own interests against the weight of custom, tradition, 
transcendental will, or other obstacles (whether individual or collective). 
 
David Cook (2005a) in his article, ‘Women fighting in Jihad?’ addresses the legal 
circumstances of the feminine participation in jihad (here understood as fight) from 
the pre-modern times until today, underlining the conservative character of Muslim 
ruling. Cook also raises gender issues related with women engaging jihad, namely 
their sex purity and the definition of their ‘martyrdom’ reward. To my informants, 
the idea of being received with glory in the highest level of Paradise (‘Firdaws’) is 
the ultimate reward a Muslim woman may aspire to achieve in the afterlife: “We walk 
together, hold fast to the Qur’an and the Sunna and the victory will be ours. A 
greater reward will be given to us by our God.” For these reasons, the present chap-
ter will focus on the following research questions: 
 
                                                 
13 The jihadist recruitment to Syria is the highest ever seen in recent history and Spain has a 
considerable number of jihadists joining it. 
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• How do women understand and define jihad?  
• How do they live and enact jihad on Facebook as a digital sisterhood?  
• How do they transfer this jihadist role from online to offline reality?  
 
Earlier in 2013, I opened up a Facebook account to enter in contact with the online 
jihadist feminine sphere in Spain. I began by browsing through public Facebook 
pages of Muslim Spanish women, stopping to better observe the ones that had ji-
hadist related posts, comments, videos, Islamic music (anasheed), images or photos, 
mention to Da’wa14 and to i-Imams15 (Imams who use the internet for Islamic 
knowledge dissemination and argumentation, for example, issuing fatwa, giving 
conferences or courses). The i-Imam (as a digital Islamic authority) and the i-Khutba 
(as a digital Islamic narrative) are essential parts of the online radicalization and re-
cruitment processes of individuals who in the ultimate phase will transfer their online 
knowledge and performance into an offline action in order to participate in current 
hot spots jihadist scenarios like Syria or Iraq. 




A new Facebook account associated with the university email account was created 
and maintained strictly to manage the contacts that serve the purpose of this study. 
My name, academic affiliation, professional web link and provenience were made 
public on my Facebook profile. In some cases, the informants demanded more per-
sonal data to confirm my identity and the aim of the research.  
The study started in February 2013 (data of the creation of the Facebook ac-
count) with me sending ‘friendship requests’ to Facebook accounts owners that had 
an open, public content.16  
The open, public content facilitates the task of profile’s selection as one can di-
rectly observe the contents, images, videos or comments and determine if they fulfil 
the jihadist criteria employed for the purpose of this study. By jihadist contents, I 
have taken in consideration the presence of one or more of the following elements: 
 
 
                                                 
14 ‘Da’wa’ simply understood as the preaching and proselytism of Islam, as a call towards Allah 
is the task of the men mentioned by the Qu’ran (Sura An-Nahl, The Bee, 16:125): “Call unto 
the way of thy Lord with wisdom and fair exhortation, and reason with them in the better way.” 
15 My informants follow online Imams, sheiks and Islamic religious scholars who are consid-
ered to belong to the general Salafist current.  
16 My network of Facebook contacts was also enlarged when ‘friends of friends’ invited me to 
be part of their own network. The same selection criteria (language, gender, location, jihadist 
contents) was applied here and extended to the Facebook groups.  
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1. Propaganda, visual symbols and imagery (flag banners, weaponry, black horses, 
violence) including or promoting the female Muslim presence; 
2. Al-Qaeda, Isis, Caliphate references; 
3. Shahid’s (martyr’s) photos/videos/comments; 
4. Graphic, violent photos/videos of victims (explicitly of children) of war/conflict; 
5. Citations of Islamic religious sources about jihad, battles and/or of violence; 
6. Salafi-jihadist ideological orientation and features (narrative, fatwa, scholars). 
 
All contents were filtered according to their relevance to the theme, quality and rel-
evance of threads (high number of received comments or likes).  
To evaluate the jihadist contents into depth, all the collected information was 
crossed with semi-structured interviews. The interviews took place via private mes-
saging on Facebook and were structured and presented equally to all the inform-
ants. As the dialogue went further in time, open questions were used in order to 
retrieve more data. Photos, links or comments were questioned to assess the reli-
gious knowledge, intention and perception of the jihadist message.  
In the first message, as I have mentioned above, I gave a short self-presentation 
and I introduced them to the goals of my Facebook account. Furthermore, I re-
quested all my informants their permission to use all contents published, shared, 
posted or commented by them on Facebook. All the data employed in this study is 
therefore legitimized by the written acceptance of the informants.  
Considering the gender scope of this study, only Facebook accounts belonging 
to women were taken into consideration. In many cases, the informants placed in 
between brackets the warning that they do not accept men (‘no acepto hombres’) 
and all informants were requested to confirm their gender, via private message. Al-
though criticism may be raised concerning the easiness that one may fake their 
identity and gender online, it is a fact that the group of women that participate in 
this study are very vigilant about tracing and exposing the male presence. 
I have attributed fake names (randomly chosen) to all my informants in order to 
protect their identities even though the informants themselves already use forged 
names17 on their Facebook accounts. They choose war names (‘Kunyas’) as forged 
names are frequently based on terminology belonging to their Salafi-jihadist belief. 
Kunyas are a common Arabic tradition, serving in the past as a parental connection 
to the name of the first-born child (Abu for the father, Umm for the mother, for 
instance Abu Karim, father of Karim). The tradition evolved when the head of the 
Palestinian organization Al-Fatah, Yasser Arafat (Abu Ammar) decided to attribute 
to himself a kunya as a way to symbolize his fighter status. Although the names of 
the informants will not be revealed, I have observed that as my informants go deeper 
                                                 
17 Some of the informants as the interviews progressed into a more informal talk eventually 
shared their true name. In the case of the converted Muslim women, they shared their pre-
reversion name as well. 
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into their process of radicalization, they change their kunyas to reflect even more 
their full adherence to the Salafi-jihadist ideology. 
The chapter takes into consideration Spanish, Arabic and English publications/ 
comments, photos and videos on Facebook in order to represent the online jihadist 
women environment in Spain. Technology advances, the living in the Web 2.0 era 
have transformed the use of language into a more flexible and more informal lin-
guistic structure. Nevertheless, the knowledge of Arabic does confer more status to 
the believer thus investing the individual with a higher social hierarchical value. As 
Jan Blommaert (2005: 71) writes: “Differences in the use of language are quickly, and 
quite systematically, translated into inequalities between speakers.” 
In the present study, Spanish is the dominant language of the group of inform-
ants, followed by Arabic transliteration that is employed for religious expressions 
(‘Assalam aleikum’, ‘MaschAllah’, ‘InschAllah’) and English in very few cases. Some of 
the informants would, during the interviews, ask me the meaning of some Arabic 
words and only a minority of the informants proved to know how to write them in 
Arabic. Given this fact, I asked my informants if knowledge of the Arabic language 
was a pre-condition to be a good Muslim. My informants agreed that mastering 
Arabic was recommended but not a determinant condition to assess the religious 
quality of a Muslim. 
On that matter, a post about ‘Tawhid’ (‘doctrine of Oneness’) in a Facebook 
group dedicated to the study of the ‘Tafsir’ (‘exegesis’) created a long thread of 
discussion among the participants. A participant affirms that the Tafsir can only be 
understood and explained in Arabic while others, namely one of my informants 
(converted Muslim woman in the process of learning Arabic herself) defended that 
behaving and living as a true Muslim is even more important than mastering the 
Arabic language. She went even further arguing:  
 
It is true that to increase the knowledge and to conserve the purity of the science of 
Allah subhana wa taala you have to make an effort to learn Arabic. However, these 
days the converted to Islam with different languages than the Arabic are the ones 
applying more the alwalaa wal baraa, that purify the tawhid in their daily day, more 
than the ones who were born amongst Muslims (…).  
 
The discussion was then transferred from the classic scholars Sheykh al-Islam Taqi 
Al-Deen Ibn Taymiyya (d.728H/1328) and Al Bukhari to the famous converted Ger-
man Muslim, Pierre Vogel as legitimate religious authorities on Tawhid because they 
were fluent in Arabic. The counter argument took an interesting twist when one 
informant interrogated other participants about the validity of the ‘shahada’ (‘the 
testimony’), of the ‘shahid’ (‘martyrdom’) and of those who intervene the fight 
‘fisabilillah’ (‘in the way of Allah’) in Syria but are not fluent in Arabic. The moderator 
of the group ended the discussion by declaring that it was more preferable to know 
the Tawhid than the Arabic language. 
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It is very interesting to notice in this event that both the religious comments and 
scholars mentioned by the woman are an integrant part of the Salafi-jihadist doc-
trine. 
Likewise, we can understand here the importance of Salafi-jihadist interpretation 
of the importance of the oneness of God to frame religious learning according to 
their particular vison, as observed in the next section. 
 
3.3 Salafi-jihadism, the online single narrative 
 
We have previously seen how women motivated by root causes, login to Facebook 
and transform this social media platform into a sacred space to learn more about 
Islam. However, what begins as a learning religious motivated process becomes a 
learning ideological process with violent objectives. Women could at this stage, 
when they are aware of the violent objectives surrounding their learning process, 
interrupt it, or question it. But, they continue it because they want to, because they 
believe they are following the right path and because as Muslim they wish to login 
to Jannah, Paradise. 
 
As salaamu’alaykum. I’m Bird of Jannah, another random muhajirah from the blessed 
land of Khilafah. 
 
Conceptually, the guidelines of this study are the terms ‘Salafi-jihadist’ (religious 
framework) and ‘jihadism’ (ideological framework), as developed under the scope of 
the Global Jihad Front.  
According to Peter Nesser (2011: 174), the invasion of Iraq and the consolidation 
of Al-Qaeda as the transnational ideological jihadist leader marked the beginning 
of the Global Jihad Front, at the same time validating it as the ideological homo-
genization of the jihadist narrative. Jihadism in the optic of Jarret Brachman (2009: 
5), is a neologism, a non-Islamic term referring to the violent nature of jihad as 
preached and practiced by Al-Qaeda. However, the analysis of jihadism has a reli-
gious aspect as well, which is anchored in the doctrine of Salafism. 
The ideological program of Salafism entails the purification of Islam, a return to 
the principles of the Companions of the Prophet and the dissemination of the faith 
(‘da’wa’). Da’wa is in fact as transnational in its goals as the Global Jihad Front ide-
ology and thus promotes the contact and the collaboration between extremist Is-
lamic groups wherever they might be physically located in the offline world. In what 
concerns the practice of da’wa in the West, Salafists continue to promote the idea 
that Muslims should refuse to integrate in the Western society and should refuse to 
adopt its impure lifestyle. The Islamic disagreement about the return to the path of 
purity and the refusal of innovations was responsible for the division (‘fitna’) that 
came about in the Islamic world, affirms Quintan Wiktorowicz (2001: 19). The author 
also points out (2006: 207-239), that in the vision of the Salafists the acceptance of 
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the concept of the unity of God (‘tawhid’), the obedience to the Qur’an and the 
Sunna, and the common refusal of any human subjective intervention are the unique 
authenticators of the Islamic creed.  
Another division was brought up to the Salafist ideology by the vindication of 
the exercise of violence. Fawaz Gerges (2009: 138) indicates that Salafi-jihadists, sim-
ilar to their secular enemies, also hold contending visions on how to engage in the 
war against apostates. Therefore, Salafi-jihadism is a subdivision of Salafism that 
defends the ritualization of violence under the name of jihad. Nevertheless, it needs 
to be underlined that even among Salafi-jihadist thinkers the conceptualization and 
employment of violence differs between authors.  
In the interest of the present study, it was also important to evaluate the knowl-
edge of my informants about Salafism. When questioned about their knowledge of 
specific terms and expressions linked to the Salafist vocabulary like tawhid (‘the 
oneness of God’), tarbiyya (‘religious education’), taghut (‘those who oppose to the 
Prophet’) or al-wala wa’l-bara’a (‘loyalty and disownment for the sake of Allah’), my 
informants presented the exact same answers with the exact same sacred texts 
references, proving that the online theological narrative is being consequent, coher-
ent and effective over these women. In other words, here we have the ‘single narra-
tive’ as defined by Alex Schmid (2010: 46-57): 
 
Al-Qaeda’s ideology is expressed in its ‘single narrative’, a unifying framework of ex-
planations that provides its followers with an emotionally satisfying portrayal of the 
world in which they live and their role in it, offering them a sense of identity and 
giving meaning to their lives. 
 
On the other side, the present study also focuses on how my Facebook informants 
learn, embrace and then promote online the violent concept of jihad. Theologically 
the debate around the interpretation of jihad is filled with complexity and diversity 
even within the Salafi-jihadist group. By adding the justification to the participation 
of women in jihad, a new moral dilemma was posed with it. 
Laiba, my informant is married and has children; her Facebook page is a display 
of jihadist women in real action, weaponry and advices on how to have a happy 
marriage. “How do you define jihad?” She answered me back with another question: 
“Do you know that when a woman gives birth that is jihad?” Childbirth as a category 
of jihad was the first definition that some women presented to me. This is an abso-
lute feminine view of the subject that includes by nature force, fight and blood.  
Personal situations also affect the choice and the manner that Muslim women 
decide to illustrate their online jihadist performances. For instance, the converted 
Muslim women are more diligent and eager to prove their Salafi-jihadist devotion: 
“To prove that I can be as good, or even better than a born Muslim”, “to make clear 
that I am a ferocious believer” are some of the reasons advanced by the informants 
to post the most graphic photos or the most violent videos. As a matter of fact, the 
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participants compete among themselves to see who has the most relevant posts or 
the most committed comments to the jihadist cause. Actual photos of a woman 
dressed in a burka and waving a sword was what first captured my attention to one 
of the Facebook pages. The informant shows much devotion and spends even more 
time in what comes to represent jihad online, therefore, my question to her was: 
“What are your thoughts on online jihad?”  
“I am fighting for life and liberty. I am fighting to show that women and men are 
the same. That is why I want to post photos of war where you can see women 
fighting, or of shahidah.” The images receive comments such as ‘mashallah’, ‘okhti’, 
or ‘insch’Allah okhti’, ‘amin okhti’ or the saying of the ‘takbir’ (Allahu Akbar). Even 
men comment these images with: “I wish you the best okhti. You are a noble wife.”  
What is interesting to highlight here is that right from the login moment, we are 
observing the Salafi-jihadist online narrative being learned and assimilated by the 
first time and being automatically applied into their online ritualization of jihad.  
 
3.4 Online ritualization of jihad, a female perspective 
 
A digital environment is a special structure offering a place for interconnections and 
interactivity between its users at all time. The more symbolism their users attribute 
to the space, the more ritualistic attributes they confer to it, the more they will feel 
emotionally bonded to it: 
 
If you cannot start with ‘Bismillah’ when opening Facebook, know that this means 
that you should not be in fb [Facebook], since your intentions are going to be mean 
and that is what we are going to be judged by. our. acts and intentions [sic].  
 
In the words of Christiane Brosius and Karin Polit (2011: 272): “As a consequence, 
the fabric of media spaces constituting social space and geophysical space through 
rituals challenges our concepts of ‘digitality’ and ‘reality’, space and place.” 
Jocelyne Cesari (2004: 111) makes here an important spatial distinction between 
Islam on the internet or the dissemination of Islamic information and Islam of the 
internet understood as a sphere allowing the existence of particular religious activ-
ities or narratives that otherwise would not be available. Gary Bunt (2009: 22), fol-
lowing the same line of thoughts, highlights the distinct features of Islamic internet 
spaces in the process of the online development of Islamic ritual and Islamic net-
works. 
As Heidi Campbell (2012: 85) states: “It helps explain the ways in which net-
worked society creates new borderlands of interactions between the online and off-
line worlds, between the digital and embodied.” As a matter of fact, being online is 
for these women a sacred experience embodied from the moment their fingers 
press the enter button. 
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As Islamic rituals, contexts and Islamic spaces change, so do the studies of Islamic 
rituals. In fact, ritual practices associated with ‘technologically advanced societies’ 
maybe better referred to as ritualization according to Catherine Bell (1992: 89). To 
the American religious study scholar, the attention should be on ritualization (1992: 
7): “(…) as a strategic way of acting and then turn to explore how and why this way 
of acting differentiates itself from other practices.” 
From now on, the definition presented above will be applied to the online ritu-
alization of jihad, which is to analyze it as a practice that is different from other 
Muslim practices. By doing so, the analyses will focus on performance, interaction, 
agents, message (textual and/or visual), all intervenient categories in the design of 
the social and religious online ritual strategy. Above all, it will focus on the emic 
perspective of jihad, which is their own constructed idea of religiously justified 
violence.  
 
3.4.1 What is the aim of the online ritualization of jihad? 
First, it is necessary to address the fact that jihad is not per se an Islamic ritual al-
though it is treated as so by many Islamic scholars who insist in including it as one 
of the fundamental pillars of Islam. Indeed, it is a ritualistic innovation that allows its 
agents to establish, structure and control all activities that occur in cyberspace in the 
name of jihad. Bell describes it as a “process of formalization and ritualization” (1992: 
148) that makes the invention of traditions possible.  
Second, it is also necessary to address the body as an integral part of the Islamic 
ritual performance and the essence of the process of construction of an Islamic iden-
tity. The prayer (‘salat’) is embedded in physical acts, from the rituals of purity 
(‘tayammum, wudu, ghusl’) to the mandatory movements (standing, bowing, pros-
tration, sitting).  
 
3.4.2 How can this ritual be performed online in the absence of a  
physical presence?  
Online the physical repetition of a body movement, an integral part of any ritual 
activity is not possible in the classic frames of ritual studies. Nevertheless, partici-
pating in online activities requires physical actions: turning on an electronic device, 
writing a password, or moving the mouse into the ‘like’ button. People do engage 
in this set of actions, in a repetitive, sequential way by which they enter a space (in 
many ways perceived as sacred) attributing to these activities a symbolic meaning.  
In the interest of transferring this framework to the ritualization of jihad the at-
tention is pointed to all online activities expressing this complex Islamic concept. 
And there are plenty of activities, from videos, to photos or simple mentions to the 
sacred Muslim texts.  
In what concerns the Spanish legal framework of online jihadist activities, the 
Spanish Supreme Court considers them a crime of terrorism, as equal as engaging 
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on physical and direct terrorist acts. An example is the arrest in 2013, of a young 
man during the police investigation (operation Kafka), accused of inciting jihadist 
actions via Facebook through compliments praising Al-Qaeda’s ideology and moti-
vating other Facebook users to conduct suicide operations in the name of jihad.18 
Hence, violence and ritualization of violence are categories pertaining to the 
analysis of online ritualization of jihad. Pierre Bourdieu (1977: 107) asserts that the 
“ritualization of violence in fighting is doubtless one of the most typical manifesta-
tions of the dialectic of strategy and ritual (...).” To the development of online ritual-
ization more important than the discipline of the body is the discipline of the mind. 
The cognitive activities concerning online sharing and/or production of religious 
knowledge are the emanation of digital power. Awan, Hoskins and O’Loughlin (2011: 
16-19) associate the acceptation and legitimation of the violent online jihadist mes-
sage as a practice of cognitive dissonance involving mental acts like ‘framing’ (pro-
mote a particular moral evaluation), ‘priming’ (preferential selection of news stories) 
and ‘issuing takfiri’ (delegitimizing their opponents and sanctioning the shedding of 
Muslim blood). 
Boyer and Lienard (2005: 3) argue that ritualization is the product of the conju-
gation of ‘two specialized cognitive systems’. The first being the motivational system 
and the second the separation of action into ‘meaningful units’ both grounded in a 
‘precautionary system’, that is induced by strangers and that pressures, threats, or 
socially offends the individual. 
In the case of jihadist individuals and moreover in the case of Spanish-speaking 
jihadist women it is the way that the offline world pressures, threats, and socially 
offends them (due to their specific religious dressing code they became easily iden-
tified targets) that induces the emotional transfer into the online sphere. During my 
offline fieldwork in Catalonia, I collected a considerable amount of data by inter-
viewing Muslim women and by observing their daily life. The common feeling 
among the Spanish Muslim women can be summed up to the answer that I received 
from a young woman:  
 
People stop me on the street to tell me to take my scarf, to insult me, why don’t they 
focus instead in the young people at the park using drugs? At the airport and at other 
police controlled spaces I feel the pressure of being a Muslim. 
 
Last, when analyzing the practice of ritualization Bell claims that ritualization can 
promote social solidarity (1992: 216) and we can find examples being disseminated 
on Facebook over and over, from relationship advices to exchanging iftar19 recipes, 
passing to pragmatic indications on how to arrive in Syria, the sisterhood bond is 
tangible even online. 
                                                 
18 http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2013/04/11/barcelona/1365680412.html 
19 Ramadan dinner. 
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The bonding among the participants, is a feature that Bell views as the result of 
ritualization (1992: 193): 
 
Such stringent ritualization has the powerful effect of tightly binding one to a small 
community of like-minded people. Indeed, one of the salient features of extreme 
ritualization appears to be a high-profile identity as a tight-knit group of true follow-
ers, a position that heightens the contrast and ill fit with other groups. 
 
In the next section, we will see the importance of shared ritualistic online perfor-
mances in the formation of a digital community. 
 
3.5 From digital sisterhood to sisters in arms in Shams  
 
Belonging, community and identity are therefore three social products resulting of 
the process of ritualization. In fact, and in the words of Brosius and Polit (2011: 269): 
“(…) ritual is the practice proving that a sense of belonging can become a social fact 
through practicing ritualized actions.” 
Belonging and its correlation to the establishment of group membership is also 
an operative concept for Douglas Marshall (2002: 2). Indeed, online users may be 
seen as social units who through their networks efforts and transition processes 
constitute their own digital communities. The period of transition between being a 
part of an offline community into becoming a part of the online sisterhood is that 
of a ‘liminal state’ as Victor Turner (2007) described it, a time of transition, a time 
when the emotional bond will produce the necessary acceptation of new messages 
and beliefs. As Hans Ulrich Sanner (2011: 116) states: “The liminal, ‘betwixt and be-
tween’ phase of rituals is an ideal medium for the symbolic communication of sacred 
truths about the composition of society and cosmos.” 
To Brosius and Polit (2011: 268) we have to also underline the value of the trans-
fer of rituals, especially in periods of social crises, wars (as the one in Syria): 
 
Further, rituals, the transfer of rituals, as well as the transformation of rituals, often 
play crucial roles at times of conflict, insecurity, or dramatic change in communities 
and societies, to the extent that even new communities and public or private spheres 
emerge. 
 
In terms of affective sense of belonging, the okhtis are very keen on making the new 
users feel comfortable and above all to feel that they belong to the sisterhood. Elke 
Mader (2011: 473) reflects on the affective perspective of ‘communitas’: “Further-
more, communitas (…) was emerging, and was expressed in intense communication, 
empathy, and cooperation in emotional, as well as organizational, matters.”  
The three features mentioned above about communitas (communication, empa-
thy and cooperation) are visible for instance, when the digital sisters choose a similar 
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(sometimes even the same) profile photo on Facebook. Another evidence is that 
they share their contacts through WhatsApp (an internet messaging tool). Their per-
sonal level of involvement constructed online is visible on their private remarks 
about their personal problems, which they share with detailed information.  
Identity construction is also ‘an emotional commitment through which people 
experience their autobiographical selves’, says Gabriel Marranci (2006: 7). They seek 
advice, opinion (frequently accompanied by quotations of the sacred texts) or just 
comfort from one another:  
 
my dear beloved sister X, m [sic] I m so worried abt [sic] you all the time..dont know 
frm [sic] where that sort of love comes form. everytime I get yr [sic] post I get relieved 
that ur [sic] there safe Alhamdullilah. Plz [sic] take my love, lots of duas for u[sic]. 
  
On one side, the online connections and interactions further down the ‘together-
ness’ of the digital sisterhood. On the other side, it produces an impact on their 
offline emotional structure. Don Radlauer (2007: 74), co-founder of the Institute for 
the Study of Asymmetric Conflict, comments about the continuity between digital 
community and offline existence as so: 
 
By providing a sense of ‘otherness’ from ordinary society, extremist virtual commu-
nities can also deepen their members’ alienation from their surroundings, reducing 
their normal inhibitions against violence while increasing their ability to perform as 
‘sleepers’. 
 
Aisha is a young Muslim woman who enjoys her sweets with almond and honey and 
the sunny days in Spain. Her time is filled with her Facebook page, posting romantic 
photos of the ideal future husband. The prospective husband is a good-looking 
Muslim, strong and with loving eyes, carries a gun and on his forehead, he has the 
green banner of the shahid. Behind him, a young Muslim woman, dressed in a 
floating black abaya and hijab raises her hands to pray. Aisha wants to be that okhti 
in the image, better even, Aisha is willing to be another okhti, the one that is a true 
fighter and she posts a new photo. This time the okhti stands in front, wearing total 
black while waving a modified assault weapon with one arm and holding a child in 
the other. I asked her:  
 
I asked her: “Would you participate in a jihadist fight?” 
“I am very much willing to, thanks and praises to God.” 
 
And she keeps on searching online for fatwas on jihadist women, for hadiths and 
comments on the Qur’an that justify her favorite subject: ‘Jihad fisabililah’ (‘Jihad for 
the cause of Allah’). 
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I use the internet all the time to search and to share information about Tawhid,20 
Da’wa or to watch what is going on in Syria and Palestine. I also use it to connect 
myself with the other sisters. We help each other to become better Muslim women. 
We all seek a deeper understanding of Islam and on how to engage on jihad and it 
is more comfortable to do it among okhti. 
 
A common trait to my informant’s online interactions is humor, for instance one of 
the informants posted a photo of a 9mm weapon with the comment: “Did you al-
ways question what is inside of a woman’s purse? Well, a 9mm thus…” to what the 
other okhtis reply to with comments such as: “Thought you would get one in pink”, 
“I have to get one myself”. 
Exchanges similar to this one are frequent and since some of the okhtis started 
to arrive in Syria, they have evolved from posting pictures of children crying along-
side their dead parents’ bodies to inquiring about practical information. ‘How do I 
get to Raqqa’,21 ‘Do you get enough to eat there?’, ‘How can I book a hotel?’, ‘What 
is the best itinerary?’ or ‘Do you have internet connection?’ are part of the questions 
that the okhtis that already performed the hijra22(‘migration to jihadist war scenar-
ios’) are confronted online by the other okhtis. 
In the opinion of one okhti, the hijra to Shams23 “(…) was in adherence to the 
path of Ibrāhīm (sallallāhu ‘alayhi wa sallam) who established for them the tradition 
of declaring enmity and hatred towards the mushrikīn [polytheists] and their 
tawāghīt [disbelievers].” 
Her definition is a direct application of Salafi-jihadism doctrine, as followers de-
fend that the founding principle of ‘millat Ibrahim’ (‘religion of Abraham’) is the 
concept of ‘al-wala’ wal bara’ (‘loyalty and renunciation’) as it was defined by the 
Jordanian scholar (accredited as one of the most important jihadist thinkers) Al-
Maqdisi24 (1959-). Hence, the Salafi-jihadists justify the displacement (‘hijra’) of men 
and women to the region as a part of their individual duty to jihad (‘Jihad al-
fard’ayn’). Online sheiks have been dedicating their time on issuing fatwa about the 
subject. Several of them agree with the role of women in jihad being confined to 
motherhood, praying, domestic activities and to the moral support of their hus-
bands. In fact, many of the women think that jihadist contents should also be en-
larged to the ones reflecting their role as a mother and as a wife. The mother’s sup-
port and educator role is therefore understood as a way of doing jihad and posting 
it online is a way of promoting and teaching other ohkti about it. 
                                                 
20 ‘Tawhid’ means Allah is One and Unique. 
21 North-Centre of Syria. 
22 Name given in Arabic to the migration of the Prophet Mohammed from Mecca to Medina. 
23 Historical Arabic denomination to the region of the Great Syria. 
24  To better understand the written work of Al-Maqdisi, I recommend the book of Joas 
Wagemakers (2012b), A Quietist Jihadi: The Ideology and Influence of Abu Muhammad al-
Maqdisi, Cambridge University Press. 
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Others expand these activities to the performance of online da’wa.25 “How do 
you perform da’wa online?” I questioned her after seeing she had a post with the 
title ‘The role of the Muslim women in the Da’wa’. By it, she gave instructions to her 
okhtis on how to be and to behave as a good Muslim wife, and how to support their 
husbands in their call for jihad fisabililah. The obligation of the women is to follow 
the example of model Muslim women (like Khadija, Umm Salama or Umm Imarah) 
and online they can do it by posting photos with instructions on how to wear the 
hijab or the niqah but also by posting pictures of jihadist male fighters.  
Sheik Yusuf al Qaradawi,26 the Egyptian Islamic theologian issued a fatwa were 
he justifies women participation in jihad as part of their individual Islamic duties in 
order to fight the occupation of Muslim land: 
 
(…) I believe a woman can participate in this form of jihad according to her own means 
and condition. Also, the organizers of these martyr operations can benefit from some, 
believing women as they may do, in some cases, what is impossible for men to do. 
 
Still, during my Facebook research on the online diaries of jihadist women living in 
Syria (or Iraq), I did not find one narrative accounting their direct intervention in a 
battle, or even that they receive any weaponry training. As an example, one 
informant posted a photo of her 9mm gun saying: “Been six months here, still I don’t 
know how to use kalash [sic]. I only know how to use 9mm calibre.” 
‘The stories of Muslim women who are now fighters of Allah’, or ‘Feminine Fight-
ers of Allah’ are the titles of Facebook photo albums seeking online support or re-
cruitment for the fight in Syria. Mali, Somalia and Palestine are other jihadist fight 
scenarios that appear in these albums. In it, diverse war/violent photos of women 
that are now living in Syria with the description of their story are displayed and 
commented by the okhti.  
However, these albums revealed three striking features: they were created by 
male individuals; the male individuals are the one’s inciting and praising women’s 
participation in jihadist conflicts; and finally, and third, they justify their posts and 
photos with Suras and/or hadiths such as Sura Al Nisa 4:74: “Those who readily fight 
in the cause of God are those who forsake this world in favor of the Hereafter. Who-
ever fights in the cause of God, then gets killed, or attains victory, we will surely 
grant him a great recompense.” Passages such as this one are selected out of their 
                                                 
25 On this matter, it is interesting to notice that the digital sisterhood is well alert of the online 
privacy sets and correspondent dangers: “Assalamu Alaikum Warahmatullah Wabarkatuh [sic]. 
... my sister in Islam, u [sic] should maintain some strategy, u [sic] r [sic] doing da’wa, good, 
but do not share personal matters, be careful of ur [sic] safety, may ALLAH protect u [sic] from 
all evil and devil ... ameen FI AMANILLAH …” 
26 http://www.meforum.org/646/the-qaradawi-fatwas 
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‘Okhti online’ is a digital sisterhood aiming first to share and spread jihadist con-
tents, secondly to support the jihadist conflict scenarios and thirdly to become a real 
life jihadist fighter. Jihad is perceived and performed by Spanish-speaking jihadist 
women on Facebook under their gendered construction, as sisters, mothers, and 
wives and as women. Yet, violence is defended through photos, images and videos 
but also through comments and declarations. Declarations that have a clear mes-
sage. These women are willing to transfer their online jihadist performances into real 
war scenarios. Furthermore, the online active role of the okhti associated with the 
changes on the jihadism as a social movement are transforming women’s independ-
ency on social and religious level. However, the most important factor in this trans-
formation has been the interference of modern Islamic academics as well as the 
online sheikhs who are giving legitimacy to the role of women in the jihadist fight 
issuing fatwa ruling in favor of the okhti right to participate in the jihad fight. Ob-
serving jihadist women online (in this case on Facebook) demonstrates that the way 
they are practicing their faith online is also changing how they practice their faith 
offline. Moreover, that the okhti online radicalization process is being successful cat-
apulting the roles of these jihadist women: “Sister, what’s the hardest thing for you 
there? Nothing beats the palpitation that a Mujahid’s wife has whilst checking list 
names of the Martyrs.” For Samira Yerou nothing made her heart beat faster than 
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The significance of Web 2.0 to Jihad 3.0 –  
Female jihadists making sense of religious violence 
on Facebook27 
Abstract  
The jihadist phenomenon has a privileged space in Web 2.0 where contents can be 
created, networks can be global and all exchanges of information have significance. 
The emergent jihadist organizations have been profiting from these digital commu-
nication features to enlarge, diversify and connect with their audience.  
On the one side, the digital framing of jihad through the manipulation of the 
sacred Islamic texts and its transformation into an ‘authentic’ religious discourse has 
given the jihadists an opportunity to justify any religious violence associated with 
the performance of jihad(ism). On the other side, the digital performance of jihad 
through a ritualization process that combines ritualistic innovation with the use of 
cyber tools has allured individuals to engage and participate in jihadist acts, both 
online and offline. Moreover, and in the light of the jihadist warfare in the Middle 
East, the chapter will reveal the importance of online ritualization of jihad into shap-
ing these individual representations into a community both offline and online. 
 
4.1 Digital jihadism, embedded, embodied and everyday28 
 
Back in 2005, O’Reilly coined the expression ‘Web 2.0’ to explain the World Wide 
Web as a social platform, later Fuchs (2005: 137) would add an important perspec-
tive to the understanding of the Web 2.0, a perspective that hits a higher note when 
we speak about online jihadism, namely surveillance:  
 
One important characteristic of many contemporary web platforms is that they store, 
process, assess and sell large amounts of personal information and usage behavior 
                                                 
27 Adapted from the published article: Carvalho, C., (2015) The importance of Web 2.0 for Jihad 
3.0: Female jihadists coming to grips with religious violence on Facebook. In Post, P. & Sparks, 
L. (eds.), The study of culture through the lens of ritual. (=Netherlands Studies in Ritual and 
Liturgy 15). Instituut voor Christelijk Erfgoed/Instituut voor Liturgische en Rituele Studies, 37-
53. 
28 Implicit reference to the book of Christine Hine: Ethnography for the Internet, embedded, 
embodied and everyday (Huntingdon: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2015).  
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data. It is therefore important to theorize Web 2.0 surveillance and conduct empirical 
research about the surveillance and privacy implications of Web 2.0. 
 
During an online discussion between the members of the Association for Internet 
Researchers on how to better name the fourth age of internet studies, Barry 
Wellman, a household name on the matter of internet research (networks, digital 
communities, communication, computers, methods), advanced the idea of Digital 
Media Studies, in order to integrate in it the studies of ‘Internet of Things’ and of 
‘Mobile’. 
Consequently, the digital space where we find ourselves and others being online 
is enlarged to include mobile operational devices, M2M (machine to machine) ap-
plications implicating that networks of communication are now endless in terms of 
time, space, location and participants. 
Muslim women benefit from the social networking capacities of the Web 2.0, 
they especially benefit from free mobility without any type of religious restrictions 
(no need for a male companion, mahram, for instance).  
The practical, easy, and accessible mechanisms of Web 2.0 confer the Muslim 
women with an egalitarian online role. Online they have the same power of creating 
content, of collaborating, participating and designing their own social networks. 
However, the embodied online experience for these women means still being Mus-
lim, so still subjecting their online freedom, mobility and interaction to the rules of 
moral religious behavior. To list just some of the online religious behaviors observed 
by Muslim women in general, I can refer to numerous posts on the importance of 
not posting personal photos, more in particular photos of their own faces (unless 
they have the hijab, Islamic head cover, on), and on not accepting men in their Face-
book accounts. By engaging on these moral online fundamentals, they feel that they 
are making a sacred sense out of the web. The other facet of making a sacred sense 
of the web is to use it as a means to spread Islamic knowledge, more specifically 
Salafi-jihadist knowledge. The task of disseminating Islamic knowledge (da’wa) goes 
together with the task of also giving advice (nasiha) on religious matters to other 
sisters. The two tasks are an everyday practice for online female jihadists to the ex-
tent that they incorporate it, in brackets, to their profile names:29 Maryam maryam 
(Salafism counsellor). 
Online jihadism is a cultural, political and religious phenomenon embedded in 
Web 2.0. Web 2.0 is the ‘new media ecology’ (Awan, Hoskins & O’Loughlin 2011; 
Sisler 2011) where individuals create their own content, where ownership of data is 
                                                 
29 The Spanish Muslim women use fake names as their profile names. The fake names repre-
sent religious expressions, for example, ‘Muslim by the Grace of God’, or their motherhood, 
for example, ‘Umm Amin’. Although the names are fake, I still name the participants differently 
from their profile names to preserve their anonymity.  
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substituted by sharing data, where collaboration, cooperation and establishment of 
networks are vital components. 
Jihadism (Al-Qaradawi 1998; Armstrong 1988; Cook 2005b; Lawrence 2005) is 
the operating concept of my research and therefore the guiding element of the in-
terviews (via instant messaging) that I conducted with my online informants. My 
research aim is to understand the way in which they make meaning of jihadism and 
jihadism online. For the present chapter, I will select one of the most recent defini-
tions of jihadism by Fawaz Gerges who reckons that the jihadist movement has en-
tered its third wave with the surge of ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria). Gerges 
relates the evolution of jihadism with the ISIS tactical lines: “ISIS’s swift military ex-
pansion stems from its ability not only to terrorize enemies but also to co-opt local 
Sunni communities, using networks of patronage and privilege” (Gerges 2014: 340). 
To grasp the ideological propositions of jihadism more concretely of the propo-
sitions of Salafi-jihadism (Kepel 1985), attention needs to be given to the Sunni 
theological school, Salafism (Meijer 2010; Wagemakers 2012: 145-164; Wiktorowicz 
2001). Etymologically speaking, Salafism derives from al-salaf al-salih (the pious 
predecessors who were contemporaries of the Prophet) and defends the strict ob-
servation of the Sunna and refusal of theological innovations (bid’a), the proclama-
tion of the unity of God (tawhid), the declaration of excommunication (takfir) and 
the purification of practices. 
Facebook has been a privileged location to the promotion of jihadism among 
women. My female participants have this to say about how others make sense of 
their online performance: “Violent, us? That makes me furiosa (‘furious’ in Spanish). 
If by defending Islam, the Prophet (PUB) and jihad we are violent, well so be it, we 
are violent women!”  
 
4.2 Furiosa – Digital research(er) on Facebook 
 
I first started my online fieldwork on Facebook with an open profile and a direct link 
to my university webpage. In a couple of months, I had a network of more than 50 
‘friends’ or informants and I was joining groups under the jihadist theme. My first 
methodological step to collect meaningful data was to monitor Spanish Muslim 
women who had open source jihadist contents, then to add them as friends or follow 
them, sketch their connections and finally to establish text contact with these 
women. 
I have used the following criteria to select my participants: female30 Spanish-
speaking individuals who indicate to live in the area of Catalonia, who claim to be 
                                                 
30 To have a comparative measure, I have been also doing observation research throughout 
male Facebook accounts. The result of the observation was interesting. The Spanish-speaking 
Muslim males keep having a jihadist profile on Facebook. Some of them are even reporting 
directly from Syria, posting pictures of their daily lives. 
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Muslims (Born-Muslims and/or converted Muslims) and who produce violent con-
tents online. I draw their connections and establish their social networks through 
the perspective of their shared interested in jihadism, which leads to the inclusion 
of:  
 
• Female participants who are from and/or have relatives in Morocco; 
• Female participants who live in Morocco, The Netherlands, Belgium and/or 
France; 
• Female participants who communicate in Spanish, transliterated Arabic and 
French. 
 
That was until February of 2015, when my Facebook account was blocked by the 
digital quality of my online activities reflecting ‘my sympathy for jihadism’. I not have 
an inch of sympathy for violence of any kind. However, as an online user, I identified 
with the feelings my informant had shared, furiosa, or furious because I had invested 
much time and effort in constructing a relationship with these women, to line up 
their networks, to collect and select relevant data to my research. In the previous 
section, we have seen that the digital space is still being defined and explored by 
academia. To the novelty of the research space, we have to add a series of obstacles 
that come with the digital territory: authenticity of sources, irregular working times, 
immediacy of the data and in the case of jihadism research, the sensitivity of the 
subject of religious violence.  
As a digital space, Facebook is a paradox in its formulation and decision making 
in what can be defined as violent content. The acceptance and the refusal of certain 
contents without a coherent pattern leads to the questioning of what Facebook ad-
ministrators define as violent content. When conducting ethnography online I aim 
at analyzing the meaning that individuals attribute to their performances online. In 
fact, after the blocking episode I started to question myself how do I formulate this 
event: ‘I was blocked’, or, ‘my account was blocked’? The answer is that I need to 
reflect on the embodied experience of being online, as I will address further in this 
chapter. 
Even with such administrative delimitations Facebook represents still for jihadist 
individuals an interesting open space because here they can act as if they have reli-
gious authority, as Nico Prucha (2011: 43) acknowledges, “within these Online Ter-
ritories of Terror, the jihadists assume the role of authoritative religious scholars, 
who define what is legal and who the ‘enemies of Islam’ (...) are.” 
Facebook is therefore the adequate platform to disseminate distorted religious 
Islamic values and to wave violence as an Islamic sword. Or in the words of Hans 
Kippenberg (2011: 175): “The change from toleration of the unbelievers to violence 
against them is a central theme of Islamic theology. Some Muslim scholars hold that 
the ‘sword verse’ has replaced other revelations that sound a different note.” 
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Contemporary Muslim scholars have the digital techniques (simple, clear theo-
logical messages) that grant them ‘celebrity sheikh’ (Brachman & Levine 2011: 30) 
status. Anwar al-Awalaki (1971-2011) was and still is a celebrity Salafi-jihadist sheikh 
capturing the global attention of jihadists. In this chapter, I consider the significant 
theological model by which Awalaki presented Islamic migration (hijra) and violent 
jihad as the educative (tarbiyah) guidelines (Meleagrou-Hitchens 2011: 40) that 
could foster the identity of the Islamic community (umma). 
In the meantime, I opened a new Facebook account and partially restored my 
former network of informants, only this time I was more careful and gave preference 
to open source jihadist contents in the form of images, photos or texts. My choice 
of method to collect and select the data reflects once again the sensitivity of the 
subject of religious violence as well as the vulnerability of the digital researcher. 
The present chapter will develop around the question: How are the Spanish-
speaking jihadist women making sense of both jihadism and online environments 
included in the Web 2.0 definition, namely, of Facebook as the preferred social net-
working platform (Boyd & Ellison 2007: 210-230), to create a sacred space that re-
inforces the ritualization of online jihad and at the same time the acceptance of 
religious violence as a mandatory ritual?  
In Section 4.3, I will detail the definition of online ritualization of jihad, funda-
mental to comprehend the promotion of religious violence.  
 
4.3 Online ritualization of jihad 
 
In this study, I draw on the ritualization notion developed by Catherine Bell (1992: 
91) as “(…) a way of acting that specifically establishes a privileged contrast, differ-
entiating itself as more important or powerful.” 
Jihadist scholars do in fact aim at establishing themselves as having the most 
powerful extremist ideology, and one of the strategies they employ to attain their 
goal of domination is online ritualization of religious violence, i.e., “(…) a ritualistic 
innovation that allows its agents to establish, structure and control all activities that 
occur in cyberspace in the name of Jihad” (Carvalho 2014: 32). 
I will now bring together the notion of ‘ritualized body’ with the notion of ‘em-
bodiment’ in cyberspace. This is important to understand the online ritualization of 
jihad. The ‘ritualized body’ was defined by Catherine Bell (1992: 98) as “a body in-
vested with the ‘sense’ of ritual”. It is in her vision a product of the dynamic relation-
ship between ritualization and the ‘structuring environment’. 
Online space is the ‘structuring environment’ where ritualization occurs and pro-
duces the online ‘ritualized body’, however the task of describing the online embod-
iment is a theoretical challenge. A challenge that Christine Hine faced in her most 
recent work, Ethnography for the Internet: Embedded, embodied and everyday (2015). 
The author considers that ‘being online’ is another example of the “embodied ways 
of being and acting in the world” (2015: 14) and therefore “the internet user is an 
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embodied user” (2015: 43). David Bell in his book on cyberculture addresses the 
online body presence with the terms “digital meat” and “the flesh made code” (2011: 
156). 
Following online body representations and the communication through physical 
manifestations, Nanako Hayami (2004: 5) questions the significance of the ritualized 
body in the contemporary society. He directs the answer to applications such as the 
‘emotion icons’, symbols that represent ‘human facial expressions of feelings’, be-
cause “even in the absence of the physical human face, the importance of the face 
remains” (Hayami 2004: 6). 
The main categories of Islamic rituals are the shahada, or the declaration of faith 
by which one officially becomes a Muslim, the salat or prayer (performed five times 
a day), the zakat, the act of giving to the poor people of the Muslim community, 
sawm, fasting and hajj, the pilgrimage to the holy city of Mecca in Saudi Arabia.  
The Islamic rituals can be studied on three principles: spiritual submission, body 
conformity and purity. According to the Islamic dogma, the performance of the rit-
uals is anticipated by the act of voluntarily submitting them to the will of Allah, in 
other words, the believer engages the worship activities with the feeling of wanting 
to obey the divine laws. The feeling of obedience and respect for the rituals is suc-
ceeded by the physical ability to perform all the five pillars of Islam. The believer 
needs to have a sane body to the extent that Islamic jurisprudence dispenses people 
who have body disabilities or problems. At the same time, the bodily discipline re-
quired to execute the prayers is also an instrument to conform mind and spirit to 
the sake of the faith. The respect for and of the body is inserted in Islamic living via 
the Qur’an and maybe seen in themes such as funeral rites or the covering of inti-
mate parts of the body (awra). 
The last principle, the principle of purity (tahara) concerns mind, physique and 
environment, more specifically all Muslims should have pure intentions (niya), pure 
bodies (ghusl) and a pure Islamic community (umma). In fact, jihad and martyrdom 
due to their features and as commands of Allah belong to the ‘ritual-purity’ themes 
(Gauvain 2013: 169). Kippenberg concurs with the idea that in order to be consid-
ered an act of jihad, the individual needs to act in conscience when inflicting death 
‘against the impure’ (2011: 65). The linkage between purification rituals, blood and 
jihad shapes the justification that Salafi-jihadist scholars needed to promote reli-
gious violence. 
Women initialize the process of online ritualization of jihad by the same methods 
of theological purification as presented above. First, they consider the online space 
as a sacred space that they need to respect in the same way they respect the 
mosque. The online intentions (niya) need to be pure and oriented to the benefit of 
God being the guiding principle that leads to the legitimization and acceptation of 
violent jihadist performances. 
Section 4.4 will analyze how Facebook surveillance and censorship features are 
carving the new phase of online jihadism. 
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4.4 Jihad 3.0 – ‘Boiling the frog’31 
 
The development of a jihadist global communication strategy has its roots in Al-
Qaeda’s activities to disseminate their messages throughout the world. In fact, Al-
Qaeda understood the strategic value of the web as a vital way to attract more ad-
herents to its cause. 
ISIS is Jihad 3.0 as the North-American newspaper New York Times pointed out 
in August 2014. The jihadist organization took Al-Qaeda’s online project further 
down a notch by guaranteeing a continuous stream of contents to flow in the cyber 
space. Moreover, jihadist ISIS contents are found in all forms of social networking, 
chatting, blogging, messaging available online. The contents are well thought, well 
elaborated, using simple texts but powerful imagery so that they reach a larger au-
dience. Most importantly, they are translated in a variety of languages. The contents 
are also tailor made, according to gender, generation and geographical positioning 
of the audience. ISIS has been aiming specially at gaining the hearts and minds of 
the youth working on closing the gap that Al-Qaeda with its senior elements had 
not managed to do (Torres Soriano 2007: 1-3). 
Finally, the online jihadist contents of ISIS are a professional production employ-
ing cutting-edge digital tools in order to grant an expanding audience. They also 
have enough readiness and preparation to quickly adapt, move and settle into new 
cyber scenarios. Indeed, the jihadist phenomenon is continuously evolving within 
the ‘new media ecology’ space that characterizes the Web 2.0. One of the main fac-
tors promoting online evolution and modification of the jihadist landscape is the 
topic of ‘trust and privacy’ (Dwyer, Hiltz & Passerini 2007). Likewise, the efficiency 
and diligence of Facebook’ censorship program are causing jihadist individuals to 
act online in a more precautionary fashion. Facebook administrators are particularly 
effective and fast in detecting jihadist contents. Once the Facebook administration 
signalizes jihadist contents (‘activation of all types of alarms’ as I was told in my case 
by an internal source) the correspondent accounts are cancelled. For a comparative 
analysis on censorship on online social networking, I can report to fieldwork I have 
done on Tumblr where jihadist users blog on a daily basis jihadist related contents 
(photos, images, texts). The violent contents on Tumblr are graphic; the names of 
the users and their comments clearly indicate their jihadist affiliation, yet censorship 
in this social platform is less effective than on Facebook or even on Twitter. 
                                                 
31 In the popular story, ‘Boiling the frog’, a frog that is placed in hot water jumps directly, a 
frog that is placed in cold water that slowly warms up does not read the alarming signs that 
will lead to his death. Surveillance and censorship are the hot water that made Jihad 3.0 jump 
to other forms of online identification. The same analogy was used to the question of com-
puters, privacy and personal data protection in the business world by the Advise Project. I 
apply it here as the image of frogs was actually used in the context of representing jihadism. 
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Aware of the censorship measures, online jihadist users are in the process of 
transforming all the elements that gave away their online jihadist identity. Black 
horses, banners, lions and other commonly jihadist associated images are now giv-
ing place to a ‘gentle Jihad’ (Barber 1996: 171). The details of the profile photos 
enclose good indicators of how the individual wants to be perceived online, from 
the close-up photo, to the use of well-known jihadist pictures, or symbolic repre-
sentations of their current feelings towards a certain theme, that only a trained au-
dience will be able to read the underline meaning. For example, since Mohammed 
Morsi (former head of the Muslim Brotherhood and former President of Egypt) was 
condemned to death, many jihadists have chosen the image/photo of a frog to be 
their profile. The frog represents the first fatwa issued after Morsi assumed the gov-
ernment of Egypt and refers to the need to protect the frogs as they were special 
creatures to God, “a frog’s croaking is praise [to Allah].” The profile picture in this 
case is a clear indication of political and religious stands, furthermore of the solidar-
ity of the network members to the jihadist cause represented by the Muslim Broth-
erhood. 
Despite all censorship online to control, filter or block jihadist contents, Jihad 3.0 
has been resistant to all these obstacles and thriving to have an even stronger and 
ramified online presence. Section 5 will discuss the role of imagery in the new online 
jihadist female profile. 
 
4.5 Black butterflies and blue names – Imagery, meaning and 
communication 
 
In the case of jihadist women online, the more rigid norms of surveillance and cen-
sorship (both by Facebook administration and by police and security forces), made 
them be more careful with their online activities and less available for interviews. 
The new online control made the jihadist women change their profile pictures from 
classic jihad symbols to other pictures, such as compositions of flowers, birds, small 
texts (‘I love my prophet’) or generic photos representing Muslim women. They sel-
dom post selfies, or self-portraits. In this day and age, however, selfies and social 
media platforms are inseparable components of the embodied online being. Muslim 
women are directly affected by the posting of personal photos, selfies online be-
cause it is an offense to their honor (ird) in the eyes of Islamic dispositions. In real-
ity, this new form of self-representation clashes with the Islamic jurisprudence on 
photography (taswir)32 but does not stop jihadist individuals from posting personal 
profile photos online. There is a debate around the permissibility (mubah) or forbid-
dance (haram) to share personal photos online among the scholars and among 
                                                 
32 Photography and statues as well, the legal framework on the matter is related with ISIS 
destruction of Human Heritage sites and with the attacks on cartoonists who depicted images 
about the Prophet. 
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Muslim believers. An informant of mine just recently posted a fatwa she collected 
online about putting personal pictures on websites, especially Facebook and Twitter:  
 
I say that the images of souls are haram and kaba’ir (‘grave sins’). The Messenger 
(PUB) said: Those who will be most severely punished on the Day of Judgment will 
be those who make images. (…) And by this we know that it is not allowed to publish 
photos (pictures) of people on Twitter, Facebook or other networks.33 
 
Besides religious reasons there are also surveillance reasons to change their names 
from ‘Umm’ into for instance, ‘Black butterfly’, where the imagery enclosed in the 
name hides its deepest symbolism (death). The contents do no longer present a 
direct, obvious link to jihadism or to the jihadist fight in Syria. They do however 
continue to approach the Salafi-jihadist doctrine and the passages of the Qur’an 
and of the Sunna that according to the Salafi-jihadi doctrine justifies violent jihad. 
In this sense, the themes that are associated with Salafi-jihadi theory, eschatology, 
salvation, Paradise references either through imagery or texts continue to appear in 
a frequent way.  
Jihadist videos are an equally vital source of jihadist embodied online perfor-
mances, either we speak about executions or war scenes. Violent footages continue 
to be well accepted within the online jihadist community but they are being gradu-
ally substituted by other videos that highlight the soft jihadist lifestyle. 
As we saw in the introduction, Facebook has a ‘complicated’ relationship with 
jihadist contents and videos are no exception. Knowing that the videos are the first 
items to be reported or blocked by Facebook administrators, part of the thrill of 
using this online space to publish them, is for the producers the online chase and 
the possibility of getting it out on the digital space. As for the consumers and ana-
lysts, the thrill is still being able to watch this content, before it is taken down by the 
administrators. 
In a Facebook community account entitled ‘Meaning and Understanding of Ji-
had’ that I had access to via an informant, the administrator explains the goal of the 
page: “This Page is to Enlighten those About The Greater Jihad which is in the Bat-
tlefield for the sake of Allah and True Islam. May Allah guide us!!!” A set of elabo-
rated compositions of images with small poignant sentences are the core of his/her 
productions. May 17th 2015, a new video was placed under the title: ‘Mujahideen’s 
response to the HATERS, Speech by Muhammad bin Abid.’ The speech is in English, 
spoken by a male voice using a sermon tone and its main message is about the 
qualities and sacrifices the Mujahedeen/Mujahidun (‘jihadist fighters’) have and do 
for the protection of the umma. The narrator has a stronger message for the listen-
ers living comfortably in the Western nations, eating fast food and not supporting 
                                                 
33 Transcriptions will be directly translated into English due to the limitation of words. 
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the jihadist fighters: they should be ready to embrace their near future, death with-
out salvation. He keeps the speech on the emotional side appealing to all kinds of 
feelings from gratitude to sympathy for the jihadist fighters. It ends with an appeal 
to the change of hearts towards the jihadists so that to please God and guarantee 
His forgiveness.  
The comments made by the followers of this page are the most interesting as-
pect; they just mention and notify a friend (placing the name of the friend in blue 
letters). The name notifications are a Facebook interactive tool that links the post to 
the friend’s page hence spreading the content through multiple recipients. The in-
teractive tools have a direct impact on the construction of social networks: suddenly 
participants without connections to each other are marked together in the same 
post. For instance, a woman liked and marked four other women in this post. We 
therefore need to multiply these four participants by the number of women that 
they are ‘friends’ with to have an estimation of how many women are now aware of 
the existence of the video that aims at giving meaning and value to the role of ji-
hadist fighters. Due to these circles of communication, and notwithstanding the at-
tempts to keep gender separation (in respect for Islamic social rules) these attempts 
end up being frustrated on Facebook as men and women become associated to the 
same content.  
Here, I will just make a quick remark on gender online coexistence: the concern 
of respecting and keeping gender separation as an online behavioral principle only 
reinforces the sacred value individuals attribute to the online space. In the offline 
world, Muslims follow and respect the rules of gender separation and if they extend 
this Islamic principle of conduct to the online space it is because in their perspective, 
the digital space has a sacred value.  
Back to the circles of communication, they broaden women’s meaning of the 
online jihadist contents by being exposed to information that would not be acces-
sible to them in the offline space.   
In Section 4.6, I will deal with my online and offline case study of female jihadism 
in Spain. 
 
4.6 Immigrants in digital space 
 
Spain and Morocco have a historical connection that dates back to centuries ago, a 
geographical connection that goes over the Gibraltar Strait and a shared social ex-
perience that links the population from both nations. 
During the 1970s, the first Moroccan immigrants started to arrive in Spain, first 
as guest workers, mainly men, travelling alone and returning after a short period 
back to their homeland (Empez Vidal 2007). A decade later, Madrid signed the 
agreement to be part of the European Community (after the Maastricht Treaty in 
1993 it was denominated as European Union) and the country’s economy entered a 
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phase of exponential growth and development. Labor was in demand and workers 
being given the legal permission to extend their stay and bring along their families. 
Catalonia pursued the same open immigration policy, encouraging North African 
people from across the Mediterranean to work and live in the province. Catalonia is 
these days home to about 226,321 Muslims (UCIDE 2015) an estimated 20 percent 
of whom follow the precepts of Salafism. The contour of the lines that shape the 
integration of Moroccan immigrants in Catalonia is determined by the contrast of 
ethnicity, identity and religion. Much has been said about the general struggle of 
the diasporic groups to adapt to the new living and working conditions and to ‘gain 
access to the culture of their host societies’ (Conversi 2012: 1371). The Maghreb 
population live in Catalonia their family life in a similar way they would if they were 
living still in Morocco. Men are in charge of the family’s earnings and decisions while 
women are occupied with domestic chores and the raising of their children. This 
situation indicates ‘a reinforcement of a traditional stereotype that connects women 
to the sphere of care and affection’ (Martínez & Huertas 2014). Indeed, women are 
in charge of keeping the international contacts with the rest of the family, either 
they are in Morocco or have also immigrated elsewhere in the world. In that sense, 
Facebook offers these women a suitable social networking platform to reach out to 
family members, and to preserve frequent contact with them by sharing family pho-
tos, moments or to exchange traditional Moroccan recipes.  
But above all, the common denominator that draws them into the jihadist net-
works is the wish to gain Islamic knowledge (ilm). The former administrator of a 
Facebook page called ‘Muyahidines los guerreros de Allah’ (‘Mujahedeen/Mujahidun 
the warriors of Allah’) explained to a woman the purpose of his page: “Alhamdulillah 
sister, that is why this page was made for, to teach about what is going on in the 
world and that jihad is also Islam, even if some do not agree (…).” 
Internet is fairly accessible to my informants, many of them having already 
smartphones that allow them to be connected anytime, anywhere. The older inform-
ants demonstrate a certain resistance to adapt to new social networking tools. One 
of the informants complained about what she thinks it is an excessive use of Face-
book compared with the time devoted to praying: 
 
And what hurts the most is that when one sees the register of Facebook, one sees 
that he/she has sent more than 5000 messages, and if you compare that with how 
many verses of the Qur’an you have read...’wallah’... I cry. 
 
The use of WhatsApp is viewed differently by different generations. To the younger 
ones it is a valid tool of communication while to the older ones consider it a possible 
harmful tool to the community, as an older informant affirmed:  
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The new updated version of WhatsApp [the double check symbol] is creating fitna 
(‘division’) among Muslims because you know when the message was read. Fear Al-
lah, do not let the devil whisper on your mind and do not judge your Muslim broth-
ers/sisters. 
 
To that, a younger informant replied: “Each one of us must know how to organize 
herself with the social networks, but WhatsApp is more practical, easier and simpler.” 
As a matter of fact, the younger ones, who have access to longer and better educa-
tion profit from the fact that they have access to internet services at school to create 
and manage different web accounts (Twitter and Instagram, for instance). 
In the particular case of women’s radicalization in Spain, I have come to the con-
clusion that there are two distinctive web layers within the same “community of 
practice” (Wenger 2012: 1), the digital (internet) and the mobile (smartphones). 
A ‘digital media community’ that shifts its space from online to mobile connec-
tions is especially crucial for the Spanish Muslim women who wish to accomplish 
their radicalization process. In a recent Skype interview with a Muslim Spanish-Mo-
roccan leader of an Islamic Organization in Catalonia (whom I cannot name for pri-
vacy and security reasons), he referred clearly that the process of women radicaliza-
tion migrates from a digital community on Facebook to a mobile community on 
WhatsApp and/or Skype (online communication software product). This move ac-
cording to the interviewed leader happens when the phase of radicalization enters 
a deeper level of commitment and the sources of communication cannot be open 
sources anymore. This different layer of online space that is shielded from the public 
eye is denominated as the ‘Invisible Web’ (Bergman 2000). Due to its secrecy, the 
mobile relationship is more individualistic, intimate and free of all features that open 
source internet is so feared for: control, privacy and exclusion. In that sense, here 
are the words of Nour Nour: 
 
Salam aleikum sisters. I would like to communicate you that you are added to certain 
groups, do not accept it, and if you are already in, get out of them, because the 
TAGUT, make themselves pass by Muslims so that they can locate where you and all 
of us are, to search for us, to calumniate us, and therefore arrest us, because to them, 
the TAGUT, so there is more security to not accomplish jihad … (…) I tell you this 
because there are many brothers in Morocco that have been arrested because of 
this...the location of their data.. I know of sisters that their husbands have been ar-
rested because of this and have asked me to make this message arrive to all Muslims. 
Do not publish your authentic data, here we are for one cause, and that is the cause 
of ALLAH (…) 
 
According to my previously mentioned male informant, the process of mobilization, 
radicalization and recruitment is quick (maximum eight weeks and already including 
logistic arrangements) and aims at very young women, more vulnerable and eager 
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to abandon their lives in Spain. The speed of the process is related with the need of 
‘sending them there, before they change their minds.’ “And what if they change their 
minds?” I asked him.  
 
You know, they just say to the girls that their families will be informed of their acts, 
bringing dishonor upon them and the families will also pay the price. Summing up, if 
they change their minds they are violently threatened so they have no other alterna-
tive but to go to Syria. 
 
Samira Yerou, a Moroccan immigrant in Rubi (Catalonia) was travelling together with 
her three-year-old son to Syria when the Turkish authorities arrested her and sent 
them back to Barcelona (El Pais 2015). There the Minister of Internal Affairs accused 
her of having jihadist affiliations. An accusation that was formulated after the police 
intercepted conversations between her and a jihadist fighter, where she confirmed 
her adherence to the cause with sentences defending violence: “(…) he [three-year-
old son] only wants the knife of the beheading” (El Confidencial 2015). In December 
2014, Samira’s husband had denounced their missing to the Spanish police. The 
husband suspected that Samira was keen on migrating to Syria and that she had 
altered her behavior since a previous visit to Morocco.  
In May 2014, I was in the Islamic Center of Rubi, Catalonia, where I interviewed 
20 women (including a female scholar) precisely about these subjects: jihadism, 
online radicalization and hijra to Syria. I asked them: “What would you say if your 
son would ask you permission to become a jihadist fighter in Syria?” The answer was 
unanimous: “No!” The female scholar agreed and entered a lengthy theological ex-
planation on why all those subjects were not part of the Islamic doctrine. However, 
the voices of reason at the local mosque have little impact compared with the online 
radical networks. Samira is indeed, according to the Court deliberation, responsible 
for a jihadist recruiting network that was taking women from Europe and Morocco 
to Syria. 
In the following section, I will present the concluding remarks by opening space 
to further studies on the new digital landscapes of female jihadism and the new 
challenges for digital researchers. 
 
4.7 A new digital jihadist female landscape? – Concluding 
remarks 
 
Due to the effective Spanish security and defense institutions and their active col-
laboration with similar European and international institutions, namely the Moroc-
can Counter Terrorism Institute, the number of apprehended jihadist individuals and 
jihadist material has increased significantly in the last years (28 individuals in 2015, 
11 in 2013, El Mundo 2015). This increase is directly connected with the increase of 
the processes of online radicalization and recruitment. As we have seen, the female 
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jihadist individuals are aware of counter terrorist activities and of the need to there-
fore adopt a more discrete online profile. Their process of online ritualization of 
violence is changing into more subtle jihadist performances that require from the 
digital researcher sharper observation skills, edgier analysis and faster adaptation to 
new digital landscapes. 
A final example to illustrate this change are the new jihadist landscapes being 
proposed online to attract female individuals to perform the hijra to Saudi Arabia 
and/or Morocco and Algeria. In fact, I analyzed two Facebook pages (that I had ac-
cess to via an informant) announcing their services for those who wish to live in a 
proper Islamic land. The distinctive feature of the Facebook pages with the purpose 
of facilitating the hijra is their mention of ‘Salafiya’, or as it can be read in the Hijra 
Algerian page: “Information Page for hijra in Algeria, according to the Qur’an, the 
Sunna and the understanding of the pious predecessors.” Here the reference to 
Salafism appears in the mention to the ‘pious predecessors’ or salaf, one of the core 
fundaments of the Salafist doctrine. Another very interesting fact is that when I 
clicked the link leading to their blog, I noticed that the cover image is a passage of 
the Qur’an, more exactly Sura Al-Nisa, aya 97-100, which narrates the reward of Allah 
to those who complete the hijra. At the end of the quote and in orange letters, one 
can read ‘Reserved for women only’.   
The pages are fed daily with new tips and recommendations and there is a 
monthly lengthy post where one of the sisters that have already performed the hijra 
narrates online her experience. One of the migrants (muhajirun) as they call them-
selves had this advice (originally written in French and Arabic) to the women thinking 
of performing the hijra:  
 
Also to live in a country that does not insult our Beloved Prophet Allah (PUB) is more 
rewarding than the opposite. May Allah grant to all of those who have niya [‘inten-
tion’] to make hijra and allow us mouhajirouns [‘migrants’] to prolong ours until we 
die Inscha’Allah. 
 
The cycle of events is similar to the female online radicalization route (exposition 
and acceptation of the Salafi-jihadist fundaments), migration to Syria (transfer of the 
acquired cognitive skills to the offline space) and then return to the online space to 
report back on their hijra experience (exercising authority role to affect other women 
to embrace hijra). The critical difference when compared to online ritualization of 
jihad is the absence of the practice of ritualization of violence in the case of the hijra 
performance. 
In conclusion, the complexity of this brand new phenomenon, the female Salafist 
(jihadist?) migration, its insertion in the new concept of Jihad 3.0 and its possible 
proximity with deeper routed jihadist goals are an important novelty within the 
online-offline jihadist space research that opens up future and further study. 
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i-Imams studying female Islamic authority online34 
Abstract  
 
Using Facebook as a case study, this chapter details how self-proclaimed jihadist 
women construct and disseminate an online discourse to engage their audience 
with jihadist ideology. The empirical data provide a glimpse into the mechanisms 
that enable female Islamic authority online, while the theoretical framework de-
scribes the elements of jihadist propaganda used to grant legitimacy to those who 
assume the roles of, in this case, female i-Imams. The study shows that female online 




Since the advent of the internet, and with it Islamic websites, in the late 1990s, Is-
lamic religious authority has acquired a new layer of complexity: cyber religious au-
thority. Online spaces that are used by i-Imams to inform, lecture, and decide about 
Islamic subjects are very popular, particularly among Muslim youth. The online min-
bar (‘pulpit’) has become a virtual platform for the i-Imams: a (usually) hardly con-
trolled space where communications formatted as fatwas are often issued without 
any legal validation or guarantee of the professional or educational training of the 
issuers. The question of legitimacy and authenticity is even more pertinent because 
the internet is an open, free, and global communication tool. Moreover, i-Khutbas 
(‘internet sermons’) are attractively presented in simple English via Facebook, You-
Tube, or Google Plus and offer an interactive way to debate all aspects of Islamic 
living from rituals to sacred sources.  
More recently, these sites also serve the goal of the radicalization and online 
recruitment of young women to engage in jihadist war scenarios, including in Syria 
and Iraq. In this chapter, i-Imams, understood from a female perspective and as a 
virtual Islamic authority, and i-Khutba, understood as the various shapes virtual Is-
lamic discourse may take, are central to a state-of-the-art study of the imamate in 
Western Europe (Carvalho 2014: 26). The present chapter approaches the online 
                                                 
34 Adapted from the article: Carvalho, C., (Forthcoming) ‘i-Imams, studying female Islamic au-
thority online.’ Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. 
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construction of female authority through the analysis of the online performance of 
young Spanish-speaking Muslim women, specifically using Facebook as a social net-
working case study.  
On Facebook, the female informants export similar rules of engagement to their 
online groups as those that prevail in their daily lives. The case study presented here 
concerns 50 Muslim Spanish-speaking women of Moroccan origin, as well as con-
verted Muslim women of Spanish origin, between the ages of 18 and 40, all of whom 
live in Catalonia. The women from both groups use similar building blocks of dis-
course and narratives, based upon “a true part of Muslim tradition” (Mernissi 1991: 
vii-viii), in a self-constructed online participation that is not focused on gender op-
position since they do not strive for a “direct struggle against men” (Sadiqi 2003: 
35). Their online participation is part of an individual struggle to be mujāhidāt (‘fe-
male participants in jihad’), and even muqātilāt (‘women who fight with arms’) ‒ for 
the Quran does, they claim, call for qitāl (‘conventional fighting’) (Cooke 2002: 232). 
In this online space, authority is constructed through the pursuit of religious 
knowledge and religious education, with the highest regard awarded to the women 
who are proficient in both Classical Arabic and Spanish. This model of authority 
founded on language competence was already noted by the Moroccan anthropol-
ogist Fatima Sadiqi, who acknowledged the social importance of codeswitching 
among Moroccan women (2003: 39). The situation is similar on Facebook, where 
women who understand and write in Classical Arabic are seen as having a better 
understanding of the Quran, and therefore being more competent in interpreting 
the sacred sources. 
Women who want to further their online role as i-Imams usually use a simple 
digital tool to achieve this goal: they make their Facebook profile public. Open ac-
cess to their page implies that they are willing to give voice to their veil and claim 
their place among the religious authorities. The fact that the woman who wants to 
assume a distinctive online social status maintains a public Facebook page opens a 
bridge between the public sphere (polis), women (gender), and ritualization (reli-
gion). Public spaces and ritual practices in Islam are predominantly male. Hence, new 
cognitive schemes are being developed to format contexts and contents that will 
confer meaning and authority to the ritualization processes led by women. In fact, 
these new cognitive schemes lead women to both religious knowledge and new 
learned performances that, in the case of jihadism, introduce them to violent behav-
ior patterns. 
This model of Islamic online authority has two sides. On the one hand, it is a 
‘bridge-building discourse’ framed by the faculty of ijtihād, defined as reasoning and 
interpretation; on the other hand, it is a bridge-building network process framed by 
the ideology of jihadism (Ahmed 2011: 7). For this reason, it is relevant to attempt 
to build an empirical study of the female ritualization of religious violence and fe-
male religious agency together with the notion of local cultures to unveil the iden-
tities, roles, and activities of self-proclaimed online female jihadists.  
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This chapter first explores online female religious authority, and then discusses 
how the study’s informants employ their online Islamic authority to direct their au-
dience to migrate to Syria and become part of the offline jihadist fight. Our attention 
then turns to the online space, or the Web 2.0, to understand how its specific fea-
tures help in promoting jihadist discourse among young cyber users. All of this is 
discussed in the context of a case study that aims to demonstrate how Spanish-
speaking Muslim women use Facebook to develop jihadist narratives and, through 
them, convince other women to transfer their jihadist performances from the online 
world to the offline world, or more concretely to the so-called Caliphate of the Is-
lamic State in Syria and Iraq. 
 
5.2 Methodological considerations 
 
The present chapter addresses the Facebook social media network as the specific 
field of research, focusing on Facebook accounts and/or pages from Spanish-speak-
ing, Sunni Muslim women residing in Spain, specifically in Catalonia. All of them 
were aware of my research activities and agreed to share the contents of their pages 
for the purpose of my study. Follow-ups were done in the shape of interviews (via 
private messages and Skype) to get to know the informants and their circumstances 
better, assess their actual religious knowledge, and clarify the goals of their perfor-
mances online. In their study on the evolution of jihadism in Catalonia, Fernando 
Reinares and Carola García-Calvo (2015a) wrote that between 2004 and 2012, “Four 
out of every ten individuals sentenced for jihadist terrorist activities in Spain during 
the period were located in Catalonia.” This high number of jihadist individuals high-
lights the importance of the Catalan region to the study of jihadism in Europe. This 
number should also be interpreted in relation to the high presence of Salafi imams 
in the area: ‘50 Salafi worship places, half of all those currently in existence in Spain’ 
(Reinares & García-Calvo 2015a).  
The dominant language of the informants is Spanish. They have some under-
standing of transliterated Arabic, although its syntax is frequently incorrect, and only 
a limited number have fluency in Classical Arabic ‒ an important skill, since one’s 
proficiency in Classic Arabic determines the individual’s capacity to achieve a posi-
tion of authority. The language level reflects one’s hermeneutic competence in in-
terpreting the sacred sources and indicates the possession of greater religious 
knowledge.35  
In the offline context, language is also a crucial factor for understanding the role 
of imams in Spain, and more specifically in Catalonia since the autonomous region’s 
official language is Catalan. The lack of training of the local imams can be detected 
directly through their communication tools, as not all of them are fluent in Spanish, 
                                                 
35 I translated all the quotes of the informants, in Spanish, Arabic, or other languages, in the 
study and in this chapter into English. Original quotes are listed in my dissertation.  
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let alone in Catalan. Originally from Morocco, many of the imams do not speak or 
understand Spanish and perform their sermons in Classical Arabic, hence creating a 
gap between themselves and the younger Muslim generations who prefer using 
Spanish. Another crucial factor is the role and the space of women in Spanish 
mosques. In 2014, when I conducted my fieldwork in the region, it was evident that 
the mosques were spaces reserved for male believers. Women are mostly only in 
mosques on Fridays and/or for Classical Arabic classes, which usually take place on 
weekday mornings. The perception of the ‘invisibility’ of women at the mosque was 
reflected in small details, such as the surprised and delighted reactions from children 
that were in clear contrast to the men’s noticeably hostile attitude towards my pres-
ence in the mosques’ courtyards.  
During the period of data collection, none of the women declared that she had 
or was about to travel to territory controlled by the Islamic State or that she was 
located in the region. Moreover, during the period of data collection, no information 
was shared that indicated that any of the informants had in fact travelled to the 
region. Still, because they expressed their desire to travel and to join the Islamic 
State, they are regarded as potential jihadist migrants. That was for example the 
case of S.C. (El Pais, 7 July 2015), a mother and converted Muslim who was in charge 
of the recruitment of young girls to the jihadist cause.  
Even though there is no information on whether any of the informants in my 
study did in fact migrate to Syria, there are examples of Spanish-speaking women 
who were not part of the study attempting to travel to territories controlled by Is-
lamic State. One example is of course, Samira Yerou, a Moroccan-born Muslim, mar-
ried and the mother of a three-year-old child. She worked as an online recruiter for 
the Islamic State and was captured in December 2014 in Turkey (Audiencia Nacional 
2015). At the time of her arrest, she was waiting to enter Syria together with her 
child. For the specific purposes of this chapter, and considering that Spain is the 
location of the case study, I use the definition of a jihadist according to the law Ley 
Orgánica 2/2015:36 individuals that are involved in “The act of accessing in a usual 
manner a website that has contents directed to promote recruitment to a terrorist 
organization or group, or to collaborate with it, or to pursue their goals. The facts 
will be understood as committed in Spain when the access to those contents is done 
from Spanish territory.” 
The study also considers open source jihadist publications and comments, pho-
tos, and videos on Facebook that are posted online in a consistent and frequent 
manner. For this analysis, the publications that generate long threads of conversa-
tions, reactions, or a significant amount of ‘likes’ were given preference. Data collec-
                                                 
36 The text of this law is available from the website of the Agencia Estatal Boletin Oficial del 
Estado, https://www.boe.es/boe /dias/2015/03/31/pdfs/BOE-A-2015-3440.pdf. ‘Ley Orgánica 
2/2015, de 30 de Marzo,’ BOE, 77 (2015): 27177-27185. 
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tion was conducted between February 2013 and December 2014 through monitor-
ing, selecting, collecting, and examining data posted on Facebook to get a repre-
sentative view of the cyber jihad feminine sphere. Although this monitoring was 
aimed at Spanish-speaking Muslim women, I have also used information about and 
data from female Facebook users who expressed themselves in other languages. 
Even though the Spanish-speaking informants are in general not fluent in other lan-
guages, they frequently resort to the Facebook option of ‘see translation’, and in 
some cases ask other users to help with the translation. All informants use a kunya, 
or nom de guerre, to hide their true name. To protect the sources, I have opted here 
to designate them by using the Arabic word umm, meaning ‘mother’, and adding a 
different letter to indicate each informant. In the end, the study aims to formulate 
answers to the following questions: 
 
• What are the key concepts explored by women who aspire to a role of reli-
gious authority? 
• What are the elements and the events, be they of a religious, political, social, 
or cultural nature, that lead to framing and developing the online relationship 
between the female i-Imams and their female audience? 
• How does an i-Imam give shape to her online authority? 
 
To attempt to answer these questions it is imperative to analyze both the textual 
and visual components of their narratives, identify the key concepts of the female 
jihadist narrative, relate their discourse to the construction of agency in an online 
environment, determine whether these reflect the objective of acquiring authority, 
and finally relate this process of acquiring female authority to the female jihadist 
recruitment networks. 
Gary Bunt’s Virtually Islamic: Computer-Mediated Communication and Cyber-Is-
lamic Environments (2000), Islam in the Digital Age: E-Jihad, Online Fatwas and Cyber 
Islamic Environments (2003), and iMuslims: Rewiring the House of Islam (2009) were 
the first scientific approaches to the online presence of Islam. Bunt introduced con-
cepts such as ‘e-Jihad’ and ‘cyber Islamic environments’. Since then, there has been 
much development in the field of Digital Media Studies in general and digital Islam 
in particular. As a matter of fact, Digital Media Studies evolved to integrate studies 
of the ‘Internet of Things’ with issues connected to the ‘mobile’ world (Carvalho 
2015). Therefore, the ‘i’ in ‘i-Imam’ depicts the ‘i’ in interface communications that 
include both internet and mobile services. Similarly, I apply the notion of i-Khutba 
to the digital Islamic sermons that occur with frequency, that vary in length, and that 
the sisterhood community considers an authentic religious service. In the term ‘i-
Imam’, I include the collection of women who have been invested with a role of 
religious authority through their Facebook connections and who guide their online 
performance through a jihadist narrative. 
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5.3 i-Imam: Female virtual leadership 
 
In the Sunni Muslim tradition, an imam is defined as the “leader who constitutes the 
community, and without him God’s ordinances cannot be implemented” (Crone & 
Hinds 2003: 33). At the beginning of Islam, religious authority was in the hands of 
the prophet’s companions, the individuals who had been in direct contact with him 
and thus could narrate his life’s deeds. The companions transmitted narratives about 
the prophet’s conduct to the people close to them, who in turn continued the chain 
of transmission to the next generations (Crone & Hinds 2003: 2). For this reason, 
those who had learned from the sources closest to the companions could claim to 
have stronger religious authority. The same principle is respected and applied today 
by Salafis, a religious Islamic line of conservative thought that aims at imitating the 
deeds of the prophet Muhammad and of al-salaf al-ṣāliḥ (‘(his) companions’). This 
is also the vision shared by the Spanish-speaking Muslim women in this study, who 
use Facebook, have mastered Islamic studies and Classical Arabic, observe the pious 
Salafi doctrine, and are entitled to lead the online minbar and to teach their sisters 
the ways of salvation. Teaching, disseminating, and defending Islam are the main 
actions of da’wa, a mandatory task for all Muslims. According to Wiktorowicz (2006: 
212), part of Salafism is the task of the promotion of ‘a vast educational network’ 
that branches into jihadism and religious violence. 
The cyber environment is ideal for the endorsement of violent messages and 
rituals because it offers a less visible identity, fewer controls on authority and legit-
imacy, and a more feasible, faster way of disseminating jihadist discourse to a grow-
ing virtual audience (Lawrence & Cooke 2005: 23). However, the women’s perfor-
mance of religious authority is publicly contested by other women, either about the 
correctness of their knowledge of Islam or about their language skills in Classical 
Arabic. In some of these public discussions, men also interfere to set the tone of the 
arguments, recommending good manners, suggest that they read other scholars’ 
works, or even praise the guidance of the woman who is leading the group’s con-
versation. 
Leadership has always been a sensitive subject in the history of Islam, from the 
death of the prophet Muhammad. Like other forms, virtual Islamic leadership suffers 
from a lack of unifying religious guidance. Virtual leadership is, in the words of 
Philipp Holtmann (2012: 72): “a steady process of trend-setting and steering com-
munication to influence the behavior of individuals in order to achieve a goal. This 
process, [which] involves the target-oriented use of forces and resources, is rendered 
by a computer and independent of time and space. It is based on mutual infor-
mation.” Muslim women have transformed the problem of virtual Islamic leadership 
to their benefit by claiming a role of their own in the cyber sphere. Islamic female 
agency is apparently evolving online, and the products of that evolution are being 
transferred into the offline world. One of those evolving products is ijtihād: allowing 
individuals to self-investigate the sacred sources. This is an important faculty that in 
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the offline world is much more of a male domain. Cyber environments facilitate the 
exercise of ijtihād by women because they do not exert gender segregation. For that 
reason, the cyber gates of ijtihād are accessible to Muslim women who wish to em-
ploy this theological tool. At the same time, the use of it grants the possibility for 
Muslim women to affirm their agency online.  
Another religious argument that these women use to construct online leadership 
is supporting their authority on legal dispositions of Saudi scholars. This is a para-
doxical situation because Saudi scholars have a strict religious perspective on gen-
der matters and contest any female religious authority. It is also a clear statement 
that proves that these women in particular, and sympathizers of Islamic State in 
general, have a basic level of religious knowledge and their interpretation method 
is reduced to “cherry-picking extracts from the Quran” (Duderija 2015: 8). 
These arguments, together with the jihadist actions in Syria, Iraq, and Europe, 
shape virtual female Islamic leadership and work as motivational factors for the re-
cruitment of female jihadists ‒ justifying the importance of the scope of the present 
analysis. The next section treats how these women frame their religious views in the 
online space and how they adapt the jihadist narrative for a youth audience. 
 
5.4 The ‘call of duty’  
 
Although the privatization and individualization of religious knowledge (Cesari 2003: 
138) are a dialectical component of living and experiencing the religious-self 
(Campbell 2012: 9), the reality is that the online individualization of religious knowl-
edge is succeeded by the online networking and connection to other individuals 
that have similar profiles, group affiliations, language, likes, and preferences. For 
example, the popular computer game Call of Duty serves as an encoding use of 
language to reach Muslim youth and encourage them to become jihadists. In the 
opinion of Akil Awan, Andrew Hoskins, and Ben O’Loughlin (2011: 54), the utilization 
of references to youth culture is critical to attracting English-speaking ‘diasporic 
Muslim audiences’. The internet is the preferred means of communication between 
young women, who use it to socially interact, develop networks, and access infor-
mation (Lövheim 2008). What is more, the online presence of Muslim youth reflects 
the expression of what Jon W. Anderson (2001) labels the ’missing middle’ between 
the Islam of intellectual subject to textual analysis (of thought) and Islam of the 
masses more likely to be examined in terms of social forces. Facebook content cre-
ated around the jihadist narrative is designed to be easily accessible to all types of 
audience. 
The networks formed online by young Muslim women can be seen as “neo-com-
munities” (Allievi & Nielsen 2003: 21), as they are the result of participation in a high-
tech-oriented society by a European Muslim minority that is more attached to the 
virtual space than to a specific urban environment. The internet as a social, religious, 
and transnational space has challenged the pertinence, and even the authority, of 
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the offline imam (Sisler 2007). The transfer of authority and legitimacy from the con-
text of urban space into that of the web 2.0 has induced alterations in the notions 
of authority and legitimacy (Bunt 2013). These changes are also felt in jihadist dis-
course and practice. The online reformulation of authority, legitimacy, and authen-
ticity imposes great challenges on the offline imamate in Western Europe. Or, as one 
of my informants said: “To identify the genuine imam against the false one, the 
quality of his being endowed with the knowledge of everything, is clearly marked 
out in the Holy Quran, Sura Yasin, 36:12”, which text reads as follows according to 
the English translation: “We shall surely raise the dead to life and We record what 
they did and the traces of their deeds that they have left behind.” This sura has a 
two-fold meaning: first, the virtue of having a solid knowledge of the sacred Islamic 
sources; and second, the virtue of practicing the good deeds transmitted by that 
learning experience. 
The next section treats how authenticity (‘genuine Imam’) and authority (‘quality 
of knowledge’) are employed to promote a sense of belonging to the Islamic sister-
hood. 
 
5.5 Digital Umm, mother, and virtual sisterhood  
 
Da’wa (‘issemination’) is the preferred way to spread the Islamic word, and dedica-
tion to it is one of the main female tasks online. As Umm G. says in a written Mes-
senger conversation:  
 
I use the internet all the time to search and to share information about da’wa or to 
watch what is going on in Syria and Palestine. I also use it to connect myself with the 
other sisters. We help each other to become better Muslim women. We all seek a 
deeper understanding of Islam and of how to engage in jihad and it is more com-
fortable to do it among ‘sisters’. 
 
The dissemination of jihadism online is at full speed among women as a permanent 
reminder of the individual duty to pursue jihād fī sabīl-illāh (‘jihad in the path of 
God’). By using keywords such as ghurabā’ (‘strangers’) or kuffār (‘infidels’), they re-
inforce a clear separation between ‘true Muslims’ and the rest, whether they be 
‘weak’ Muslims, the followers of other Islamic sects, or non-believers. By participat-
ing, a sister is immediately integrated into the process of virtual sisterhood, or be-
coming a digital Umm. The ‘Umm sisterhood’ is a connection to all the ‘mothers’ of 
jihadism who aim at achieving Paradise together. “Imagine entering the gates of 
Jannah [paradise], hand in hand with those that you love. Yes, keep that in mind and 
continue to struggling [sic]” writes Umm M., after posting an image of a Muslim 
couple walking hand in hand.  
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The communications of the digital Umm are linked to the performance of reli-
gious rituals, the promotion of adab (‘good Islamic manners’), and the exterioriza-
tion of affection and solidarity. Anna Piela (2012: 119) indicates that ‘spiritual and 
emotional connection’ are two key features for defining sisterhood. Even though the 
sisters are present online as a group, they also keep being individuals who have their 
own perceptions and experiences when it comes to letting these online narratives 
and practices structure their religious knowledge. The process called “individual rit-
uality” (Heidbrink 2007: 177) is crucial for comprehending these religious manifes-
tations online, and even more crucial for understanding the dynamic between 
offline-online-offline transfers of ritual activities (as will be seen below).  
Another source of identification in the online sisterhood is the dress code. The 
sisters encourage each other to dress in allegedly Islamic clothing such as the hijab, 
the niqāb, or even the burqa. Indeed, to them a vital element of proper feminine 
religious behavior is the use of Islamic garments such as the niqāb and the burqa as 
the exterior symbol of pious Islamic practice. The sisters employ this in their profile 
picture on Facebook or as a part of the messages they convey via imagery. The im-
agery refers to transformations, and reflects the stages of ever-deeper radicalization 
of the ‘sister’. For example, they might begin by choosing cute Islamic cartoons or 
female Disney characters dressed in Islamic clothes as their profile picture before 
they move on to displaying women who are brandishing weapons. The central mes-
sage of the photos or cartoons is the beauty of modesty: “Sisters don’t let your last 
day on earth be the first day you wore the hijab,” said Umm F. to her female audience 
while reinforcing this principle of behavior with a set of photos of women wearing 
the hijab. The apocalypse narrative, the idea that the world is coming to an end and 
that therefore the Last Judgement is imminent, is an integral part of the ‘Salafi-jihadi’ 
discourse. Through the act of posting videos, images, photos, or text online, these 
women form a new community, a virtual sisterhood, and this includes a new shape 
of online agency in the domain of jihadism.  
In their analysis of the work of the scholar Tariq Ramadan, Mohammad Hashas 
and Jan Jaap de Ruiter (2014: 159) point to the relationship between “secularism and 
the issue of women in Islam” to explain that cultural practices should be distin-
guished from Islamic practices. In the offline realm, the Islamic community has al-
ways set limits on the presence and performance of women in jihad-related conflicts, 
framing these limits as in accordance with the principles of Islamic jurisprudence 
and cultural discourses. In addition, women who have digital agency and a digital 
authority framed by a jihadist narrative, pay for their religious activism with real-life 
costs to their personal safety and security. The vulnerabilities and risks they experi-
ence online are transferred into the offline world. The i-virtue of the jihadist dis-
course deletes the innocence of the offline veil. Indeed, due to their typical Muslim 
attire they are directly identified and subject to public and official scrutiny, for in-
stance by facing thorough airport security checks. Gaining ascendancy in the virtual 
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world as well as relevance in the real world has important social, religious, and cul-
tural implications that first and foremost affect European Muslim women.  
The following section discusses how female authority is performed online and 
how that performance turns into an effective jihadist recruitment tool. 
 
5.6 Repeat after me, ukhti, my sister: On performing female 
authority  
 
‘Giving birth’, and ‘being a mother’ are expressions that help define jihad from a 
feminine perspective, in the opinion of my informants. A recurrent theme on many 
jihadist websites is inciting women to promote the love of martyrdom in their chil-
dren. Moreover, mothers are also encouraged to accept their girl’s martyrdom. For 
example, informant Umm Z. wrote: “Mother do not be sad, Allah is with you! Prepare 
for my Janazah [‘burial’]!! I am coming to meet you as a Shaheeda [‘female martyr’]. 
Do not plan my wedding! As I chose my martyrdom day as my wedding day.” 
The performance of each female i-Imam follows a very personal style. According 
to Umm T., her most important task while using her own online minbar, Facebook, 
was persuading other women to convert to Islam: “The woman also can use the 
adequate opportunities to educate, guide and invite others [to the faith].” For some 
women, it is choosing and posting Quranic citations and/or parts of the hadiths. For 
others, it is spreading imagery and videos related to war scenes, jihadist fights, or 
just the visual symbols of jihadism (black banners, black horses, and swords, among 
others). Imagery plays a decisive role in the framing and legitimization of the jihadist 
narrative. Images convey messages without the need of translation, and often with 
a far more emotional impact than text. Arabic calligraphy and Islamic motifs are a 
constant presence in their online performance and narrative. The examples of Arabic 
calligraphy I collected during my research are usually in black and white, through 
the reproduction of small excerpts of the Quran. The Islamic motifs come from ar-
chitectural details in symbolic mosques that have an important value in collective 
Muslim history. They represent ideological and political power, a strong past that is 
a reminder of the umma’s glorious moments and achievements (Fighel 2007: 35). 
According to Jonathan Fighel (2007: 36), these visual elements are an important in-
strument of the indirect process of radicalization online: 
 
The Islamic motifs, in a sophisticated manipulation, are embedded within propa-
ganda; they can be easily recognized as legitimate Islamic historical symbols and fac-
tors that support a radicalized interpretation of Islam. The new radical motifs can 
easily gain legitimacy, as they appear to be authentic when they are used in proximity 
to widely accepted mainstream Islamic symbols and cultural references.  
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One interesting common denominator in the imagery of the sisters, shared through 
posting the same items over and over again, is that they are accompanied and jus-
tified by comments related to religious texts. Citations from the Quran are usually 
posted without historical or spatial context and without regard for their sequentially, 
i.e., without referring to the preceding or following verses. These disconnected cita-
tions are part of the strategy of framing Islamic knowledge in such a way that violent 
conceptions of jihad become acceptable (Awan, Hoskins, & O’Loughlin 2011: 27). 
Umm C., for example, wrote her name surrounded by bullets and two modified rifles, 
and posted the photo on her Facebook wall. Awan, Hoskins, and O’Loughlin (2011: 
28) argue that here we are in the presence of the “classical theory of cognitive dis-
sonance which suggests that individuals seek out information confirming beliefs or 
behaviors while actively avoiding contrary information, in order to mitigate uncom-
fortable psychological tension.” 
The same happens with the citations of hadiths, narratives of the prophet Mu-
hammad’s words and deeds, which should obey the authoritative criteria of analysis 
determined by the muḥaddithūn (‘scholars with great expertise in hadith’) to evalu-
ate the authenticity and the reliability of the hadiths. Umm B., who gradually ac-
quired an online authority among the Facebook sisters, narrates for them the story 
of the best Muslim women in da’wa: 
 
Umm Sulaim (one of the Prophet’s companions) would teach her son Anas Ibn Malik 
about Islam, this she was doing knowing that her husband refuted Islam. […] Her son 
Anas became a servant of the Prophet (pbuh). […] If we speak in general terms we 
find women who had a very strong role in their sacrifice and service in the cause of 
Allah. Sumayyah was the first Muslim person to die for Islam. Khadija, the Prophet’s 
first wife who was very rich, spent all her money supporting the da’wa.  
 
This post is from 2013 and has been extensively shared and commented upon by 
the sisters. My informants firmly believe in the jihadist narrative, in the jihadist hero, 
and in the duty of doing da’wa for their spouses: “The work of the women in the 
field of da’wa is to give strength to the work of our men, and to expand it to areas 
where the efficiency of women is higher than the efficiency of men.” 
Likewise, naṣā’iḥ (‘advice’) on how to promote their husbands’ ultimate sacrifice 
and to help others who are willing to become a shahīd (‘martyr’) are kindly spread 
throughout the feminine jihadist cyber sphere. Women give advice as a part of the 
da’wa process (Becker 2013), to transmit Islamic knowledge to the online sisters. The 
contents of the advice vary from regular daily life subjects (clothing, food, children, 
relationships) to the translation and interpretation of the Islamic textual sources. 
Translation is a vital step in the process of correctly transmitting any religious 
knowledge, as many of the women are not fluent in Arabic. 
By translating and transliterating their comments, these women also broaden 
their audiences in number and diversify them in terms of both general education 
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and physical provenience. In the sisters who are capable of translating from Classical 
Arabic, the women recognize a direct religious and linguistic authority. This authority 
is further bestowed on them when they bring into play jihadist linguistic terminol-
ogy, which is perceived as proof of their absolute adherence to the jihadist narrative 
and above all their command of the subject. Table 5.1 summarizes words belonging 
to the jihadist vocabulary, the themes to which these words refer, and examples 
taken from the women’s posts on Facebook. The author has translated the examples 
from Spanish to English. 
 
Table 5.1 Jihadist linguistic terminology 
 
Categories Themes Examples offered by informants 
Jihād fī sabīl-illāh 




“Guns are the shield of the Quran… the battles are 
for the sake of Allah and victory is close.” 
Kuffār  
(‘unbelievers’) 
Enemies/Infidels “Well, sure that the unbelievers are not all the same. 
Allah has divided them into 2 groups: the ignorant 





“We ‘the strangers’ do not bow our heads for noth-
ing except to Allah … we are the soldiers of Allah, the 
way we travel is reserved just for us … ‘God is great’, 
Allahu akbar.” 
Caliphate Islamic State as 
interpreted by IS 
“Allah ‘azza wa jalla’ (Mighty and Majestic He is) 
chooses whom He wishes to be part of this Khilafa Is-
lamic revival…” 
Salafism Piety and Purity “Whoever hates scholars of Salafiyya is innovative, 
misplaced and hypocritical.” 
Apocalyptic Dis-
course 
Last Judgement “In that Day (Doomsday), the weight on the scale will 
say the truth. The ones whose actions will have 
weight, will be those who have succeeded.” 
Hijra Migration  “Those who believe, those who have completed the 
hijra and those who fight with their wealth and their 
lives in the cause of Allah have the highest rank with 
Allah … and they are the victorious.” 
Janna 
(‘paradise’) 
Ultimate goal of 
Jihad 
“Oh martyr, what have you seen that made you 






Heroism  “Bring up your children to be brave and courageous. 
Let your houses be places for lions and not for 
chicken farms in which your sons will be fed and then 
slaughtered by tyrants like if they were sheep…” 
Female role in clas-
sic Islam 
 “#WhoIsMuhammad pbuh? The man who stood up 
for women's rights when the pagan Arabs were bury-
ing their daughters alive.” 
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Table 5.1 contains examples of jihadist narrative elements that stimulated long and 
pertinent threads of discussion among the informants. This illustrates the role of the 
leading female informants, who in the eyes of the audience have better Islamic ar-
guments and answers. As such, the audience members trust their more educated 
sisters to teach them, smoothing the path to their assimilation into and understand-
ing of the ritualization of jihad in the religious Islamic framework. Their acts and 
performances online respect the need for a temporal and spatial structure. For ex-
ample, the online space is sacralized by the niyya (‘right intention’) that the per-
former should keep at all times and in all spaces if they are rightly and truly com-
mitted to act with respect and purity. The sisters constantly issue reminders of the 
relevance of their religious mission online, and of their need to be even more of a 
role model online than they are offline, since they define social media platforms as 
sacralized spaces. Similarly, in terms of respecting a temporal structure, the sisters 
follow a precise timetable. For example, every Friday before the regular sermon they 
remind the rest of the online community of the need to pray special suras.  
Still, the authority established online by these women has a limited reach, as 
female i-authority appears valid only in the virtual world. In the offline world, female 
authority is graded down. Women may have a determinant role in the task of mo-
bilization and recruitment online, but the arrangements for travelling to and settling 
in Syria are confided in a network of men, as notified through a public male Face-
book profile: “A salamou aleykum, the brothers that want to do the hijra send me a 
message, and for those who are sisters, my wife will take charge of you.” An addi-
tional fact that differentiates female authority and indicates that it is mostly only 
part of the virtual world is, for example, the question of using guns and women’s 
physical and direct participation in the frontline of the war. Upon their arrival in Syria, 
women have commented on their personal Facebook pages that they receive small 
caliber guns, while the modified assault rifles are reserved only for men. Clearly, 
physical jihadist combat is, in the majority of cases, thought to be a male task.  
 
5.7 Umm got married: Female authority and the jihadist 
recruitment 
 
The perfect woman, the one that can be considered a female i-Imam, is, these days, 
the one who performs the hijra, supports her husband by cooking, raising jihad-
loving children (Von Knop 2007: 410), and posting all of her jihadist i-Khutbas daily 
on Facebook. Their endeavor is to perform rituals in a pure way, transmit the right 
knowledge, be authentic when selecting the sources, and be modest in behavior. 
“Good homes are built on the pious wife. Therefore, it is obligatory for a Muslim to 
choose pious wife” posted Umm H., quoting the fatwa ‘Advice to Muslim Women’ 
of the Saudi preacher Shaykh al-Fawzan (b. 1933). Al-Fawzan publishes his work on 
websites like https://salaf-us-saalih.com and www.fatwa-online.com, and the women 
focused in this case study prefer his religious guidance. 
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Women depart for the caliphate of Islamic State in search of a jihadist authority 
position in the fight for Allah, and of a role of power in concord with their newfound 
online voice. After arrival, they again connect to the online world so that they can 
share their narratives of life in Syria. The other sisters are willing to listen, learn, and 
ask questions about the living conditions in Syria, and they urge those who are al-
ready there to fill them in on all sort of details ‒ from the mundane to the theological 
justifications of jihad. Historically, the idea of combining hijra (‘emigration’) with 
da’wa (‘proselytism’) and jihad is a tradition stemming from the prophetic times 
(Perešin & Cervone 2015: 495). 
The lives of the ‘sisters’ in Syria are described as happy and pious, just like in the 
time of the prophet Muhammad, as they constantly reassure the sisters online. Umm 
X. ‒ ‘Got married’ is the most frequent Facebook status of the sisters, and they try 
to illustrate how pleasant their lives are in the Sham (Syria) by posting photos that 




Female i-Imams that support the jihadist narrative in general and the ideology of 
the Islamic State in particular encounter an effective online space in which they can 
perform their religious authority and convince other women to enter jihadist recruit-
ment networks. In that sense, the jihadist narrative has the elements and motiva-
tional factors to encourage individual participation in the jihadist fight. Islamic online 
female authority is anchored in online Islamic female agency, i.e., the practice of 
taking independent action online and the goal of being recognized as a leading 
religious individual, as a female i-Imam.  
However, this online female authority is contested. As one Moroccan female re-
ligious scholar living in Catalonia (I have chosen not to reveal her name or location 
out of safety considerations) explained to me in an interview, these individuals speak 
for themselves and should not be trusted by their audience. In her opinion, ‘wise 
Imams’ should have the exclusive right to issue fatwas about what is authentic jihad, 
and should condemn all forms of violence. Spanish mosques are controlled by the 
security and police forces, so the imams issue politically correct khuṭbas and coor-
dinate statements that openly condemn jihadist discourses and activities. However, 
as mentioned before, this kind of khuṭba deals with the youth audience that is ‘at 
risk’, in terms of its language and contents. These khuṭbas are not in tune with daily 
face-to-face communication, and more needs to be done in terms of socio-eco-
nomic and political measures to prevent the grievances that ultimately degenerate 
into engagement with extremist Islamic narratives. It is exactly this void that is being 
filled by jihadist sermons. 
The vulnerabilities and risks associated with female online agency represent for 
these women not an obstacle, but a concrete sign of their increasing power, author-
ity, and value within the digital Islamic community. They feel they are on the right 
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path to Allah, fī sabīl-illāh (‘on the path of God’), whether in the virtual world and/or 
on territory controlled by Islamic State. They are no longer innocent, passive reli-
gious subjects; now they are the ones endowed with religious authority, transmitting 
their message through an online minbar, or platform of communication. Through 
their online performance, the young Spanish-speaking Muslim women shape a form 
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‘Kids in the green lands of the Khilafat’ – A Tumblr 
case study of imagery within the Jihad 3.0 narrative37 
Abstract  
Caricatures of the Islamic faith are at the epicenter of the most recent case of vio-
lence associated with Muslim believers who claim to be part of the Global Jihad 
Front. There was never a more opportune moment to study the impact of images 
upon the jihadist phenomenon and how they shape new identities and new com-
munities. 
The present chapter will approach the crucial role of imagery in the framing of 
the jihadist discourse online. Moreover, and due to its emotional value and global 
language, visual material is becoming the preferred online ritualistic performance to 
recruit children to the Khilafat’s army. The research will be conducted online having 
Tumblr contents representing the case study: “So apparently my blog was used as 
an example of ‘ISIS media’ for some stupid think tank presentation by some pea-
brained conservative dunderheads in America. i’m not in IS but thanks for the free 




ISIS, also denominated as the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), is an associa-
tion of dissidents from the jihadist fighting group Al-Nusra (both linked to Al-Qaeda 
in Iraq and Syria), they are as so a Sunni Islamic group. Its jihadist fighters are en-
gaged into a military campaign to take over the territorial space corresponding to 
Iraq and Syria. In the summer of 2014, they declared to have instituted a ‘Khilafat’ 
or Caliphate. 
According to Jessica Stern (2014: 1) their objective is to set a “Sharia based state 
throughout the region.” Joas Wagemakers (2015: 33) argues that the acquisition of 
territory and the declaration of state’s edification set ISIS apart from other jihadist 
                                                 
37 Adapted from the published article: Carvalho, C. (2017). ‘Kids in the green lands of the 
Khilafat’ – A Tumblr case study of imagery within the Jihad 3.0 narrative. In M. Kayıkcı & L. 
d’Haenens (eds.) European Muslims and New Media. Leuven: Leuven University Press, pp. 91-
112. 
106 Women Who Run With The Wolves 
 
groups. Furthermore, the Dutch expert adds that the leader of ISIS, Abu Bakr al-
Baghdadi has managed to gather the religious conditions to be considered a caliph, 
an Islamic ruler: “Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi had been vetted by a group of scholars de-
scribed as the ahl al-hall wa-l-aqd,38 was found by them to be a pious Muslim ruler 
who fit all the criteria set for a caliph and was therefore worthy of believers’ baya.39”  
Thomas Hegghammer (2014) in his turn, considers the acts of ISIS, namely the 
cyber acts of ideological propaganda as deliberated, premeditated acts, he nomi-
nates it as ‘Calculated Caliphate’: 
 
ISIS is not an isolated sect, but a tech-savvy bureaucracy that monitors enemy Twitter 
accounts and consumes academic literature (in fact, they will probably read this very 
article). They must have known the lay of the ideological land. We should therefore 
not dismiss the move as ideological excess, but rather assume it was based on a 
careful calculus. 
 
The selection of themes that compose the fatwas issued by ISIS affiliated scholars 
maybe a response to the problems affecting the jihadist group (Bunzel 2015a). In-
deed, the fatwa No. 46, dated from December 17, 2014 reads as follows below: 
 
Q.: Is it permissible for the wives of martyrs to leave with their children for the lands 
of unbelief? 
A.: No. It is prohibited for them, and for anyone else, to leave for and reside in the 
lands of unbelief. Whoso migrates from the Abode of Islam to the Abode of Un-
belief has committed a great sin (ithm ‘azim), shirking the duty to emigrate to the 
Abode of Islam. If a woman insists on leaving for the Abode of Unbelief with the 
son of a mujahid, she should be punished (tu‘azzar) as a deterrent and preventive 
measure. 
 
The problem is the retirement and the abandonment of many of the ISIS members 
or in the words of terrorism expert, J.M. Berger (2014), “(…) it’s starting to look like 
that time ISIS threw a Caliphate party and nobody came.” The lack of jihadist fighters 
(both local and foreign fighters) in part, due to the difficulties posed by International 
Security to let Western individuals to migrate to Syria, the territorial advance by the 
coalition forces (now trying to get back Tikrit and with plans to move to Mosul) the 
lack of local support, the intensification of American aerial intervention, the lack of 
relevant victories, or even the absence of public appearances by ISIS leader, Abu 
Bakr al-Baghdadi configure the current state of the Caliphate. Furthermore, these 
                                                 
38  In accordance to the author’s personal translation, “the people who loosen and bind” 
(Wagemakers 2015: 33). 
39 Personal oath of loyalty. 
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facts may present a plausible explanation to the change of hearts of the online ji-
hadist campaign, now aiming at children. 
  
And We have certainly honoured the children of Adam and carried them on the land 
and sea and provided for them of the good things and preferred them over much of 
what We have created, with [definite] preference. (Qu’ran, verse (17:70) of chapter 17, 
surat l-isra, The Night Journey) 
 
6.2  Bringing my online research toolkit to Tumblr 
 
Christine Hine (2013), one of the first authors to construct virtual ethnography as a 
valid form of social science method and to develop a scientific approach to the field 
defends that “(…) the ethnographer’s toolkit changes with every new setting.” 
My starting field of research to this study was Facebook (yes, Facebook not 
Tumblr) where I had a network of circa 60 informants (mostly women), plus partici-
pation in closed groups. Through a snowball method, I had a very interesting en-
semble of individuals who were or directly engaged in online jihadist activities or 
directly engaged in jihadist counter-narratives. A restricted number of those indi-
viduals were in the frontline of the Syrian war and another restricted number was 
about to departure to Syria. Censorship on Facebook distinguishes no user and as 
so one afternoon I received the message that my account had been blocked because 
I was supporting, promoting and liking people and violent contents that were 
against Facebook policies. Therefore, these events diverted my research fieldwork 
to Tumblr. Why Tumblr? I had already been alerted to it by an Asian female inform-
ant who was also tired of constantly needing to open new accounts on Facebook 
after her account being cancelled due to reasons similar to mine. I welcomed the 
challenge of exploring a new social media space and built a new network that would 
allow me to do virtual ethnographic work this time around observing imagery as a 
manifestation of jihadism online. 
Tumblr is an excellent medium for those who seek to establish an online pres-
ence through images. The media contents are here easy and fast to share and re-
blog, guaranteeing consequently that the online narrative is continuously being 
spread out in the cyberspace. These features suit well the objectives of the online 
jihadist strategy, keeping its discourse updated, appealing and accessible to all types 
of audiences.  
As a short-form of blogging. Tumblr lets its users post texts, videos and even 
music and communicate with other users privately and publicly via messages. By 
consulting Tumblr’s Community Guidelines the users find the same type of limita-
tions as they would find on Facebook, namely the prohibition to incite hate-
speeches, violent contents among other forbidden posts. Jihadist related contents 
are for this matter also considered banned online material, yet they circulate fairly 
at ease on Tumblr, even the graphic images of decapitations and other grueling 
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events. In actual fact, censorship in this medium seems to be less effective and 
slower than on Facebook were censors detect more, better and faster any of these 
non-accepted contents.  
My network on Tumblr started with the same system that I had previously em-
ployed to do virtual fieldwork on Facebook, snowball method, choosing users whose 
profile picture indicated a relationship to jihadism (flags, black banners, weapons, 
lions), or lately, the choice of name (usually a ‘kunya’, or name of war). From these 
‘start nodes’ I reach to a network of users who blog in a qualitative (relevant and 
related jihadist contents), consistent (guiding principle and theme are jihadism) and 
frequent manner (daily). 
In this chapter, I will analyze the jihadist images elements and visual symbols that 
are being employed to justify under religious Islamic terms the transformation of 
children into jihadist fighters. Additionally, I will also reflect on how the jihadist dis-
course rationalizes through images the militarized role of the kids of the Khilafat. 
 
6.3 Exploratory data analysis: The importance of imagery 
 
The Tumblr mechanisms available to develop a network are easy, and immediate, 
one truly just needs to click at the ‘follow’ link to be able to follow a blog. Since 
February 2015, I have been following 12 blogs and collecting images with the cor-
respondent #hashtag (metadata tag, an online symbol to brand a concept, expres-
sion) of ‘Jihad’, ‘Jihadism’, ‘Caliphate’, ‘Khilafat’, ‘Ak47’, ‘children’, ‘cubs’. My filter of 
selection has these themes as the core of the media jihadist campaign to legitimate 
the (ab)use of children into the Syrian jihadist conflict. In a month, I have gathered 
a collection of 70 images that project in a clear, effective manner the answer to my 
research questions.  
Is jihadist imagery changing the themes of its contents in order to achieve a new 
online dimension of their online media strategy? Is this change going to justify the 
militarization of children in the Caliphate among their online audience? How do 
online users make sense of a kid in military clothes aiming a gun at a prisoner? Or 
more interesting what sense do online users make of the blessed daily life in the 
Khilafat? 
I have conducted extensive research in all the 12 blogs to study their ‘old posts’, 
prior to 6 months ago (September 2014) there were no textual references, visual or 
media contents indicating the personification of children as real jihadist fighters in 
the terrorist frame of reference.  
After the extraction of the data, I have proceeded with their codification to better 
identify the phenomena of both online jihadism and the militarization of children in 
the Caliphate. I have come to conclude that I had two sets of concepts that I can 
better explain by using Grounded Theory designation: ‘definitive concepts’ and ‘sen-
sitizing concepts’. ‘Definitive concepts’ are all the ones that already have an estab-
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lished, transparent definition whereas ‘sensitizing concepts’ are yet to be clearly de-
fined and can be better grasped through imagery, for example. I consider for that 
reason, concepts such as ‘online jihadism’, ‘jihadist discourse online’ as ‘definitive’. 
While analyzing the social and religious role of the children that are draft by ISIS, I 
cannot attribute them theorizing concepts such as ‘jihadist boy/girl’, ‘radical Islamic 
children’, ‘fundamentalist children’, as a result they are ‘sensitizing’. Hence, the rea-
son why I am using images to study the relationship between online jihadist narra-
tive and the function of children in the Syrian jihadist military training and opera-
tions. 
 
6.4 Wiring Syria with the Jihad 3.0 
 
At this moment, two major factors affect the quality and continuity of cyber com-
munications in Syria: state control and the devastating physical effects of the war in 
the territory. 
The Syrian telecommunication system is underdeveloped, insufficient and under 
state control. The regime has a strict surveillance as well as a strict censorship over 
all information channels, a task that is achieved through filtering, phishing, monitor-
ing and social engineering (Freedomhouse 2014: 2). In the early spring of 2011, the 
eruption of the civil conflict caused severe setbacks and disruptions on the internet 
and telecommunications networks. Overcoming their telecommunications limita-
tions has been made possible by virtue of digital devices such as VPN, Tor, BiTorrents 
(Chaabane et al. 2014: 1). 
Nevertheless, these difficult circumstances, the number of users has grown up to 
5.3% of the population (Internet World Stats 2014), a significant percentage that 
gains even more relevance if we measure the amount of information under the form 
of videos, texts, images that are sent daily from Syria. One may conclude that the 
internet users located in the country are efficient, effective and diligent keeping a 
steady stream of newsfeed flowing in the cyber space. 
In a news piece of the New York Times (2014), ISIS is named ‘online jihad 3.0’ due 
to its fast and vast dissemination online through accounts on all major social media 
platforms, Twitter, JustPaste, SoundCloud, Instagram or WhatsApp. Besides the 
maximization of the cyber ways, ISIS has also been prolific in creating tailor-made 
contents alluring specific groups according to their geographical origin, language, 
age, gender and mainstream pop cultural references. Counter actions engaged by 
governments, security and defense agencies or even most recently by the Anony-
mous (international and informal congregation of hacktivists) have not been able to 
slow down the online Jihad 3.0. Their success resides in its resilience to keep on 
opening new accounts on the diverse social media channels every time they get 
blocked or cancelled, their ability to adapt to the constant transformations of the 
cyber space and to refresh their design and semiotic productions (making them 
more appealing and compelling to the targeted audiences). 
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ISIS has been exploiting as well the online search effectuated by Muslims (and 
even non-Muslims) to obtain Islamic knowledge. Salafists, radical Islamists, jihadists, 
moderate Muslims despite their religious doctrinal differences, they all attribute the 
internet with this education and cognitive function. Internet blog formats such as 
the one of Tumblr allow its users to post texts (although there is a limit per day on 
how many posts an user can blog), either in their pure written form (never too long), 
as GIFs (Graphic Interchange Format), or as a shared image and/or content with a 
written citation. These new online functions, spaces and tools are part of the ‘new 
media ecology’ and together they bring improvement to the development and ac-
quisition of Islamic knowledge (Sisler 2011: 1136). At the same time, the new online 
infrastructures of communication bring more emphasis to the exchanges between 
the participants of the online communication process: producer of the message, 
transmitter, channel, receiver and destination. Online ritualization of violence 
through visual codes is the communication exchange that this study is focusing on, 
as an aesthetic manifestation of religious performance. The manifestation through 
online visual artifacts (videos, images, photos) expresses the emotional side of the 
jihadist phenomena and drawing on Benjamin Ducol theory (2012: 97) on how feel-
ings affect the engagement in violence and terrorist activities, we need to integrate 
the psychological state of mind of jihadists as the critical focal point of the radicali-
zation analysis. In the optic of Frazer Egerton (2011: 98) the emotional engagement 
with jihadism and terrorism “is enabled and encouraged by images.”  
On that matter, it is relevant to analyze the online posts placed on social media 
platforms by the individuals that perform the hijra (‘migration’) to Syria or Iraq. In 
fact, their first task after arriving at the ‘Caliphate’ is to enter the first available cy-
bercafé and start posting online about their new life’s status. The digital narratives 
are filled with pleasant emotions, the beautiful scenery, the piety and purity of the 
Islamic behaviors, the constant celebration of weddings (and correspondent chang-
ing of online status) or even photos of the ‘brothers’ leaving to the war zones. Ad-
ditionally online jihadists focus their narratives on the dark side of emotions, hence 
exploiting fear, angst or even abhorrence as an indoctrination strategy, in the words 
of Fawaz Gerges (2014: 342): 
 
Young recruits do not abhor its brutality; on the contrary, its shock-and-awe methods 
against the enemies of Islam are what attracts Muslims living in Western countries 
join ISIS and other extremist groups because they want to be part of a tight-knit 
community with a potent identity. ISIS’s vision of resurrecting an idealized caliphate 
gives them the sense of serving a sacred mission. 
 
In fact, watching, sharing or simply clicking at the ‘like’ button when these images/ 
videos appear on their Tumblr dashboard brings the participants the feeling of be-
longing to a community, believing in the same principles and more importantly of 
being virtually engaged in religious violent performance.  
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In sum, beautiful landscapes where the tones of green are enhanced, jihadist 
fighters relaxing, even taking happy ‘selfies’ (self-portraits) are a graphic composi-
tion attempting to demonstrate that albeit the war operations, they have achieved 
to upgrade their level of jihadist organization into a Caliphate. 
 
6.5 Jihadism is always greener in the Khilafat 
 
Internet did not create religious violence not even jihadism but it surely gave these 
two entwined phenomena a steady, speedy stream to shape, share and spread their 
message. The features of the internet as mean of communication are what Marshall 
McCluhan (1964) was referring to in his renowned work, Understanding Media: The 
Extensions of Man, when he affirms, “The medium is the message.” In terms of com-
municative skills, Tumblr is a short-form of blogging oriented to the visual domain 
where images are the new online preferred language. And the message via the cyber 
channels is transmitted repeatedly, globally and immediately, especially in what 
comes to images. All social media platforms allow the posting of images, starting by 
the profile image of the user, and above all allow the dissemination of those images 
through their own features: like, share, comment, tweet, retweet, reblog, just to men-
tion a few. 
Back to Tumblr. While at the beginning of the jihadist enterprise in Syria most of 
the images posted online were self-made, amateur photos (many times blurred, not 
cantered, and with weak compositions) of food, fighters and flags (new territories 
were officially belonging to ISIS when the black jihadist banner was settled there), 
nowadays significant images of key events pertaining to the jihadist fight, are re-
touched, added filters and visual effects in order to convey its message in a more 
impressive style. At naked eye, they seem to be professional products accomplished 
by image/media/design experts. For that matter, a good example is the Tumblr ac-
count of the Dutch jihadist, Omar Yilmaz whose images are very expressive and the 
touches of color add a new layer of interpretation to his radical message. 
Another good example of the ISIS sophisticated media campaign has its spot-
light at the killing of an ISIS prisoner by the hand of a young boy. The first image to 
hit Tumblr (and then repeatedly posted through several users) had a young boy 
(considered to be by the written press a French native) standing up with a gun on 
his hands and pointing it to a Palestinian individual, sitting on his knees, in the pres-
ence of other jihadist fighters (one of them believed to be the brother of the French 
terrorist, Mohamed Merah who in March 2012 gunned down 7 people and hurt 
other 5 before being killed by a French police sniper).  
Since then everyday new visual forms containing the young boy in his military 
clothes were posted and every time they had a more elaborated, enriched design, 
glossy techniques and color emphasis. The photo was directed to the Arabic speak-
ing audience as Arabic was the only used written language in contrast to the norm, 
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since the majority of the photos/images posted online have English text and/or Eng-
lish translation.  
The constant repetition and circulation of these images is the strength of the 
jihadist single narrative as proposed by Alex Schmid (2010: 46-57). Here, two con-
cepts come across and interact with each other: ritualization and ‘semiotics re-
sources’ (Van Leeuwen 2005: 3). By ritualization I mean, the integration of ritual per-
formance with new communication technologies whereas by semiotic resources I 
refer to the definition presented by Van Leeuwen: “(…) as the actions and artefacts 
we use to communicate, (…) or by means of technologies – with pen, ink and paper; 
with computer hardware and software (…).” The ritualization of a ‘semiotic resource’ 
inducing into a state of acceptation of violence as an integral, obligatory component 
of jihad here placed under the category of Islamic ritual. An Islamic ritual that due 
to its ritualistic innovations combined with its high tech affordances can be per-
formed with equal validity both online and offline. 
Online jihad activities include the promotion and dissemination of radical Islamic 
discourses, narratives and any other media material that legitimize and justify the 
offline performance of religious violence under the scope of jihad (Peters 1979, 
1996) as a mandatory and individual ritual (‘fard al Ayn’) to all Muslims. 
To provide a better understanding of the online jihadist narrative we can observe 
a photo placed on Tumblr that assembles its necessary components: extremism, ji-
had as an individual militarized duty, religious text and manipulation of the image. 
So we have a young man dressed in military clothes carrying an ammunition belt, a 
knife around his leg and a gun while standing next to the black flag against a green 
background. 
Once again, the production of the photo is calculated, the camouflage suit giving 
a more lawful war perspective, the jihadist colors: black for fight, white for 
knowledge and green for paradise. It is also interesting to note that these fighters 
follow (with or without awareness of it) the recommendations of the Brazilian guer-
rilla author, Carlos Marighella40 (1969: 85) when in his mini-manual on how to en-
gage successfully on guerrilla warfare he advises the combatants to always carry 
light arms due to its easy transport, use, and facilitation of movements. The photo 
has the below quote: 
 
The #Syria’n revolution has turned boys into men, men into lions and lions into mar-
tyrs, Oh Allah we ask of You that you grant us martyrdom like you granted the sincere 
Mujahideen in Syria martyrdom! Oh Allah accept from us our good deeds and mul-
tiply them and destroy for us our bad deeds and forgive us. 
                                                 
40 The references to guerrilla leaders are becoming more frequent among online jihadists as 
we may read in the following example retrieved from a Tumblr user: “Umm Kirin is, in theory, 
the Subcommander Marcos of modern-day jihad. What she is… easy to understand. What she 
stands for… a lot more complicated.” 
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Visual material as simple as this causes a direct effect in the mind of the jihadist 
audience creating an online social connection between individuals who accept the 
jihadist principles and through these shared signs, codes and symbols they proceed 
with the establishment of online ‘religious’ communities (Bunt 2000; Campbell 2004; 
Anderson 2013). Stories of the jihadist fights and fighters are the other component 
of the edification of the online identity and furthermore of the online community. 
Also known as myths in the ritual theory, the stories forge an online jihadist ‘collec-
tive memory’, (to borrow the concept of Maurice Halbwachs 1925) based on narra-
tives they assimilate as pure, pious and with similarities to the historical and sacred 
narratives of the Prophet Muhammad. 
In consonance with the categorization of myths linked to online jihadism narra-
tive developed by Philipp Holtmann (2013: 19), there are the ‘community myth’ (be-
longing), the ‘conspiracy myth’ (otherness) and the ‘salvation myth’ (redemption and 
recompense). 
The community myth is what reinforces the sense of identity, namely group iden-
tity versus the sense of alterity, the other. In Islam the discussion between identity 
(Muslim) and otherness (non-Muslim) has been present since the Qur’anic times and 
it is even present in the semantic Qur’anic readings (Duderija 2010: 75-93), until the 
modern times (Daniel 1993; Said 1997; Cesari 2004; Esposito 2010; Volpi 2011). The 
third element defining identity in Islam is the dialectic relationship between believer 
(iman) and unbeliever (kufr) associated with idea of excommunication (takfir) from 
Islam (Kepel 1985: 19; Wiktorowicz 2001: 27; Wagemakers 2012a: 150). 
 
6.6 ‘The world have [sic] only 2 religions today, jihadi and non-
jihadi’ 
 
In jihadist culture, the concept of alterity encloses all enemies of their ideological 
principles, therefore these enemies range from Muslims who refuse them as inno-
vation, Shias, Israelis, and Westerners. Looking deeper into the jihadist ideology 
(Armstrong 1988; Al-Qaradawi 1998; Cook 2005b; Lawrence 2005) and taking into 
account its Salafist roots (Brachman 2009; Meijer 2010; Wagemakers 2012), we can 
see that the internal debate on kufr, iman and takfir between the different Salafi 
branches of thought is far from being consensual. 
 
Never argue with conspiracy theorists. They have never met Mujahideen or have be-
come part of jihad but they spend time watching millions of documentaries and have 
convictions developed through such crap. Sometimes they will tell you that Mujahi-
deen are funded by CIA and Israel and when the same people fight against Mujahi-
deen and kill hundreds of their leaders and bomb their soldiers then they underesti-
mate and try to confuse you like they themselves are. Our measuring device is Emaan, 
we will judge them by Shariah law and see them in the light of Islam, not in the 
manmade opinions of Kuffar and apostates who are misguided from the beginning. 
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The quote above leads us directly to the second myth, conspiracy myth, an im-
portant part of the motivation for the group’s cohesion is of course the external 
common enemy. As Konrad Lorenz (1963: 183) defined it: “Discriminative aggression 
towards strangers and the bond between the members of a group enhance each 
other.” The opposition of ‘we’ and ‘they’ can unite some widely contrasting unities. 
On Tumblr and coinciding with the interview of the British jihadist better known 
by the press as Jihadi John a counter strategy was launched with the posting of 
memes (mimicked situations, people through images) filled with humor. Jihadi John 
in his black clothes brandishing his knife to cut a watermelon, to carve kebab meat, 
directing it to a dinosaur or a Christmas tree, all attempts of character assassination, 
in order to reinforce the theories of conspiracy that defend the idea that these exe-
cution videos are a mere American media campaign to undermine Islam. 
Children are also employed in the imagery of the conspiracy myth, usually in the 
condition of fragile victims, or even more frequently in their condition of orphans 
whose fathers were murdered by the enemy. 
In what appears to be a child’s drawing, we see two representations of female 
Muslims dressed in pink hijab (one of them looking like a child) looking at a man 
hanged to a red rope. Under the picture, one can read the following citation: “This 
picture was drawn by the daughter of an Iranian Sunni Muslim who was hanged this 
week after an unfair trial by Shite government. Note: Iran executed 6 Sunni scholars 
this week.” 
Last, the myth of salvation that will lead to triumph (Gerges 2014: 342) and to 
the compensation of all the good deeds and personal sacrifices made by the indi-
viduals in order to achieve the very last degree of reward in the afterlife, Paradise. 
“I’ve been moving around a lot these days he told his mother. Stop getting tired and 
moving around she said, come back home and relax she said. In jihad we’re like 
travelers he said, in Paradise we’ll finally be home and relax he said.”  
Paradise, in Islamic thought is represented by green gardens of abundance, an 
image that is frequently reproduced by jihadist bloggers when posting photos of 
the Caliphate. They employ for that purpose all available filters and color manipula-
tion tools to make the photos of the regional landscape look greener than it is in 
reality. 
 
6.7 Khilafat kids 
 
The new social media trend on accounts affiliated with ISIS and jihadism are children. 
Images and videos of young male individuals dressed in military uniforms and/or 
with black banners in their foreheads can be spotted all over Tumblr. The increase 
use of these images is equivalent to the increase number of children being recruited 
to join the jihadist fight in Syria and in Iraq. They serve both the purpose of propa-
ganda to attract more fighters and also more families into the war effort. 
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Mujahideen teaching the kids in Syria, all of them were given Ak-47 to fire some shots 
after giving tips on how to use it in a correct manner. Now this is true empower-
ment…. Where are the feminists? Allahumma Barik lahum’ I’m sure that these kids 
have the strength of lions!! 
 
The above excerpt was posted alongside a collection of 3 photos having as common 
(and quite striking) feature, the presence of young girls dressed completely in black, 
carrying guns in the company of older men and three boys. It was striking because 
I had not until that point encountered a photo of young girls who are receiving 
weaponry training. Evaluating from the photos and correspondent comments vio-
lence associated with jihadist fight has absolute religious legitimacy and offers sense 
of empowerment (Nauta 2013: 137-138) to those who defend it, even if its perfor-
mance is confided to little girls. ‘Maybe we live and maybe we die’ is the title of the 
report done in 2014, by the Human Rights Watch organization and it documents the 
life of 25 children who are/were related to the jihadist fight in Syria. The authors 
substantiate the participation of children as young as or even younger than 13 years 
old in the conflict (Human Rights Watch 2014: 21). Moreover, they corroborate that 
not only ISIS but also other jihadist groups combating in the region violently draft 
children preparing them to the war with full military training (2014: 2). They have 
advanced as well the possible motives (2014: 2) why these children accept to join 
the jihadist fight, varying from close connections (family and friends) who are al-
ready part of these jihadist group, to the inexistence of schools, participation in 
manifestations or personal reasons against the government. To which I also add the 
religious belief that ISIS represents the true Khilafat.  
 
I“Q: Why do you believe isis [sic] is a true caliphate? There is not one scholar on this 
earth who supports them. Scholars are people of logic so they know if a cali-
phate is established correctly. IS leader doesn’t meet any of the conditions for 
a caliph. 
A: Because it’s a caliphate… The prophet mohammad [sic] (PBUH) said: {Islam be-
gan as something strange and will revert to being strange as it began, so give 
glad tidings to the strangers.} If everyone support this caliphate so where is 
strange or the strangers?? Think about it...” 
 
#Childrenatwar (label for children at war) became a hashtag that has evolved from 
images of physical suffering, psychological abuse, relocation to refugee camps, 
(where they are represented as the passive subjects, victims) into a direct, active role 
in the military trainings and operations. The militarization of children in the cyber-
space is the result of the historical development of the media use of children during 
war periods (Mosse 1990; Marten 2002). ISIS virtual campaign to recruit children 
recurs to the virtuous ideas of hero, sacrifice, rite of emancipation into manhood. In 
terms of images, I have rarely encountered photos that portrait war as a game or an 
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adventure, children often have serious, focus facial expressions as if they are fully 
committed to their military duty. 
“He wishes. I will be the one who slaughters you, O kuffar. I will be a mujahid, 
insha’allah.” First photo, a beautiful young boy, somewhat with Asian traces and with 
medium-long straight black hair dressed in camouflage garments. Second photo, 
the same boy with a dark sweater and camouflage pants holds a gun at a short 
distance from a man who seems to be on his knees, with his back to the boy. 
“ISIS made his wish come true.” Last photo, the boy smiling and raising his right 
arm. Together the sentences and the set of three photos resemble to a marketing 
poster template or an almost positive advertising campaign of values of purity, 
honor and pride (Combating Terrorism Center 2006: 90). They represent the new set 
of individuals, the #cubs who will be in charge of defending Islam and carrying on 
with the jihad fight. If it is a child’s duty to perform violent jihad than it is also at the 
same time evoking the Muslim father’s ‘sense of pride, honor, and paternal respon-
sibility’ (Combating Terrorism Center 2006: 90).  
“’A brother from Maghreb’ fulfilling the duties of jihad with his five sons. 
Allahumma Barik lahum.” In this photo, we see a man with beard, military clothes 
and weaponry surrounded by five young males also with military clothes and weap-
ons with smiling faces and victory gestures. Green is the predominant color, from 
the clothes to the landscape, ending with the green hearts that appear in the citation 
text. 
One of the last attempts in both of these directions are the photos released from 
a fairground named Dijla City, located north of Mosul (Iraq). “Families in #Mosul 
enjoy spring picnics in the Islamic State#caliphate#Nineveh. People say they feel 
comfortable and safe under the rule of #IS…” The first photo on the stream is of the 
entrance of the park, a colorful construction welcoming visitors to a safe and secure 
amusement space. More pictures of the site portrait a happy, safe land with children 
playing around, the pictures are hashtagged with the words such as: #isis, #isil, #is-
lamic state, #caliphate, #islam, #land, #happy, #children, #jihad. I would like to give 
focus to the three that relate the most to this study: islam, children and jihad. So, 
despite the fact that we are watching what seem to be free war zones, still they are 
being coded under the title jihad and furthermore they pair children and jihad.  
The photo stream is completed with a link to a video entitled: ‘Excursions flock 
to the state of Nineveh.’ In the video, at one point the journalist is interviewing a 
child calling him dear while in the back another young boy raises his finger up, the 
known Islamic gesture symbolizing the unicity of God (tawhid). However, and watch-
ing the segment more in detail, we can spot behind the children, a man wearing a 
color green uniform and a gun on his shoulder. 
The message obtained in every single interview throughout the video is the 
same: In the Islamic State life is ideal and all its citizens respect the will and the law 
of God even if that means that the kids of the Khilafat are soldier material. 
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A Tumblr user posted two photos of the young Jake Bilardi, an Australian jihadist 
fighter, 18 years old whom she calls a ‘man’ and who had just been killed in a suicide 
operation with the text below: 
 
May Allah accept our dear brother Abdu-Rahīm. For indeed this ummah needs true 
men like him who wish to sacrifice this worldly life for the hereafter. Brothers & sisters, 
this brother originated from an atheist family & ended up selling his soul to Allah for 
a cheap price, to defend this ummah & give victory to this religion, while you sit at 
home at the comfort of your family born into Islam & not doing anything to stop this 




The leading conclusions of the present study, namely the amount of relevant im-
agery contents supporting the role of children as actual jihadist fighters in the terri-
torial area corresponding to the borders of the Caliphate point out to a new dimen-
sion of the online jihadist strategy. A visual dimension that enhances the qualities of 
the life under the domination of the ISIS rule to the extent that this wellbeing justifies 
being paid off with martyrdom and the sacrifice of human beings. The novelty of 
this dimension is that violent contents are not at the core center of the online jihadist 
narrative, regular life snapshots such as eating candy, going to an attraction park 
are now the normal online jihadist messages. This new and differentiated online 
performance is even more threatening than the ritualization of religious violence as 
it becomes more alluring, easier to disseminate and to accept as a standardized 
behavior. 
Albeit the online jihadist media effort to picture life in the Caliphate as peaceful, 
abundant and with greener grass, the truth is that the picture is wrong.  
As a researcher dedicated to online jihadism, I have to keep the sharp ability of 
separating these two forms of radical indoctrination as two proportioned forces that 
concur to the online rationalization of violent performances and terrorism. Will ISIS 
media continue to shape not only the online reality but also the offline existence? 
On that note, I finish this study by quoting Jan Jaap de Ruiter (2014: 3): 
 
It will be clear that education as advocated by ISIL will be destructive for young peo-
ple and will at the same time succeed in brainwashing at least part of them into war-
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The hidden women of the Caliphate – A glimpse into 
the Spanish-Moroccan Jihadist Network on Facebook41 
Abstract  
As terrorists increasingly utilize and rely on the internet for the purpose of commu-
nication, information, propaganda, recruitment and fund-raising a new trend has 
emerged in terrorism studies focusing on the collective online activities of jihadist 
groups. While some case studies included particular webpages and Twitter, barely 
any research was conducted on the jihadist online activities on Facebook. That is 
surprising since online ties on Facebook, compared to other social networking sites, 
usually represent real-life relationships. Users primarily seek for social information, 
engage and befriend with offline friends rather than total strangers. Taking the 
Spanish-Moroccan Jihadist Network (SMJN) as a case study, the paper explores the 
role of women as online recruiters as well as the homeland-diaspora relationship 
within the network. Considering the collective nature of terrorism, we hereby apply 
the concept of social capital as an innovative approach in terrorism studies. Alt-
hough it is meanwhile well known that women have a role as online recruiters within 
the Spanish-Moroccan Jihadist Network and that these women have direct online 
contact with leading elements of the so-called Islamic State (ISIS) there is neither a 
sampling frame of the female jihadist recruiters nor a social network analysis of the 
jihadist network that they belong to. By the combined use of snowball sampling 
applied to Facebook and offline target sampling we have now a clear visualization, 
providing a glimpse into the SMJN, of its key figures and of their connections to 
individuals linked to the terror networks responsible for the attacks in Paris 2015 
and Brussels 2016. Through a mixed methods approach including social network 
and content analysis the article offers an empirical base to think further about the 
importance of the SMJN within the Global Jihad and opens new scientific avenues 
to explore the explanatory potential of social capital to understand the underlying 
patterns of jihadist fighters’ online and offline bonding. That is why we find it rele-
vant to merge the themes, gender jihad, the Islamic interpretation of jihad and social 
network analysis to better grasp the ‘hidden women’ within the jihadist networks. 
                                                 
41 Adapted from the article: Carvalho, C. & Saal, J. (Forthcoming), The hidden women of the 
Caliphate – A glimpse into the Spanish-Moroccan Jihadist Network on Facebook. 




The first Spanish-speaking woman who officially migrated to Syria was Tomasa 
Perez in 2014, together with her youngest children (the oldest ones, 19 and 18 years 
old, had already travelled to Syria and she had made previous plans to give her only 
daughter to an ISIS fighter). Tomasa married Abdel Ahram (Abu Yasin el Andalusí), 
born in Tetouan (Morocco) and arrested in 2010 for being a member of a jihadist 
cell. Tomasa decided to become a muhajira (‘migrant’) at the end of 2014 taking her 
elder sons along with her from Morocco to Syria. Asia Ahmed Mohamed, followed 
the same itinerary as Tomasa, only she became a mother (March 2015) already after 
being a muhajira in Syria (June 2014). Born in Ceuta (Spain), she travelled to Syria 
with Mohamed Hamduch (Kokito Castillejos), a Moroccan-born ISIS fighter who de-
fended the ‘takfir’ (Sageman 2004: 28) ideology. More recently, an arrested jihadist 
mother of Moroccan origins living in Catalonia added an interesting twist to the 
study of gendered jihad, by becoming both a mujahida (‘fighter’) and muhajira. She 
took upon herself the responsibility of the process of mobilization and subsequent 
radicalization of her remaining twin sons. In fact, the Atanji twins were the brothers 
of Yassin Atanji, a mujahid (male fighter engaged in jihad) killed in 2014 in the Syrian 
battlefield. The twin brothers were sent by their mother to attend a mosque in 
Tetouan, returning to the family’s residence in Badalona (Catalonia) where they 
could then be seen wearing new haircuts and new Islamic attires, changes that were 
considered later in court as external individual signs of an ongoing process of radi-
calization. The judge concluded that the internet through social media platforms 
had been part of their online radicalization program once they had returned to 
Spain. In the morning that they were arrested by the authorities they were ready to 
perform their hijra (‘migration’) to Syria, just like their brother had done years before. 
We should reinforce, they did it because their mother took the individual initiative 
of fulfilling her sons’ hijra and subsequent obligation of engaging in jihad. In July 
2015, a woman was arrested in the island of Lanzarote (Canarian Islands) with 
charges of being involved in jihadist activities. S. C. Carrasco (Nabila Leci, her Face-
book username), a Spanish born-again Muslim mother that passed from being a 
recruited jihadist to become a jihadist recruiter herself was using a bottom up pro-
cess to invite other young women (preferably born-again Muslim females) to be 
migrants to Syria. On Facebook a woman revealed in a public discussion (2015) that 
Nabila had approached her some time ago: “She practically invited me to go to Syria, 
she defended al-Baghdadi and ISIS. I know she was doing it together with other 
people.” 
As a matter of fact, she had a straight link with at least two of the jihadist recruit-
ers from the Tetouan network and one link to a leading ISIS fighter. Her operations 
were being held through digital platforms (Facebook, WhatsApp) and so far, we 
could trace her connections to jihadist females from South America (Brazil, Mexico) 
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and Africa (Morocco, Mauritania). These connections illustrate developing new ji-
hadist networks and the evolutionary process of women’s engagement in jihadist 
behaviors that should be subject of further studies. 
Since in the last years Europe increasingly became the target of several jihadist 
terrorist attacks often executed by foreign fighters of the Islamic State of Iraq and 
Syria (ISIS) who returned to Europe (Hegghammer & Nesser 2015), many studies in 
terrorism research stressed in response that jihadist terrorists and foreign fighters 
are primarily but not exclusively young males. The crucial role of Western foreign 
fighters in the professional production and distribution of propaganda caused an-
other research trend that deals with the online media output of ISIS. Hereby, special 
emphasis was placed on jihadist activities on Twitter (Carter, Maher & Neumann 
2014; Berger & Morgan 2015; Klausen 2015; Vidino & Hughes 2015; Berger & Perez 
2016). In the present chapter, we will address two gaps in these recent studies by 
applying social capital theory as relatively novel concept in terrorism studies in order 
to offer a new and differentiated scope of investigation that will be aiming at: 1) the 
Spanish-Moroccan Jihadist Network and its local digital narrative on Facebook, and 
2) the role of female jihadists within it. The lacking research on jihadist activities on 
Facebook is surprising. Compared to other social network sites (SNS), the interaction 
between Facebook users and the resulting social capital is, in one hand, not well 
researched and, on the other hand, more often reflects offline connections. Despite 
the majority of jihadists and foreign fighters being male, the foregoing representa-
tive sample of female cases who engage with Spanish-Moroccan Jihadist Network 
prior to the terrorist attacks of 2015 illustrates that women, indeed, appear as re-
cruiter, facilitators and propagandists, offline as well as online. In order to conduct 
further research on that phenomenon, this chapter will firstly present a literature 
review on female jihadists, followed by a theory part on social capital in general and 
the social capital of jihadist Facebook networks particularly. In the method part of 
the paper, we will present methods of data collection and how we operationalized 
the structural aspects of the social capital concept through social network analysis. 
Finally, we will present the social metadata of our sample as well as the results of 
the social network analysis, including their discussion illustrated by several case 
studies. 
 
7.2 Literature review: Muhajira and Mujahida 
 
The majority of the jihadism studies rely on the theory of radicalization to approach 
it as a process (Sageman 2004; Bakker 2006; Neumann & Rogers 2007; Dalgaard-
Nielsen 2010; Ranstorp 2010; Sedgwick 2010; Borum 2011; Schmid 2013; Nesser 
2016), as a religious product, Salafi-jihadism (al-salafiyya al-jihadiyya) (Wiktorowicz 
2005; Hegghammer 2006; Kepel & Milelli 2008; Filiu 2009; Meijer 2009; Gauvain 
2013; Maher 2016), as a Sunni military global movement (Sivan & Friedman 1990; 
Rashid 2002; Roy 2004; Lawrence 2005; Wiktorowicz 2005; Bergen 2006; McCants 
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2006, 2015; Barret 2009; Gerges 2009; Al-Tamimi 2014; Hoffman & Reinares 2014; 
Cokburn 2015; Stern & Berger 2015); and to approach it as a social network (Arquilla 
& Ronfeldt 2001; Krebs 2002; Napoleoni 2003; Sageman 2004; Atran 2008; 
Moghadam & Fishman 2011; Asal, Nagar & Rethemeyer 2015). Parallel to these 
studies we also find literature that rather enhances distinct male Islamic thinkers, 
like Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi (Wagemakers 2012), Juhayman al-’Utaybi 
(Hegghammer & Lacroix 2011), Abu Mus’ab Al-Suri (Cruickshank & Ali 2007; Lia 
2008) or Sayyd Qutb (Calvert 2010) to name a few. However, studies of jihadism and 
jihadist terrorism seldom take in account the debate on gender jihad (Cook 2005a; 
Von Knop 2007; Sjoberg 2007, 2009, 2010, 2013; Groen & Kranenberg 2010; Bloom 
2011; Sjoberg & Gentry 2011; Carvalho 2014; Lahoud 2014; Perešin & Cervone 2015; 
Winter 2015b; Cottee 2016) and rarely mention the Islamic principles that frame 
jihad as a theological precept (Peters 1979, 1996; Kepel 1985; Akbar 2003; Bonner 
2006; Euben & Zaman 2009). In addition to it and according to Coolsaet (2016), we 
are now experiencing the fourth wave of jihadist terrorism that is based on younger 
elements that belong to ‘local networks’ with a distinct subculture and to whom 
bonding and kinship are the main vectors of social cohesion. Continuing the litera-
ture review towards the local subculture, we need to approach the subculture con-
tents that are held by the Moroccan jihadists, one of the highest contingents of 
foreign fighters in Syria (Caillet 2014; Masbah 2014). Here one may be surprised by 
the insignificant academic production on the subject. There are of course, honorable 
exceptions, Reinares and García-Calvo (2014), who have connected the Moroccan 
fighter’s activities to the Spanish jihadist fighters, Corte (2007), Jordan and Trujillo 
(2006) with their relevant work on Ceuta, or Alonso and Rey (2007) who treated the 
evolution of jihad in Morocco. 
While there is much debate on jihadist recruitment there is still much to be done 
in terms of exposing the Islamic Sunni principles that are being applied by ISIS nar-
rative to effectively recruit women to join their movement and to expand the terri-
tory of the Caliphate. Hijra and muhajira are connected Islamic concepts. Hijra refers 
to the migration (622 CE) of the Prophet Mohammed from Mecca to Medina, an 
historic event for the consolidation of the Muslim community that symbolizes the 
travelling of the muhajir (‘migrant’) from a troubled to a safe space. Since then the 
attribution of the designation muhajira has been considered an honor because it is 
the result of “a meritus act” (Holt, Lambton & Lewis 1970: 446) in the name of God, 
a reason why many female Facebook users adopt the kunya muhajira to reinforce 
their wish and availability to migrate. Perešin and Cervone (2015: 495) adapt this 
theory to the migration into ISIS territory mentioning three factors that make West-
ern women select the name, muhajira: “Western women who have joined ISIS have 
extensively used the term muhajira to identify themselves on social media, clearly 
indicating in this way a discontent with their previous living environment (the West), 
an impellent drive to move to a place of ideal perfection (the Caliphate) and the 
religious motivation for seeking the change.” 
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Efforts made by ISIS to attract women into their movement are directly related 
to their efforts to attract men to join the fighting positions that is to say recruited 
women will be the reward given to these fighters and their future children will help 
them retaining an extra payment (Bloom 2015). On the other hand, the concept of 
mujahida, the female fighter has evolved also to include the goal of an exclusive 
female process of jihadist recruitment of other women that has according to Qazi 
(2012) a violent motivation sustaining and promoting a call for terrorist actions. That 
is to say, the value of migration maybe substituted by teaching other women online, 
on the value of affiliating jihadist principles. 
ISIS religious framework to justify women’s jihadist tasks takes in consideration 
the debate among Islamic academics on the matter. In fact, Islamic academics’ de-
bate about the role of women in the defensive function of jihad (jihad al daf which 
is also theologically considered as an individual obligation – fard’ayn) is complex 
and without a uniform perspective. In Sunni Islamic tradition, defensive jihad reports 
to the duty of every single Muslim to engage in warfare (qital) when and if their 
territory is being invaded by unbelievers and they have no time or conditions to 
required superior permission to fight (Kepel & Milelli 2008: 106). In this case, women 
need no prior authorization from their husbands, fathers or brothers to engage in 
jihadist military action (2008: 107). Despite being dead, the Islamic scholar Anwar al-
Awlaqi (1971-2011) continues to be the most influential scholar among Jihadist 
women as he was supportive of their active engagement in jihadist activities. Con-
firming his ideological legacy and persisting influence, memes with his most famous 
quotes appear on female jihadists’ Facebook newsfeed on daily basis, an interesting 
fact since he was the jihadist scholar who coined the expression of ‘Internet muja-
hideen’. Regarding the military role of jihadist women, al-Zarqawi (Lahoud 2014: 
788) and Egyptian scholar Yusuf al-Qaradawi (1998) are two important theological 
guidelines for ISIS’ narrative. Al-Qaradawi – while addressing the Palestinian fight – 
affirmed that women have the obligation to participate in defensive jihad on their 
own, even if that entails travelling alone or not wearing a hijab as they are pursuing 
jihad fisabilillah, Jihad in the name of God. Cook (2005a: 381) adds in this sense that 
the choice for female jihadists fighters in Palestine was made to “skew the profile of 
the typical suicide attacker” and with that to deceive the Counter-Terrorist Israeli 
forces. 
Furthermore, Muslim and non-Muslim scholars continue to discuss ISIS’ acts and 
regulations in the optic of Sunni traditions, explicitly the recruitment of already mar-
ried women with the purpose of re-marrying them with ISIS fighters. The Qur’an 
(24:32) is very clear on the matter: “And marry those among you who are single.” 
Albeit, the Islamic principles on marriage, ISIS is promoting and facilitating the trav-
elling of jihadist women to their territory even when these women are already mar-
ried. In addition, these recruitment strategies are challenging another Islamic marital 
principle that expresses the obligation of every married woman to obey her husband 
in an absolute manner, as it reads in the Qur’an (4:34): “men are in charge of women 
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inclusive in the subject of travelling.” Women play with the space offered by these 
different theoretical approaches to express their motivation to be an active part of 
the jihadist fight. In the words of Anne Speckhard (2015: 410): “A Muslim woman is 
a female jihad warrior always and everywhere. (…) She wages jihad when she sup-
ports jihad (and) when she calls for jihad in word, deed, belief, and prayer.” 
 
7.3 Social capital theory 
 
Often people need to cooperate and invest their resources collectively to achieve a 
common goal. But collective action is susceptible to the dilemma of free-riding: “un-
less there is coercion or some other special device to make individuals act in their 
common interest, rational, self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their 
common or group interests” (Olson 1971: 2). Addressing the dilemma of collective 
action, social scientists emphasize the function of social capital as “social superglue” 
(Putnam 2000: 24). Coleman (1990: 302), therefore, defines social capital as follow-
ing:  
 
It is not a single entity, but a variety of different entities having two characteristics in 
common: They all consist of some aspect of a social structure, and they facilitate 
certain actions of individuals who are within the structure. Like other forms of capital, 
social capital is productive, making possible the achievement of certain ends that 
would not be attainable in its absence. 
 
Coleman’s definition implicates that social capital constitutes a multiple-variable 
concept encompassing different social phenomena. In reference to Putnam’s origi-
nal conceptualization, social capital accounts usually for trust which arises from two 
related resources: norms of reciprocity and social networks (Putnam 1994: 171). 
Taken together, the variables of social capital function as trigger for collective action 
since they provide access to information and social life through social relations, in-
crease the willingness to involve oneself trustfully into social interactions, produce 
support, aid and solidarity, allow social control, and raise awareness to the fate and 
action of others (Esser 2008: 24f.). But social capital is also accessible to other indi-
viduals when they are integrated into the same social structure (Zmerli 2008: 36). 
Externalities are neither restricted to in-group activities nor must be necessarily pos-
itive because “any society with cleavages of class, race, ethnicity, religion, and other 
lines of fracture will potentially suffer from group-specific social capital” (Warren 
2008: 129). To distinguish between the different effects of social capital, Putnam 
introduced the typology of bridging and bonding social capital. Bridging or inclusive 
social capital is outside-oriented. It produces enclosing identities, generalized trust 
and norms of reciprocity. Bonding social capital stands for particularized trust and 
norms, fostering in-group solidarity, parochial identities, distinct group loyalties and 
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antagonism against non-members, often with negative and deliberative conse-
quences (Zmerli 2008: 50; Putnam 2000: 22-23; Traunmuller 2012: 20). 
 
7.4 Social capital of jihadist online networks 
 
Putnam (2000: 358) warned that recognizing “the importance of social capital in 
sustaining community life does not exempt us from the need to worry about how 
that ‘community is defined – who is inside and thus benefits from social capital and 
who is outside and does not.” The radical antagonism and religious extremism of 
jihadist groups is a vivid example of it and also extremists often need to cooperate 
to achieve their goals. In this regard, many terrorism researchers stress that terrorism 
respectively political violence – as one possible collective action outcome of jihadist 
groups – foremost constitutes an “extreme form of within-group cooperation” 
(Ginges, Hansen & Norenzayan 2009: 225). Acts of terrorism often occur as a collec-
tive action thus without an organizational vehicle it is difficult for aggrieved individ-
uals to perform violence effectively (Oberschall 2004; Hafez 2006; Finke & Harris 
2009; Van Dongen 2014). Additionally, the free-riding dilemma is especially inherent 
to clandestine activities. Therefore, individuals engaging in extremist activities col-
lectively are highly prone to defection – “the Achilles’ heel of coordinated violence” 
(Berman 2009: 14) – as the infiltration by traitors or informants poses a great threat 
(Iannaccone 2003; Oberschall 2004; Berman 2009). Social capital is for terrorist 
groups consequently a crucial resource determining efficient collective action out-
comes such as mobilization and coordinated violence. 
While trust and norms are to some degree determined by cultural, religious or 
political settings, networks constitute the structural aspect of social capital (Putnam 
1994; Zmerli 2008: 47). According to Lin (2008), there are four explanations on how 
resources in a network can benefit embedded nodes: reshape of information flow, 
exercise of influence, social credentials and reinforcement of relationships. Especially 
the quantity and quality, respectively density, of the relationships (ties) within a net-
work influence the ability of actors to mobilize resources through the connections 
to other actors. Granovetter (1983) established in this regard his famous typology 
of strong and weak ties. Strong ties occur in dense networks with intense interac-
tions while weak ties are intermediate or less frequent relationships between actors 
sharing the same interests or attributes. Cliques are one extreme form of closed 
social networks characterized by strong ties and the interrelation of all involved ac-
tors (Esser 2000: 200; Sageman 2004: 152). Dense networks like cliques produce so-
cial cohesion, foster solidarity, trust, political inclusion, intense face-to-face interac-
tions, commitment and conformity towards group behavior and attitudes. Thus, they 
function on basis of homophily and generate mainly bonding social capital. In this 
regard, several studies stressed the underlying family and friendship ties in jihadist 
networks (Sageman 2004; Bakker 2006; Gill 2007; Harris-Hogan 2014; Saal 2014). At 
the same time, more complex collective action is usually easier to manage for larger 
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and resourceful groups. The mobilization of bigger amounts of resources requires 
the delegation of tasks and support from a broader constituency (Asal & 
Rethemeyer 2008; Nesser & Stenersen 2014; Van Dongen 2014). Sageman (2004) 
emphasizes hereby the importance of bridging terrorist cliques and the outside 
world – the core and periphery of a network – through weak ties, otherwise network 
growth will be slow. Individuals with many direct contacts within one network are 
called hubs; individuals who bridge different networks or clusters (i.e. in case of their 
absence, a link would be missing, constituting a ‘structural hole’) are called brokers. 
In the last years, terrorism researchers increasingly discussed the influence of the 
internet on network building and recruitment. Some experts (Taarnby 2005; 
Neumann & Rogers 2007; Genking & Gutfraind 2011) reject the claim that the in-
ternet serves as effective online tool to recruit European Muslims because intensive 
interpersonal actions are crucial for developing trust. That might be true for many 
radicals, and especially for clandestine networks, but other studies point to the op-
posite direction especially in the case of Muslim women who have online a privi-
leged space to communicate and interact with others without being subjected to 
the Islamic rules of social public behavior. After the Iraq invasion (2003), radicaliza-
tion leading into violence is greatly achieved by the internet (Hoffman & Reinares 
2014: 40). Furthermore, Masbah (2014) infers that in reality “around 60 percent of 
Moroccans who joined the fighting in Syria are today recruited via social networks, 
whereas the rest are recruited face-to-face.”  
Those social network sites (SNS) are defined by Ellison and Boyd (2013: 158) as  
 
a networked communication platform in which participants 1) have uniquely identi-
fiable profiles that consists of user-supplied content, content provided by other users, 
and/or system-level data; 2) can publicly articulate connections that can be viewed 
and traversed by others; and 3) can consume, produce, and/or interact with streams 
of user-generated content provided by their connections on the site. 
 
While early research on online sociability was skeptical about the possibility to form 
relationships online, “a growing body of evidence has accumulated which shows 
that internet users are as sociable offline as are non-users, if not more so, and that 
the internet is used often as a tool to maintain and extend offline social relation-
ships” (Gennaro & Dutton 2007: 592). Compared to other SNSs like Twitter or Insta-
gram, especially Facebook – the most extensively used SNS – follows a more recip-
rocal approach in its user-to-user interaction with important implications for the 
generation of bonding and bridging forms of structural social capital. Friending is, 
indeed, one of the most central aspects of users’ activities on Facebook and serve 
multiple purposes of marking and displaying relationships, filtering who can access 
what content, and finding common friends (Joinson 2008; Smith 2011; Ellison & 
Boyd 2013). In a study about US Facebook users, Smith (2011), for instance, con-
cluded that almost everybody stated as major or minor motivation to stay in touch 
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with friends, family and/or to reconnect with old friends. According to several other 
studies, users estimated that 25-30% of their Facebook friends are ‘actual’ friends 
(Ellison & Boyd 2013). Furthermore, Hampton et al. (2011) state that Facebook users 
friend around half of the number of their offline social ties and that they have gen-
erally larger core networks and strong ties than the average person. Therefore, con-
nections on Facebook reflect offline relationships to a certain degree and friending 
practices maintain bonding social capital in form of strong ties. Ellison et al. (2014) 
describe relationship maintenance behavior in this regard as ‘social grooming’ which 
includes signaling attention, building trust and creating reciprocal expectations.  
However, possessing more ‘actual’ friends on Facebook also increase bridging 
social capital because of more meaningful relationship with ego (Burke, Kraut & 
Marlow 2011; Brooks et al. 2014; Ellison et al. 2014): that makes SNSs so important 
when considering social capital processes, because a reshaped network, especially 
one with many more bridging ties, has the potential to increase one’s access to var-
ious resources, such as novel information and diverse perspectives (Ellison & Vitak 
2015). In Smith’s study (2011), for instance, half of the respondents stated that their 
use of Facebook is motivated by the possible interaction with people who share the 
same interest. In another study by Vitak (2012), perceived bridging social capital of 
users increased with their network expansion by size and diversity. Usually, three 
SNS elements have hereby the potential to increase (bridging) social capital (Ellison 
& Vitak 2015). Firstly, profile information facilitates the activation of latent ties 
(friends of friends) because they signal shared interests and help users to find like-
minded (jihadist) users. Secondly, the public display of friend lists and eventually 
mutual friends can serve as ‘vetting process’ and approve one’s identity which be-
comes especially crucial in environments requiring high stocks of trust. At the same 
time, the ability to comment, reply and like common friends’ content can increase 
the likelihood of friend-of-friend encounter. Finally, user-generated content in Face-
book’s newsfeed serves additionally to the profile information as ‘social awareness 
stream’. 
On Facebook, content repetition (share, retweet, repost, regram, among other 
means to spread a message online), the virality (constant circulation of the message) 
and the universal language of these images and videos make it easy and effortless 
to any individual to learn the jihadist narrative. Moreover, it facilitates as well the 
construction of the ‘community of practice’ as ‘form of collective learning’ (Taylor 
2010: 125) because a “close connection is drawn between the viewer and the viewed, 
an understanding developed that they are both warriors in the same war” (Egerton 
2011: 98). Videos have also the capacity to stimulate the feelings, emotions and so-
cial connections between the sources and the receivers. A good example of a video 
that impressed the female jihadists of this network and that has been circulating 
among other European jihadist networks (demonstrating the power of repetition, 
virality and fluency of the jihadist narrative through images) is the one of a young 
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jihadist singing the Hoor Al Ayn poem before seeing his future wife, while sur-
rounded by his war companions. The title and the lyrics of the song refer to the 
‘chaste women of Paradise’ who will be the reward of the righteous Muslim men 
and that finds its religious roots in the passages of the Qur’an ([Sura As-Sâffât (37): 
40-48]; [Sura Sâd (38): 52]; [Sura Al-Wâqi’ah (56): 22-23]). The female jihadists who 
received the video via a Dutch contact, with Dutch subtitles (streamed on YouTube 
by Al Haq Media Holland) were very enthusiastic about the musical performance, 
praising the performer’s passion with ‘MaschaAllah’ comments. These types of 
online interactions with the help of audio-visual materials are the ‘most powerful 
da’wa tool’ (Fisher & Prucha 2014) and the most powerful gregarious tool among 
the “diaspora mujahedeen” (Rogan 2006: 58) who by the hyperlinks and the likes 
create a sense of belonging and emotional attachment, as Egerton (2011: 92) ex-
plains: “The key role played by hypermedia in the production of the global militant 
Salafist imaginary is its ability to allow for the construction and consolidation of the 
imagined community of the ummah, and one’s place within it.”  
In this regard, a Tunisian foreign fighter in Syria (who connects with the Spanish-
Moroccan network) posted on Facebook an image of two women, one carrying a 
baby and the other one waving a gun. The foreign fighter placed it without a title or 
any sort of explanation yet it is a remarkable use of imagery because it figures 
women of the Caliphate both in their mother role and in their female jihadist role. 
The photo may challenge the principle that women who perform the hijra to the 
Caliphate are confined to become a mujahid wife and a ‘revolutionary womb’ (Bloom 
2013: 154). However, it is also true that until the moment the authors have not en-
counter online data supporting the idea that the women within the analyzed net-
work aspire to be an ‘exploding womb’ (Bloom 2013: 154), it is nevertheless a sce-
nario to consider as gender and violence are operative concepts for the ‘imagined 
community’. Visual posts such as the one mentioned above grant the jihadist narra-
tive with ‘digital readiness’ (Horrigan 2014) that is to say that their imagery is the 
first one to be seen, moreover that their imagery will install a biased judgment of 
reality and these circumstances will enable the audience to perform and behave ac-
cording to ISIS’ narrative. In other words, ISIS digital skills are being effectively di-
rected to the purpose of “performance of goal-directed behavior” (Taylor & Currie 
2012: 30). 
 
7.5 Data and method: Social network analysis 
 
After 9/11 researchers progressively utilized social network analysis (SNA) for a bet-
ter perception of terrorist networks. By utilizing SNA, researchers inquire the social 
phenomenon of terrorism/extremism as a consequence of social structure which is 
characterized by actors represented as nodes, and by the ties between those con-
nected and interacting actors.  
The hidden women of the Caliphate  131 
 
Hence, in contrast to other quantitative methods that tend to focus on the de-
scription and aggregate analysis of the attributes of those actors who make up the 
research population, SNA assumes that to comprehend the social phenomenon, it 
is more conducive to map out and analyze the system of ties among the various 
actors and the ways in which these relational patterns shape actors’ activity, decision 
making, group dynamics, and, eventually, the outcome of the group’s collective ac-
tion (Perliger & Pedahzur 2011: 46). 
If it comes to structural social capital, there are basically two approaches to as-
sess the bonding and bridging effects in a network: the power-as-access and the 
power-as-control approach (Smith et al. 2014: 163). The related centrality measures 
originally were developed by Linton Freeman (1978) and resembles degree, close-
ness and eigenvector centrality as measures for power-as-access, and betweenness 
centrality (brokerage) as power-as-control. These centrality measures also take dif-
ferent degrees of local and global network structure into account (Bonacich 1987). 
Degree centrality, the number of ties an actor has to other nodes, indicates an indi-
vidual’s potential access to resources of other actors. Covering power through indi-
rect ties, closeness centrality describes an actor’s power through the averagely low 
number of ties he needs to reach others in the network. As a third power-as-access 
measure, a high eigenvector centrality of an actor indicates that he is connected to 
key players with a high degree centrality and, thus, probably can benefit from their 
access to resources without maintaining many ties directly to other actors. By con-
trast, the power-as-control approach captures the circumstance that if an actor is 
dependent on others’ resources, these nodes can have power over the actor. There-
fore, an actor can become more powerful if she or he is positioned as broker in a 
structural hole since dependency is decreased and ‘flows’ between network compo-
nents can be controlled (Smith et al. 2014: 163). Betweenness centrality measures 
hereby how often an actor lies on the shortest path (geodesic) between two other 
nodes in the network. In order to ease comparison between different measures of 
nodes and groups within the network we normalized all centrality measures. 
Apart from its strengths, social network analysis surely also has its weaknesses. 
One major difficulty is the boundary specification problem (or ‘fuzzy boundaries’) 
which refers to the definition of rules to include nodes and ties. We countered this 
problem by a two-fold strategy as we followed a nominalist and empiricist approach. 
According to the former, actors are included based of a formal definition of group 
membership. The data collection process started based on Muslim women using 
Spanish as dominant language and with open public profiles on Facebook and 
whose contents, comments and posts reflected their self-proclaimed affiliation to 
the jihadist ideology. From the initial sampling, we went on to select and collect the 
connections of these women to other self-proclaimed jihadist Facebook users in 
order to achieve a deep and expanded data set. In this context we carefully reviewed 
individual profiles whether they explicitly displayed jihadist propaganda in form of 
profile or cover pictures, in posts or comments. In this context we carefully reviewed 
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individual profiles whether they explicitly displayed jihadist propaganda in form of 
profile or cover pictures, in posts or comments. Since Ellison and Boyd (2013: 153) 
state that an online identity is often linked to offline presence, we believe that this 
is specifically the case for jihadists. But we also relate to the empiricist approach that 
measures observable interactions. As Kossinets (2008: 5) suggests, this approach is 
especially useful since records of online communication increasingly became readily 
available. For this chapter, Facebook friendship simply indicates interactions be-
tween nodes within the network. Unfortunately, we were neither able to collect com-
prehensive data on the strength of particular connections nor on interaction pat-
terns other than friendship. Conducting snowball sampling by reviewing friend lists 
of ‘seeds’, friend recommendations by Facebook’s algorithm and applying Face-
book’s Graph Search we were able to compile a dataset of 352 nodes connected 
through 2680 ties. Additionally, we collected data on gender, origin, residency, for-
eign fighter status and Facebook. All data was collected between May 2015 and May 
2016.  
Due to research ethics, we only analyzed public information of profiles. Unsur-
prisingly, the publically available data of the Facebook profiles in general differed 
significantly, making it difficult to collect consistent data comprehensively. We 
hence also followed two approaches considering data validity. Whereas in most 
cases we had strong evidences that a person originated from a certain place or is 
located in Syria or Iraq in some cases we only had several indicators so that we 
calculated the average SNA measures for a conservative count as well as a liberal 
estimation. Although Facebook’s design stresses the display of friend lists which is 
the default and typical setting of users (Ellison & Boyd 2013: 157), especially private 
friend lists posed a further limitation and can be compared to non-respondents in 
survey studies. While some possibly unobserved ties can be reciprocated through 
the public friend lists of others, that is not the case if both nodes’ lists are hidden. In 
our sample, one fourth (25.5%) respectively 90 accounts had a private friend list. This 
means that only 6.5% of all possible ties within the network remain unobserved. 
While network size has no significant impact on the accuracy of SNA measures 
(Borgatti, Carley & Krackhardt 2006), several studies found that centrality measures 
are still robust if the error rate through unobserved ties is not exceeding a 10% 
threshold (Borgatti, Carley & Krackhard 2006; Xu & Chen 2008; Burcher & Whelan 
2015). A second limitation concerns the circumstance that Facebook profiles of ji-
hadists are occasionally suspended due to Facebook’s policy to target hate speech. 
Yet, there are several options on how researchers can treat unobserved ties respec-
tively missing data. For practical reasons, we opted for an available case analysis 
whereby we used all observed ties, but ignored missing data (Koskinen et al. 2013: 
515). Contrary, a complete case analysis (excluding the nodes with missing data) 
would eventually exclude potentially important actors and consequently undermine 
the assumptions of social network models (2013: 516). Yet, opting for available case 
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analysis, such approach still has important implications for conclusions about net-
work structure.  
 
7.6 Social metadata 
 
Almost half of the jihadists in the sample originate from Morocco. We could identify 
between 127 and 164 nodes with Moroccan origin though we assume that the actual 
number is higher due to the fact that data on origin is not comprehensive for the 
whole sample. Out of this Moroccan sample, at least 30-43 jihadists came from 
Tetouan, another seven from Fez, five from Tangier, three from Nador, and 2-3 from 
Casablanca. If we calculate the proportion of those individuals we believe to know 
the Moroccan city of origin (N=71), we find that 60.6% came from Tetouan, 95.8% 
from North Morocco, and from those 78.9% from cities on the Ceuta-Melilla axis 
(Tetouan, Tanger, Nador, Oujda, Fnideq, and Al Hoceima). The high proportion of 
jihadists from Tetouan comes not as a surprise considering that an estimated 900 
out of 1500 Moroccan foreign fighters hail either from Tetouan or Tanger (Reinares 
& García-Calvo 2015b: 9f). Another factor that needs to be considered is the cities’ 
proximity to the Spanish enclaves of Melilla and Ceuta. Ceuta, “one of the most fa-
vorable social situations for the jihadist recruitment in Spain” (Jordán & Trujillo 2006: 
2), was according to an earlier study by Reinares and García-Calvo (2014) home to 
many Spanish foreign fighters. Another study of the same authors (2015) found that 
75% of the suspects arrested in Spain for crimes related to jihadist terrorism between 
2013 and 2015 originated from Ceuta or Melilla (37.5% each). In 49 cases we believe 
to have data on the residency of these Moroccans, while 17 live or lived in Morocco 
(35%), 28-31 (62-3%) are located in EU countries. 11-12 of them reside in Spain (four 
in Barcelona, two in Madrid and other cities), 6 in Belgium (mainly Brussels), 3 in 
Italy, 2-3 in France and other countries. But these results need to be treated carefully 
since the sample of the residency of Moroccans is too small and the data incon-
sistent. Though we believe that the actual number of Moroccan jihadists in our da-
tabase living in EU countries and especially in Spain is higher their proportion might 
be smaller. Likewise, it is hard to make statements about the origin and place of 
residence of the remaining nodes in our database. We additionally found that 22-
35 individuals have Tunisian origin and that at least 101-122 jihadists live or lived in 
Western respectively beside one exception – a Canadian – in EU countries. But also 
here we assume that the number of EU residents in our database is in fact higher. 
Most of them reside surprisingly either in France (38-48, 37-9%) or less surprisingly 
in Spain (33-39, 32%). Eight of the French residents are from Paris and the others 
from a diversity of cities (including Saint-Denis, Réunion). In case of the Spaniards 
at least 4-6 are located in Ceuta and 5 in Barcelona. Another 15-16 individuals are 
living in Belgium (mostly in Brussels and Molenbeek), and 5-7 are from (Northern) 
Italy. Few individuals also lived in other EU countries such as Germany, Netherlands, 
Switzerland, Norway and the UK.  
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Gender is the only variable we obtained data on every person in the network. 
Among them are 46 women. Their proportion of 13.1% approximately concurs, for 
instance, with the results of Reinares and García-Calvo (2015b: 14) who found that 
among the Spanish arrests were 15.8% women. For Western foreign fighters, similar 
proportions (10-15%) of females travelling to Syria or Iraq were estimated by other 
researchers (Barrett 2014; Neumann 2015; Bergen et al. 2016). Yet, the majority of 
women in our sample lives in Western Europe (28-33, ca. 90%): 12-15 of them in 
Spain, 5 in France and 4 in Belgium. Compared to their male counterpart, the pro-
portion of women with Moroccan origin seems to be significantly lower. We could 
only identify 8 Moroccan female jihadists. Interesting as well is that we could only 
verify in two cases that women in the network travelled to Syria.  
Generally, we suppose that at least 85 to 115 individuals in our database are 
foreign fighters. The term foreign fighter might be slightly misleading. Though we 
could observe that most of them are taking an active part in these wars, we cannot 
generalize this for the whole sample. We estimate that 74% of the foreign fighters 
in the network have Moroccan origin while nearly everybody of them seems to come 
from Tetouan. At least 10-14 of the foreign fighters lived in Europe (mainly France) 
but as the data on the place of residence of foreign fighters is very sparse it is im-




Comparing power-as-access and power-as-control centrality measures for certain 
groups in the network (see Table 7.1), we find that certain attributes (Moroccan 
origin, Tetouan origin, residency in a Western country, residency in Spain, gender, 
foreign fighter) predict the degree of bonding and bridging social capital generation 
and maintenance within the observed Facebook network. Running analysis for a lib-
eral and conservative count of attributes, results for power-as-access measures are 
in most cases akin so that we assume that they are fairly robust for both counts. The 
results for betweenness centrality differ for some groups, especially for jihadists 
from Tetouan and to a lesser degree for Spaniards and foreign fighters. Accordingly, 
these results and conclusions need to be treated more carefully. 
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Table 7.1 Power-as-access and power-as-control centrality scores of the Spanish-Moroccan 
jihadist Facebook network (Average of node’s normalized centrality scores) 
 
 All Moroccans Tetouan FF Westerners Spaniards Women 
Liberal count (N)  (164) (43) (115) (122) (40)  
Conservative 
count (N) 
(352) (127) (30) (85) (101) (33) (46) 
FB Friends  531 692 372 651 1,000  
 555 535 684 402 674 1,064 1,510 
Nodes  19.4 25.5 18.8 11.8 9.8  
 11.7 19.3 23.5 21.2 11.9 10.9 9.7 
Proportion  0.037 0.037 0.051 0.018 0.01  
 0.021 0.036 0.034 0.047 0.018 0.01 0.006 
Degree  0.055 0.073 0.053 0.034 0.028  
 0.044 0.055 0.067 0.06 0.034 0.031 0.028 
Eigenvector  0.053 0.075 0.045 0.011 0.019  
 0.032 0.052 0.07 0.052 0.012 0.022 0.016 
Closeness  0.362 0.386 0.361 0.312 0.306  
 0.341 0.36 0.383 0.369 0.312 0.31 0.304 
Betweenness  0.659 0.827 0.687 0.577 0.7  
 0.575 0.657 0.512 0.805 0.592 0.802 0.762 
 
7.7.1 Moroccans 
Though the average number of FB friends of the most represented group in the 
network – nodes with Moroccan origin – is slightly lower than for the whole sample 
(which is with an average of 555 friends still twice as much as the average US Face-
book user [Hampton et al. 2011; Ellison et al. 2014]) all power-as-access centrality 
scores are higher. Individuals with Moroccan origin have averagely a higher number 
of within-network ties and consequently a higher score for degree centrality. Among 
the top 10% in degree centrality (see Table 7.2) are 25-30 Moroccan jihadists (63-
75%), including all ten top players who are highest in degree centrality. But Moroc-
can jihadists do not only have more connections to other members in the network 
but also higher eigenvector and closeness centrality scores. Also here the vast ma-
jority of top players in eigenvector (25-33, respectively 69-92%) and closeness cen-
trality (22-29, 63-83%) have Moroccan origin. This means that Moroccan jihadists, 
firstly, are better connected to key players in the network (who are mostly Moroc-
cans as well) and, secondly, need a lower number of ties to reach everybody else in 
the network than the average due to their embeddedness. Such high power-as-ac-
cess indicates high stocks of bonding social capital. A visualization of the entire net-
work (Figure 7.1) as well as the Moroccan network only (Figure 7.2) supports this 
assumption since most of them form a dense cluster. Consequently, we can establish 
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that originating from the same region (North-Morocco) plays a crucial role for ji-
hadist network building on Facebook and the creation of bonding social capital 
through trust-relations. This becomes even more evident in case of nodes from 
Tetouan who averagely scores highest in degree, eigenvector and closeness central-
ity. It can be speculated that many online connections are actually also pre-existing 
offline connections. Also among the top players, we found a significant number of 
nodes from Tetouan although we believe their actual number is higher. The im-
portance of Tetouan becomes obvious if we consider that 4-6 individuals among 
the top-10 key players in degree and eigenvector centrality originate from the city. 
 
Table 7.2 Top key player and broker of the Spanish-Moroccan jihadist Facebook network 
(top 10%) 
 
 N Moroccans Tetouan FF Westerners Women 
Degree 40 24-29 7-10 16-17 6-9 5 
  (60-73%) (18-25%) (40-43%) (15-23%) (13%) 
Eigenvector 36 25-33 8-11 18-19 3 3 
  (69-92%) (22-31%) (50-53%) (8%) (8%) 
Closeness 35 22-29 7-10 16-17 3 5 
  (63-83%) (20-29%) (46-49%) (9%) (14%) 
Betweenness 35 13-18 4-6 11-14 12-15 7 



















Figure 7.1 Jihadists with Moroccan origin 
(Node size indicates degree centrality, red nodes have Moroccan origin, liberal count) 

















Figure 7.2 Moroccan network 
 
Also the stock of bridging social capital measured by betweenness centrality is 
slightly but less significantly higher than the overall average. However, while Moroc-
cans are highly overrepresented among key players this is not the case for top bro-
kers. Among them Moroccans are either slightly underrepresented or reflect the 
proportion of Moroccans in the whole sample. Still we can find in the visualized 
network a considerable amount of Moroccan brokers in or close to the two smaller 
clusters mainly consisting of individuals who mainly live or lived in Europe (see be-
low Figure 7.3). To what extent nodes from Tetouan possess bridging social capital 
is hard to verify as the results for betweenness centrality differ significantly between 
the liberal and conservative count and data is therefore not robust. Yet, the mean of 
Facebook friends is higher than for the whole sample. Despite Tetouans are highly 
embedded in the network as they have the highest proportion of nodes among their 
Facebook friends, a high number of Facebook friends itself indicates at least that 
these individuals are linked to many latent weak ties.  
 
7.7.2 Westerners 
Apart from the Moroccan cluster, the visualized network displays two smaller clus-
ters mainly consisting of Western jihadists. One cluster consists of Spanish, the other 
of French and Belgian jihadists (see Figure 7.3). Compared to nodes with Moroccan 
origin, the network-related bonding social capital of Westerners is considerably 
lower than the average of all nodes. Especially the scores of eigenvector centrality 
for Western jihadists lie, in one hand, under the average because of lacking ties to 
key players. On the other hand, we could identify some Westerners among the top 
players in degree centrality (three Spanish and 2-5 French jihadists).  
 

















Figure 7.3 Western jihadists 
(Yellow nodes are Spanish, red French, orange Belgian and light blue other EU residents) 
 
Surprisingly, degree centrality is for Spaniards even lower than for all Westerners 
but eigenvector centrality higher. This can be explained by the circumstance that 
Spanish jihadists possess more ties to Moroccan key players in the network than, for 
example, French or Belgian jihadists. For instance, two of the three Westerners 
among the key players in eigenvector centrality are living in Spain. Likewise, the 
network visualization shows that some Spanish jihadists are centrally embedded in 
the Moroccan cluster. In regard to the results on bonding social capital, it is neces-
sary to repeat that we assume a higher proportion of nodes from Western countries 
than represented in the network. Likewise, the results must be contextualized in this 
specific Moroccan-dominated network, as we cannot make any statements about 
the connections to other jihadist clusters within Western ego-networks. 
In opposite to possessing low stocks of bonding social capital, Western and es-
pecially Spanish jihadists are to some degree crucial in the generation of bridging 
social capital. Whereas betweenness centrality of Westerners is equivalent to the 
network average, Spaniards show scores above average. Westerners are also over-
represented among the top brokers due to Spanish jihadists. The 12-15 Western top 
brokers (34-43%) include seven Spaniards of whom at least two come from Ceuta. 
Interestingly, Spanish jihadists averagely have more than 1,000 Facebook friends. 
This supports the assumption that they play a central role in bridging the North-
Moroccan network with its diaspora and other jihadists in Spain and Europe as well 
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7.7.3 Women 
Female jihadists are the group with the lowest centrality measures related to bond-
ing social capital. This might be not surprising since women generally take a back 
seat within jihadist circles. Yet, this should not hide the fact that there exist excep-
tions. Female jihadists, indeed, appear as central jihadist online entrepreneurs and 
networkers though they are under-represented compared to their male counterpart. 
In our sampled network, we could identify five women (three from Morocco, one 
from Spain and, surprisingly, one from Germany) along with the top 10% in degree 
centrality. The same women can be partly found among the other key player cate-
gories. As the network visualization shows (Figure 7.4), those few female jihadists 
are mostly embedded in the Moroccan cluster. But many can be also found at the 
network’s periphery. Yet, opposed to what one might expect the visualization of the 
network also shows that female jihadists do widely engage with male jihadists online 
and not only with other women. 
While women might play a rather minor role in the generation of bonding social 
capital, they do have an importance as weak ties for bridging social capital. The 
betweenness centrality of female jihadists is one of the highest in the whole Face-
book network. Likewise, female jihadists are overrepresented (20%) among the top 
brokers compared to their proportion in the sample. These seven women live in 
Morocco, Spain, France and Germany but are like all females evenly spread through-
out the Moroccan and both the Spanish and French clusters. The brokerage function 
is additionally highlighted by the fact that these women have on average the most 
Facebook friends (1,500). Probably even more than the group of Western jihadists, 
women are crucial in bridging different cluster within the network as well as North-
Moroccans with its diaspora and other jihadists. While the men are fighting in Syria 
















Figure 7.4 Female jihadists (Pink nodes are female jihadists) 
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7.7.4 Foreign fighters 
The power-as-access centrality measures and therefore the stock of bonding social 
capital of foreign fighters within the Facebook network is equivalent to the one of 
Moroccans and nodes from Tetouan. Foreign fighters are overrepresented in the top 
10% in degree (16-17, 40-43%), eigenvector (18-19, 50-53%) and closeness central-
ity (16-17, 46-49%). All these foreign fighter key players are Moroccans. As stated 
above the circumstance that the most central foreign fighters have North-Moroccan 
origin is crucial for network building and the generation of bonding social capital. 
Especially the high-risk nature of being a foreign fighter requires trust-relations and 
strong ties to avoid infiltration, for example. As we can see in the visualized network 
(Figure 7.5), foreign fighters form a dense cluster. This dense compartmentalization 
of the foreign fighters Facebook network’s structure based on shared origin pre-
vents fragmentation and breakdowns in case a node is removed (through the sus-
pension of an account or the death of a fighter). Consequently, this guarantees for 
these jihadist users the maintenance of a robust communication and information 
platform. Additionally, Sageman (2004) stresses that such small-world networks are 
more flexible in adapting to changing circumstances because they share a big pro-
















Figure 7.5 Foreign fighters (Green nodes are foreign fighters) 
 
Nevertheless, foreign fighters also display high betweenness centrality and are well 
connected throughout the different clusters. So additionally to the high stock of 
bonding social capital, foreign fighters are also able to generate bridging social cap-
ital and function as brokers though less obviously than in their role as key players. 
Here, 11-14 foreign fighters (31-40%) can be considered top brokers. Yet, compared 
to all other groups, foreign fighters have averagely the lowest number of Facebook 
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friends (around 400) which indicates that they possess less latent weak ties. At the 
same time, the proportion of ties to nodes in the network to all Facebook friends is 
the highest for the whole sample. Besides being another indicator for the high den-
sity of the foreign fighter network, one explanation can be that foreign fighters keep 
the size of their Facebook ego-networks restricted. Tufekci (2010) found that lack of 
trust and the need for face-to-face encounter were the main reason for individuals 
to perceive an online friendship is not possible. We assume that this motivation 
should be even more essential for foreign fighters and their online activities.  
 
7.8 Local jihadist networks and narratives 
 
Tetouan is a Northern Moroccan city that has a strong link to Salafist-jihadist 
preachers, such as Omar Hadduchi, former member of the Moroccan group Salafia 
Jihadia (Sakthivel 2014). And it also counts with the presence of violent jihadist cells 
(Echeverria 2010) connected with the bombings of Casablanca in 2013. Moreover, 
five of the seven individuals that participated in the 11-M attacks in Madrid in 2004 
come from Jemaa Mezuak, in Tetouan a ‘tumble-down neighborhood’ (Atran 2008). 
Kinship and friendship connections are not a new dimension in the jihadist phenom-
enon. What is new is that the use of SNSs and the continuous and frequent use of 
its digital affordances contributed to the straight bonding between those who mi-
grate to Syria and/or Iraq and those who remain in their home countries. In order to 
understand the virtual dynamic of these strong ties between diaspora and migrants 
we need to ‘gain an insight into the local narratives and the networks such narratives 
arise from’ (Archetti 2015). A recurrent theme, for example, is having images of 
Tetouan either as a simple post, as a profile photo or a cover photo.  
Continuing to debate the home-diaspora relationships and the importance of 
bonding capital between Moroccan jihadist elements and connecting it to the con-
flict environment the foreign fighters live and fight in, death becomes part of the 
online content of Facebook. Indeed, the honor attributed to the suicide operations 
is high, and online space is frequently dedicated to the post-mortem homage rituals. 
Facebook posts on jihadist martyrs are frequently visited by other ‘friends’ express-
ing their bond to the deceased with likes, comments and multiple shares of the 
posts. Death is explored by the jihadist recruiters as fisabilillah, as the gateway to 
paradise. Hereby, the function of women is, for example, to keep the pages of their 
dead jihad husbands active, posting content that enhances their qualities, achieve-
ments and battle honors while they were still alive and fighting. The goal is to inspire 
(tahrid) other fighters to follow the same path (Prucha 2011) and conferring them 
with the celebrity status. The muhajira widows are keen on enhancing that their lives 
are now devoted to raise their orphan children in the love of the jihad, as the cubs 
that will turn into lions. 
One empirical conclusion that can be drawn from the collected data on Facebook 
is that the female participants of the Tetouan network are condensed and discrete, 
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keeping their online profiles and activities as hidden from the public eye as possible. 
Except for the few ones who aspire to become influent members, most of the female 
users keep a private profile. In fact, the Facebook walls of these women give no 
indication of their jihadist connection. They are far subtler in their approach guiding 
it to religious education, dissemination of Islamic knowledge, both regarded as part 
of the da’wa task, one the prime jihadist task for women. As an example, one of the 
authors of the present chapter was included in a closed group administrated by one 
of the women belonging to the Tetouan network. The group entitled ‘jihad al-nafs’ 
includes more than 300 women and a few men and centered the discussion themes 
on religious matters in accordance to the Salafi-jihadist fundaments. Their ‘soft’ 
da’wa and jihadist narratives online allow them to attract a larger number of women 
who truly wish to learn more about Islam and do not understand what type of net-
work they are actually entered into, as we can read in the extract below taken from 
a thread on Facebook: 
 
F.G.: Be careful with some accounts because they belong to ISIS. 
S.E.: Sister, how can you tell it? 
F.G.: They have lions in their profiles photos and they speak in the name of the Salafis, 
but what they really want is to do fitna [division] among Muslims. 
S.E.: Oh, no, I think one of them added me, but she had a good method [minhaj]. 
F.G.: I alerted you about three women. One of them was arrested yesterday because 
she supports ISIS. 
 
The dialogue (originally written in Spanish) that occurred in July 12, 2015 between 
the two women has a deeper meaning, as the woman named F.G. is in fact an ele-
ment of the Tetouan jihadist network. It is a recent and recurrent strategy to de-
nounce other women (rivalry, competition among the women could be elementary 
explanations for the event) for their online jihadist activities, and/or post contents 
condemning ISIS. It is also a recent strategy to publicly condemn ISIS as the enemy 
of Islam when in reality they are affiliated with the narrative. The strategy is useful 
to keep the same online profile (avoiding to have to open new Facebook accounts 
all the time), to filter possible ISIS sympathizers (and then privately contact them for 
indoctrination), and to dodge surveillance by police and secret services. As a matter 
of fact, posts such as the above that have a female jihadist as the producer are sel-
dom on the public eye as most of them keep private profiles. However, the lack of 
online visibility does not implicate their inexistence, or their lack of value within the 
network. They may be hidden away yet their female tasks are frequently visible in 
photos of food and/or maternity. 
They are also visible and actively participating in jihadist networks when we ex-
tend our analysis scope to the list of Facebook friends. We identified female jihadists 
acting as ‘friends’ of key leading figures and therefore as brokers of the jihadist net-
works who interfered with the terrorist attacks of Paris and Brussels. Furthermore, 
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the female individuals of the Tetouan network on their turn are expanding their 
connections to Australian female jihadists who have international notoriety like 
Asma Abdulla, Zehra Umm Abdullatif or Umm Salehaddin. A shift that we empirically 
attribute to the attraction of the luxury consumerism that the Australians female 
jihadist like to exhibit online. 
In addition, by taking a closer look to the data available on the Facebook pages 
of the participants in the jihadist network we can assess its validity as a recruitment 
tool, as a distance bridging tool and a violence justification tool. First, social 
metadata serves as a recruitment tool within the jihadist network because the ‘eve-
ryday sharing practices’ as routine actions imply the normality of life even if lived in 
a war scenario. In fact, online identities are built upon coherence and maintenance 
of the same values and principles reinforcing therefore the notion of embedded, 
embodied and everyday online life experience (Hine 2015). The simple fact that dig-
ital connectivity is possible confirms to the audience that there are stable commu-
nication infrastructures. Moreover, the ‘everyday sharing practices’ together with the 
constant and coherent stream of the same jihadist narrative works in favor of ‘micro-
moblization’ as “simply to the various interactive and communicative processes that 
affect frame alignment” (Snow, Rochford & Worden 1986: 464). In addition, micro-
mobilization reveals a great deal of the content and participants of the networks, 
how the initial nodes are linked, the focus of the initial messages and how the com-
bination of both works together in the enlargement of the jihadist networks (Viterna 
2006: 40). 
In the case of ISIS, the initial narrative penetrates the Spanish and Moroccan 
cyberspace with the recurrent themes of the re-conquest of the global territory his-
torically designated as Al-Andalus (Torres Soriano 2014) and with Morocco’s internal 
affairs. On the first theme, we can take a closer look to Salaheddine Guitone, a for-
eign fighter of Moroccan origin (and known as well by the name of Abdallah Guitone 
and his kunya Abou Tamima) who was highly active on social media until his death 
in June of 2014. He appeared with another jihadist from North-Morocco, Nouredin 
Majdoub, in a video published on YouTube and Facebook in July 2014 (just days 
before his death on July 25) where he and Majdoub direct their speech to the Span-
ish people by stating: “We say it to all the world, we are living under the Islamic flag 
and we will die for it until we open all the occupied lands, from Jakarta to Andalusia, 
InshAllah [may God allow us]. And I tell you: Spain is the land of our grandparents 
and we are going to open [sic] it, InshAllah, with the power of God.” The video went 
viral as well as many other videos he filmed during his migration period in Syria. 
Guitone, whose family originate from Oujda, was born in Grenoble and moved with 
15 to Paris, but also lived for short time in Great Britain and between 2006 and 2007 
in Spain (Manacor at Mallorca Island) before embarking to the Caliphate in March 
2013. The experience gave him valuable language skills that was profited by ISIS 
media channels to issue visual and audio propaganda in different languages. In this 
context, Guitone was not only an integral jihadist for Moroccan and Spanish, but for 
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French foreign fighters too. In an earlier video published by ISIS’ al-Hayat media 
channel in April 2014, Guitone, for instance, walked through al-Raqqa and inter-
viewed several fellow French-speaking foreign fighters and called European Muslims 
to join the jihad: “Today we created an Islamic Caliphate. We are applying the law of 
Allah. I would also like to advise my brothers and sisters to leave the countries of 
the tyrants and to join the Islamic State because it became an obligation… As you 
see, the Islamic State is there to sacrifice its money and its soldiers” (translated from 
French, MEMRI 2014). A picture with Abdelhamid Abaaoud proves additionally that 
he had links to the Francophone foreign fighter network which was later responsible 
for the attacks in Paris and Brussels. That he established himself within the ranks of 
ISIS as an important person became also obvious as the recently leaked ISIS entry 
files list him eventually as bail for at least one French foreign fighter named Sen 
Sharly.  
Guitone’s high-level digital profile granted him with enough charisma and ji-
hadist symbolism that survived even after his death. Only three days after the Paris 
attacks, an individual belonging to the Belgium and Moroccan network had, for ex-
ample, likes on the photos of a Facebook page dedicated to Guitone. That is possible 
of course due to the digital affordances of the social media platforms like the digital 
footprints and digital archive. Guitone’s ‘online persona’ is hence an ideal reference 
employed by jihadist recruiters to allure other individuals to their cause and because 
of his language abilities this grooming capacity is extended to a larger audience. It 
is in fact a reality that social metadata develops timeless reproducibility, engage-
ment (between foreign fighters and potential recruited individuals), identity con-
struction, mirror image (copying the example) and valorization among its digital us-
ers conferring, in this particular case that the life and jihadist heritage of Guitone’s 
never ceases to exist on Facebook. Interestingly, two family members of Guitone 
from Oujda, who are also well connected to French and Moroccan jihadists and for-
eign fighters in the Facebook network we observed, play hereby a crucial role by 
sharing pictures or publish video eulogies of Guitone on a frequent basis. 
On the second theme of Moroccan internal affairs, the Moroccan government is 
criticized on subjects that range from the treatment of religious prisoners, the treat-
ment of Salafist religious current followers and the corruption of pious religious way 
of living. By borrowing the concepts of Ferdinand Tönnies (1887) and applying them 
to the social media platforms we have a clear ideological distinction in terms of 
online gemeinschaft (subjective, affective digital engagement) versus the offline ge-
sellschaft (imposed, impersonal real separation between citizens.) On the other side, 
social metadata such as tags (inserting the name of a friend) have a bridging func-
tion, bringing closer the foreign fighters diaspora and their counterparts in the 
homeland. The individual that has not migrated to the territory of the Caliphate feels 
as so an active part of the actual war effort. As a matter of fact, identity and emo-
tions, or as Della Porta (2009: 17) called it ‘affective focusing’ are important compo-
nents of individual’s micro-mobilization into the processes of jihadism recruitment. 
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As mentioned before it is relevant to understand the social online constructions of 
networks to take a closer look to their ‘local narratives’ and in this particular case, 
food is a vital part of the local narratives. Indeed, the foreign fighters recurrently 
post photos of plates of couscous because food plays in the Moroccan culture an 
important role of social cohesion and togetherness and couscous, the traditional 
local dish is thus an affective symbol of it, a symbol of a shared culture. Finally, it is 
critical to understand the cognitive opening moment (Ranstorp 2010: 6) that makes 
the individual receptive to extreme violent behaviors. To that matter, social 
metadata, in the form of comments, for example, observes also the function of jus-
tification and/or clarification of their jihadist violence. Facebook, in this case and 
contrary to other social platforms has the advantage of having no text limitation, 
therefore allowing the participants to write elaborate and long threads of discussion. 
On the other hand, Facebook offers the possibility of deleting comments which gives 
the holder of the account (as well as to the producer of the comments) the power 
of manipulating the discussion in the aimed direction which is frequently aiming at 
recruitment, or at the very least creating positive engagement with the jihadist ide-




The study conducted here deepens the existent knowledge on the jihadist social 
networks operating in and from Spain and Morocco. The high volume of collected 
data has been narrowed down to the significance of, firstly, shared origin and real-
life connections for the generation of bonding social capital in jihadist Facebook 
networks and, secondly, the role of female jihadists in this network. The analysis of 
Facebook networks that have a more reciprocal nature than other SNSs emphasizes 
the power relationship between two interconnected categories of social capital to-
gether with ‘local narratives’ in the creation and maintenance of jihadist online net-
works. Overall, the empirical data of this study reveals the actual key player role of 
jihadists and foreign fighters with Moroccan origin in general and from Tetouan 
specifically, and how homophily facilitates highly dense clusters that would be hard 
to disrupt. Though less prominent and central, Western jihadists – especially from 
Spain and France – does not take a backseat within the jihadist Facebook network. 
Some of them serve as key players, but more importantly, as brokers. For female 
jihadists the results, in fact, indicate that they have a two-fold function within the 
Spanish-Moroccan network since their online activities are contributing both to the 
bridging social capital and to the brokerage function. These activities combined with 
the lower number of self-proclaimed muhajidaat point forward that the most effec-
tive role of female jihadists is the one they perform online. 
As mentioned before, the study displays several limitations. Firstly, it is impossi-
ble to verify whether Facebook friendships are only online or derive from offline 
links. Secondly, in relation to the ‘fuzzy boundaries’ of social networks we can only 
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offer a glimpse into the Spanish-Moroccan Jihadist Network on Facebook. We nei-
ther claim it is complete nor can we exclude the possibility that the online ties of 
Moroccan jihadists represented here are far more extensive than their links to the 
Spanish and French clusters. Therefore, future research should be ambiguous in col-
lecting additional data on other jihadist and foreign fighter networks on Facebook. 
Thirdly, as missing data is inevitable for research on more or less clandestinely acting 
Facebook users, future research also needs to deal with this problem. In this regard, 
social network analysts, for instance, proposed several statistical models and algo-
rithms in the last years that allow to estimate exponential random graph models 
(ERGMs) (Kossinets 2008; Koskinen et al. 2013). Finally, despite SNA increasingly is 
established in terrorism studies, its methodological possibilities are not exploited so 
far. Also this study only focused on basic centrality measures to operationalize the 
social capital concept. However, since this study addressed several gaps in the liter-
ature on online extremism by connecting social capital theory, social network anal-
ysis to explore the role of female jihadists and the influence of shared origin, we 
believe that the results are offering interesting new insights and that more elabo-





By the end of 2017, the principal concern surrounding jihadism studies was the re-
turn of foreign fighters from the territories in Syria and Iraq, formerly ruled by IS. 
Among those returnees, are of course women who pose an undeniable threat to 
European countries. Both, men and women return with war stories and experiences 
that have the potential to build up their charisma and authority and allure others to 
engage with processes of violent extremism. In Spain, small, tight-knit, homegrown 
cells associated with the phenomenon of ‘lone wolves’ may become an inspiring 
terrorist model of operations for those returning to Europe. 
The concerns are justified because as we have previously seen in this dissertation, 
women have constructed their own online jihadist role, as jihadist entrepreneurs and 
propaganda disseminators. Therefore, their online space of action keeps on being 
accessible, active and above all efficient in the achievement of their jihadist goals. 
The previous situational context that conferred IS with a physical territory in Syria 
and Iraq and a state denomination of a Caliphate has been altered by their own 
military defeat. IS’s flags may no longer be waving in Syria and Iraq but its violent 
ideology keeps on motivating mobilization, recruitment and terrorist attacks. While 
the lines of IS’s controlled territories in Syria and Iraq are being erased, the borders 
of online jihadism gain more definition in the European countries. Indeed, Salafi-
jihadist ideology continues to strive online because social grievances continue to 
soar among Muslim migrant communities in Europe. The core concepts to mobilize 
their audience to ‘run with wolves’ and to engage with violent actions continue to 
be deeply anchored in the Salafi-Jihadist tenets, and in local perceived injustices. 
Spanish-speaking women involvement in jihadist organizations is highly cen-
tered in their online activity of disseminating and recruiting, as we have seen in this 
dissertation, thus the disruption of the Caliphate does not imply a direct disruption 
of their roles. If much, a change of their operational strategy, instead of instilling the 
religious obligation of migrating to an Islamic ruled state, the propaganda is aimed 
at bringing the fight into European countries. Spain, due to its historical symbolism 
as one of the former territories of an Islamic Caliphate, Al-Andalus became a pre-
ferred target of the jihadist propaganda and of jihadist terrorism, as it was visible in 
the terrorist attacks of 17 August of 2017.  
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This conclusion bears meaningful theoretical and analytical developments to un-
derstand the evolution of jihadism in general, and of women as agents of jihadist 
violence in particular. 
 
8.1 The road ahead 
 
The conceptual outline advanced in the introduction has proven to be the most 
adequate to study the phenomenon of women involved in online jihadist networks 
and activities. The situational context evolved rapidly as mentioned above and the 
occurrence of several terrorist attacks during the period of elaboration of this dis-
sertation have brought new elements to consider, more specifically, the resurgence 
of homegrown terrorist cells, vehicle-ramming attacks and the reinforcing of the 
principle of violent jihad as an individual and religious obligation to all Muslim be-
lievers. While these factors contribute to a broader perspective on jihadist women, 
new factors derived from the return of foreign fighters from Syria and/or Iraq to 
Europe and/or the North of Africa need to start being collected and analyzed. The 
number of individuals that have departed and have re-entered Spanish territory may 
be less relevant in terms of quantity when compared to the numbers of returnees in 
other European countries. However, to this analysis we have to throw another layer 
of complexity as this dissertation well illustrates, the Spanish jihadist network is in-
tertwined with the Moroccan jihadist network. That is to say, their strong intercon-
nection will facilitate the return of the Moroccan foreign fighter contingent via Span-
ish territory in route to their home country. New tales, new myths on how ideal life 
in the Caliphate was will give place to new jihadist entrepreneurs, new lone-wolves 
and new off beaten paths of radicalization. 
The multiple terrorist attacks of the summer of 2017 in Catalonia were a terrible 
expression of the road ahead in terms of prevention of radicalization and counter-
terrorism.  
At the same time, these new developments have reinforced on one side the value 
of the theoretical and conceptual rationale here used in this dissertation, and on the 
other side, the value of the offline fieldwork conducted in Catalonia. In fact, the off-
line fieldwork was necessary to identify possible roots and routes of terrorism path-
ways in Catalonia, to study the role of Salafi-jihadist affiliated preachers, to under-
stand the difficulties associated with social integration and to assess the view of 
non-Muslim population on the matter of social inclusion.  
On the other side and following the classic ethnographic approach, this study 
has also contributed to the added-value of conducting fieldwork at the actual places 
where jihadist dynamics occur and to be familiar with the offline settings of jihadist 
environments, either to confirm their inexistence, and or transference to another 
location, or to confirm its presence and to identify the local and subcultures that are 
at play. 
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By doing so, this dissertation contributes equally to reinforce the significance of 
revisiting previous ethnographic incursions and theoretical contributions previously 




What this dissertation clearly indicates is that women fulfill online roles of propa-
ganda, recruitment and networking. These online jihadi roles complement each 
other and are inextricably intertwined serving the ultimate goal of jihadist domina-
tion. That prompts the conclusion that in a global scenario, self-proclaimed jihadist 
women operate online in similar manners, under the same ideological umbrella and 
with similar objectives. They also share similar bonding network structures that rely 
in trusted relationships – family, friends, to build up their networks and also to allure 
and convince others to accept to participate in violent jihadist activities. 
The processes of jihadist mobilization share similarities in its mechanisms, activ-
ities, performances, communication, socialization, but the profiles of the female ji-
hadist agents actually differ among them, in terms of demographics, social-eco-
nomic status and life experiences. This is exactly the line of inquiry pursued in this 
dissertation, that processes (and not profiles) convey observable patterns that com-
bined as indicators may serve as the base to construct prediction models. That is to 
say, there is no archetype of women ‘who run with wolves’ but there are indeed as 
this dissertation illustrates it, archetypes of female processes of engaging with ji-
hadist networks. 
The results obtained through this dissertation exceed the initial anticipation. In-
deed, a robust sample of data concerning the online female jihadist environment 
was gathered and studied providing a complete overview of the Spanish and Mo-
roccan jihadist networks operating in Europe and in North Africa and their connec-
tions with the European terrorist attacks of the last years. Furthermore, it allowed to 
map Facebook as a specific ‘online territory of terror’ where production and/or con-
sumption of jihadist propaganda found a digital space that would accommodate 
these activities.  
On the other hand, this dissertation displays a unique database analysis on the 
online social structures of Spanish-Moroccan jihadist network that it is as complete 
as possible. As a matter of fact, demographic details of the individuals (age, educa-
tion, occupation, location, place of birth, social affiliations and family members) in-
volved in these networks were collected whenever it was possible to retrieve and 
treat them in a conservative manner. Hence, the database analysis allowed to classify 
their social organization (sisterhood, Digital Umm), social roles (sister, mother, wife), 
social dynamics (processes, interactions, norms), social exchange (social capital), so-
cial skills (communication, personal relationships) and social status (influence, legit-
imacy, authority). This dissertation was an incursion into the online processes of 
construction of female jihadist roles. The roles were assessed and categorized as 
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jihadist online entrepreneurs and networkers, a dual function involving violence, 
digital skills and authority.  
Indeed, we have now a broad perspective on women’s online roles, their activi-
ties, and the key leading elements in the network structures.  
 
8.3 Facebook as a digital field  
 
The study was guided by the question how to identify and understand the roles 
jihadist women may play online. Facebook was selected as the most promising dig-
ital environment, and the utility was explored of analyzing social meta-data for in-
ferring vital aspects of online social dynamics and online exchanges between indi-
viduals involved in jihadist networks. 
The online ethnographic method was in its own right, key to illustrate the evolu-
tion of these women’s jihadist roles and the framing of their activities according to 
the development of the social-political contexts. Addressing the online perfor-
mances of these women was determinant to reveal their online jihadist roles and to 
attribute them their due importance among their own jihadist networks. While the 
digital methods did fulfill their function of data collection, they have also fulfilled 
the task of selecting the most adequate theories. In fact, in this dissertation the the-
ories where informed by the data and where key to explain the processes of en-
gagement with violent online contents and to explain the ability of the jihadist dis-
course to mobilize and recruit new jihadist members.  
The database was manually curated in order to make it representative of the 
study and to keep the focus limited on the designated sample hence avoiding dis-
persion and excess of collected data. ‘All samples represent something. The trick is 
to make them representative of what you want them to be’ (Bernard 2011: 147).  
Additionally, empirical evidence strengthened by solid theoretical pillars has 
highlighted the importance of understanding the impact that local cultures and sub-
cultures have in the formation of jihadist networks. This understanding of both local 
and subcultures was achieved through means of thick descriptions (ethnographic 
approach), selection of digital environments (digital humanities approach) and em-
ployment of social network analysis (social movements approach). The multimodal 
approach, that is an approach that contains different methods, different sciences 
aligned by the same research question has provided an inside perspective of the 
Spanish-Moroccan Jihadist network.  
The limitations of this study, as well as the limitations of Facebook as a digital 
field, are at the same time its unique strength, it is an online research conducted on 
a specific group of women that move around Spain and Morocco, that act upon 
local cultural references and that accept and justify violent behavior through the 
injunction of religious arguments. Although the study mirrors a particular sample 
with defined characteristics it has the potential to explain similar processes of violent 
extremism that are linked to other jihadist networks. True to the matter, alongside 
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the ideological motivation, the data here presented illustrates how kinship and so-
cial ties are other vital sources promoting jihadist networks. Indeed, family members, 
close friends create their own social structures upon belonging and emotional bond-
ing and that is why tight social support is linked to the terrorist attacks that took 
place in Europe. These jihadist social networks share similar relationship patterns 
and construction dynamics, categories that validate the importance of social net-
work analysis. Furthermore, these common categories are an informed manner to 
advance possible future social jihadist network models, that is to visualize and de-
termine how they will evolve as an organization. Moreover, the input brought up by 
empirical data such as the one presented in this dissertation contributes to a com-
prehensive, deepen topographic analysis of the jihadist social networks. There are 
of course limitations to the use social network analysis and to the social capital per-
spective. However, the benefits delivered by this methodological approach are rec-
ognizable, quantifiable and translatable into social network models and network vis-
ualizations. 
Jihadist women gain their audience through the construction of online legiti-
macy and religious authority and their knowledge of the Salafi-jihadist principles. 
Their initial nodes are individuals from their close range of connections, family and 
friends and through trust mechanisms they move forward to more distant ties. This 
was demonstrated in this dissertation. Women depart from their own Spanish-Mo-
roccan social ties and bridge and expand their networks to other women located in 
different parts of the globe. 
Daily, embedded and embodied exposure to violent arguments, contents, per-
formances and activities framed by religious justifications are central elements to 
the jihadist engagement capacity. Coherence, consistency and frequency are the 
other elements that contribute to the fast pace of radicalization as it was with Samira 
Yerou, for example. Normalization of violent behaviors through trusted, tight-knit 
relationships between online producers and consumers results in quick and firm ad-
hesion to processes of extremism. That is to say, through trusted channels of com-
munication, that are guided by recognized online jihadist female leaders who have 
and procure social closeness to their audience, have higher possibilities to succeed 
in their goals of jihadist recruitment. 
This study spotlight are jihadist women acting online to pursue their violent 
goals. However, it includes observations and analysis of the male performance, roles 
and identity and their gender engagement online transactions and relationships 
within the jihadist digital environment. I argue that female insights are essential, but 
male representations are vital to achieve a full-circle, an all-inclusive analysis, that 
gives a comprehensive perspective of ‘phenomena adjacent to violence’ (Kirby & 
Marsha 2012: 4). That is, to understand, for example, the social life built during the 
conflict, or the ‘jihadi culture’ (Hegghammer 2017: 4) which was part of the online 
discourses justifying the migration to the Caliphate. Moreover, it was through the 
observation of posts related to male ludic activities such as eating, or playing with 
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newborn babies and the subsequent analysis of the social meta-data that it was 
possible to define the role of women living in the Caliphate.  
These online methodological approaches provided important indications and 
opportunities when it came to the moment of selecting and collecting data. Empir-
ical data that in offline fields of research would be difficult if not absolutely impos-
sible to obtain. In other words, this dissertation has exposed the interest of further-
ing the possibilities offered by digital methods, namely Facebook to gather primary 
data on individuals directly engaged with jihadism. This interest has grown higher 
in the aftermath of the loss of territories by ISIS, in Syria and Iraq. Indeed, the lack 
of physical territory has enhanced the necessity of acquiring a stronger hold of all 
that communication technologies have to offer, whether it is in the form of propa-
ganda, recruitment or formation of cells. 
Ultimately, studying Facebook as an online environment for jihadist activity has 
provided critical insight into local stories and had made it possible to contextually 
link jihadist individuals and to map their local networks.  
 
8.4 Al-Andalus – Impact significance  
 
The jihadist assaults of August 2017 in Catalonia highlighted several factors that are 
critical if we want to assess the magnitude of their impact upon Western society in 
general and Spanish society in particular. Partial fruits of online processes of radi-
calization and online engagement with violent contents, and exposure to Salafi-ji-
hadist ideology, these terrorist attacks offer the opportunity to compare and con-
trast the theoretical applicability and empirical validity of this this research.   
The first factor is that the Catalan region is undoubtedly a ‘radicalization hot-
bed’. According to the 2017 census of Muslims in Spain prepared by the Andalusian 
Observatory, the autonomous body of the Union of Islamic Communities of Spain 
(UCIDE 2018: 7), the community with the highest number of Muslim citizens is Cat-
alonia with 522,113 Muslims, of which 190,869 are Spanish and 331,284 are foreign-
ers. Within Catalonia, Barcelona is the province with the highest number of Muslims, 
328,840 in total. The total number of Muslims in Spain in 2016 was 1.9 million 
(1,946,300) of which 834,058 were Spanish and 1,112,242 foreign. 
Interconnected to this, the second factor concerns the connection between 
Salafism, the set of beliefs most strongly affiliated with jihadism, and the high num-
ber of praying centers that advocate this ideology in Catalonia (Reinares, García-
Calvo & Vicente 2017: 33). Particularly important is their online appeal to re-conquer 
the historical territory of Al-Andalus.  
The third factor, digital jihadism on Facebook connects the previous points 
with the impact of abundant online exposure to violent material and engagement 
with jihadist networks. 
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The account of radicalization continues to be divided between the same three 
concerns we saw in Chapter 1, Section 1.4.1: how online violent radicalization hap-
pens, how jihadist recruitment takes place, and how these actions end up to inflate 
terror attacks. However, in the concrete case of this research we observed that Salafi-
jihadist principles constitute the mainstream discourse that is shared on Facebook 
among Spanish-speaking female jihadists. Those beliefs are introduced as the reli-
gious frames that regulate daily life until they become the core of an ideological 
system that justifies religious violence. 
The final step of the process of radicalization, the actual joining of jihadist net-
works, results from the emotional attachment, the generated feeling of belonging 
to individuals who share similar mind-sets, similar paths and similar backgrounds. 
Furthermore, the fact that these women combine their online ties with their ‘real 
offline’ ties, i.e. family members, close neighbors and friends, encourages coopera-
tion with and integration into jihadist networks. 
We can conclude that radicalization processes like the ones observed in this 
study benefit from access to online extremist constructions. It is now known that 
Samira Yerou was in possession of Salafi-jihadist materials that she consumed and 
shared on Facebook as a recruitment mechanism to capture circa 40 other women 
in the space of one year. In spite of this crucial knowledge, to actually and feasibly 
‘determine the role of internet in violent extremism’ (Conway 2016) more and more 
differentiated quantitative studies on social impact are needed.   
The fourth factor concerns the evolution of terrorism in general and the devel-
opment of an important subgenre denominated as the ‘new crime-terror nexus’ 
(Basra, Neumann & Brunner 2016: 3): the coming together of criminal and terrorist 
networks, backgrounds and contexts, increasing their potential to recruit and to fulfil 
their illegal activities. The jihadist terror attacks of 17 of August 2017 shed light on 
the alignment between crime activities and processes of radicalization. The leader 
of the jihadist cell, Ripoll’s Imam Es Satty, had been detained prior to the attacks for 
drug smuggling and had been in contact with one of the arrested elements of the 
11 March attacks of 2004. The new line of study that amplifies the role of ‘jail wing 
jihadism’ in the dissemination of violent beliefs among convicted individuals needs 
to be expanded with a gendered lens. From the 158 people arrested in Spain for the 
crime of jihadist activities, 14.6% were women (García-Calvo 2017), among them 
Samira Yerou. Although she claimed her disenchantment with IS’s violent terms, 
there are other arrested women who will most likely maintain their engagement with 
Salafi-jihadism and who may still act as disseminators. Processes of disengagement 
with violent beliefs, or the beliefs that are ‘part of an all-encompassing religious 
triangle (Nanninga 2017: 181), need to be the subject of future research. 
Finally, the fifth factor is the use of violence to generate social capital, i.e. mak-
ing use of the social connections and managing them to attain the network’s violent 
goals. However, the benefits generated by the close-knit jihadist network also has a 
negative social impact. The level of group cohesion and trust is high enough for 
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members to accept taking high risks and to ‘create spectacular acts of symbolic vi-
olence’ (Nanninga 2017: 173). In contrast, their level of social integration outside the 
network is low, thus they are disconnected from state-sponsored institutions, police 
forces or social services.  
In conclusion, the jihadist strikes in Catalonia point out, first of all, the urgency 
of focusing research on local processes and online mechanisms of radicalization. 
Secondly, they have also accentuated the importance of clearly identifying the dif-
ferent online roles that female jihadist elements assume in jihadist networks. Third, 
the violent acts have emphasized the significance of paying attention to both the 
online and ‘real world’ environments for understanding jihadist phenomena in 
Spain. 
Last, the jihadist strikes in the heart of Al-Andalus enable future impact evalua-
tion of research design, methods and overall analysis of Terrorism.  
 
8.5 ‘Women who run with wolves’ 
 
In the mid of November 2016, Samira Yerou was the first woman in Spain to be 
officially condemned and sentenced for her role as a jihadist recruiter. The court 
sentence was determined by her direct involvement with ISIS jihadist networks, her 
high-ranking direct connections as well as her violent behavior. Samira’s radicaliza-
tion process represents the model of applicability of the present study, a Spanish-
speaking female of Moroccan origins living in Catalonia who assumed an active 
online role as a jihadist recruiter. 
The maturation of her radicalization process went through different stages, as 
reflected in the structure of the thesis and at the beginning of each chapter. Depart-
ing from a woman belonging to a specific subculture with patriarch standards, in-
serted in ‘radical milieus’, where she developed an affective engagement to leading 
male figures and to their extremist ideology, factors that contributed to her initial 
jihadist click (similar to ETA’s female processes of radicalization as shown in Chap-
ter 1). To the moment she took the migrant route to Spain and was confronted by 
the local situational context that in her particular case included the root causes and 
personal grievances that were her motivation to establish contact with Salafi-jihadist 
Imams in Morocco (Chapter 2). 
Moving along in the radicalization process, Samira went on to become a sister 
who had an online role as a recruiter and who took advantage of the digital af-
fordances to complete her recruitment goals (a parallel process to what we have 
seen in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4), a jihadist female whose role and authority were 
unquestionable to the male counterparts she related to and who are known for their 
position in ISIS hierarchy (Chapter 5), a mother who travelled to Turkey with her 3-
year-old son and to whom she taught violent principles through imagery (Chapter 
6), a jihadist entrepreneur that recruited and added social capital value to the Span-
ish-Moroccan Jihadist Network (Chapter 7). 
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The case study of Samira Yerou illustrates the path of a convicted jihadist female 
who lived in Catalonia, who had migrated from Morocco to Spain with a college 
degree but felt forced to work in a factory and as a housekeeper. Radicalization was 
the result of a combination of ‘personal discrimination and inadequate coping 
mechanisms’ that enhance grievances and catalyze processes of radicalization 
(Pearson & Winterbotham 2017: 63). Her life course trajectory, the grievances she 
felt in adulthood, and her process of radicalization as documented in this thesis, 
evidence her agency, her own will ‘to knife off the past from the present’ (Sampson 
& Laub 2005: 17). 
Samira Yerou has a unique female jihadist profile, one that reflects her life expe-
rience, her social-economic background and her own grievances and motivations to 
engage with violent jihadist ideas and activities. It also reinforces the fact that pro-
filing potential individual jihadists might have scarce utility to the Studies of Terror-
ism. As a matter of fact, the process of radicalization of Samira is remarkable also 
for her geographical mobility, her fast behavioral transformation (accepting and ed-
ucating her son with violent patterns), the quick passage from recruited jihadist to 
jihadist recruiter (police sources advance she had already a female jihadist network 
of her own with ramifications to other European countries). That is why her case is 
so paradigmatic to the future analysis of how the process of violent radicalization 
works among women.  
In 2012, when I first started this study, the main question was to find online fe-
male profiles with pro-jihadist contents and to make sense of their online jihadist 
roles. Five years later, we have a clear perception where the self-proclaimed jihadist 
women are, but also what are they at, that is what are their roles and positions in 
the Global Jihadist Front. 
With that in mind, and with the gained knowledge on Spanish-speaking jihadist 
women, we should promote new studies focusing on the impact of the return of 
jihadists into Spain and their possible effect on successful engagement and recruit-
ment with online processes of violent extremism. 
What we still do not know is what happens when these roles are forced to an 
end. In the case of Samira, she was arrested and convicted for her online jihadist 
activities but has she disengaged from her Salafi-jihadist beliefs? Or is she just wait-
ing for the opportune moment to run again with the wolves? 
How will Spanish jihadist women continue to forge their online roles and activi-
ties within the new situational context, is a question for further studies. 
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8.6 Suggestions for future interventions 
 
8.6.1 Local stories – Local networks – Good practices 
Local networks 
If ‘all radicalization is local’ (Coolsaet 2016), then all attempts to disrupt radicaliza-
tion processes have to be local as well. The seeds of the process of radicalization in 
Spain are intertwined with the roots of the Moroccan migration, therefore any strat-
egy to prevent and fight back against extremism has to take this relationship into 
consideration. 
 
Local narratives  
We will need deeper knowledge of the storylines that have impact on the members 
of these networks. Together with local cultural references they constitute the cor-
nerstone of how trusted communication flows among jihadist individuals. Therefore, 




Critical visualization of the specific configuration of the online Spanish jihadist net-
work allows better identification of the key figures and the location of their weaker 
ties and/or their distant trusted ties. Since this is a close-knit network (Figure 8.1, 
women are represented in pink) the only way to have access to it is to build an online 
‘crucial bridge’ (Granovetter 1983: 202) with their weak ties. This may be achieved 
















Figure 8.1  Female jihadists 
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Local female mujtahid 
Once online access to the network is achieved, the female bridge-builder has to 
quickly establish her role as a religious authority figure. Her message is only effective 
the moment it achieves access to the network’s dense core center. 
The key to accomplish that goal is to calibrate the jihadist message and not to 
counter the jihadist message. 
 
Local gendered initiatives 
Initiatives that could lead to results include providing offline structures of belonging, 
targeting affective and meaningful relationships, valuing social assessments of best 
prevention practices, and offering education, employment and empowerment as 
seen below on Table 8.1. These may work as positive alternatives to radicalization. 
All these initiatives can only realize their maximal potential, however, if gendered, 
that is if they are adjusted to fit the different types of female audience. Thus, initia-
tives have to have small target groups of individuals that share similar experiences. 
 
Table 8.1 The three E’s strategy 
 
Recruiters vs recruitees 
One of the findings of this thesis is that the main female roles within the jihadist 
networks are propaganda and recruitment, therefore the CVE strategies should be 
directed to prevent these women from being recruited (targets) but first and fore-
most it should be directed to prevent these women from doing online recruitment. 
 
Gender jihad strategic studies 
Attributing full-fledge agency to women for engaging, pursuing and promoting 
negative and violent acts will modify the male-focused nature of radicalization re-
search and ultimately will produce more fine-grained results and recommendations 
on how to prevent and combat this violent phenomenon.  
 
8.6.2 Policy recommendations 
1. Ensure that legal, judicial, and social services are prepared for the return to 
Catalonia of foreign fighters of Moroccan and/or Spanish origin. Considering 
the high number of Moroccan and Spanish-Moroccan inhabitants of the area 
Education Employment Empowerment 
Valorization Qualification Integration 
Participation Remuneration Action 
Inclusion Commitment Resilience 
Knowledge Skills Experience 
Prevention Promotion Partnership 
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and the close family connections within the community there is a high proba-
bility that these individuals will either travel to or pass through Catalonia. The 
return or even so much as the passage of these radicalized individuals will also 
bring stories of war, heroes and martyrs, which may invigorate the jihadist nar-
rative. 
 
2. To calibrate the post-caliphate narrative, groundwork has to be set in motion 
to combat the grievances that emerge from the absence of social integration, 
education opportunities and corresponding low employment options. To de-
velop effective and successful strategies of integration practitioners need to 
have specific cultural and situational awareness and religious training. 
 
3. Consider involving leading female individuals that have valid life experience, 
recognized religious authority, and the professional status to work as local role 
models, in establishing a bridge between the local community and practition-
ers. This can help promote the figure of a local female entrepreneur with the 
ability to organize new mind-frames, to build alternative networks, and to high-
light the potential of online tools in the prevention of female processes of rad-
icalization. 
 
4. It is important to take into consideration the capacity of female agency to en-
gage with violent contents, environments and activities. Standard actions of 
CVE that misread these women’s own will as naïveté or deception are failing 
for that exact reason. Online intervention procedures should be considered 
that attribute ownership of violent conduct to women and distinguish female 
jihadist roles (recruiting, propaganda) to better tackle them. Two general dis-
tinctions should be taken heed of: while recruiters tend to have a closed, pri-
vate, ‘friends only’ online account so that their contents are only visible to the 
audience they have selected, disseminators tend to have an open, public online 
account, which allows their message to reach a maximum audience range. 
 
5. It is advisable to ensure tailored training to the online practitioners who deal 
with female jihadists with an active online profile. Tailored training has to in-
volve specific gendered cultural and religious notions about the particular au-
dience, thorough scripts of what constitutes jihadist online activity (thus avoid-
ing false negative profiles), and well-defined protocols of intervention (strict 
observation, participant observation, monitoring). More importantly, it should 
recognize the sensitivity and the perils of the practitioner’s tasks by on the one 
hand establishing high recruitment standards (personal and professional), and 
on the other hand supporting them with legal and mental health counselling. 
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6. Taking into account the number of women radicalized in Spain through online 
media platforms it is imperative to identify, select and empower local Muslim 
centers and associations to craft their own online prevention activities and help 
them direct these to their communities. Increased social participation, inclusion 
and debate can be stimulated through the development of user-generated 
content that can feed specific messages into specific social media platforms. 
 
7. It is necessary to execute diagnostic actions in the local communities, especially 
those affected by a high concentration of radicalization spots, to evaluate 
which social measures will have more positive impact on integration, and con-
sequently help to prevent and combat extremism. Local government digital 
initiatives are needed that bridge and bond their citizens, and co-develop 
small-scale projects, mobile software tools, and a disposition to find solutions.  
 
8. Online communication systems can be built that reflect a transversal female 
audience (age, education, digital literacy, occupation, background) and that are 
able to reflect back the envisioned goals in the fight against radicalization pro-
cesses. Once the results are visible and measurable (reduction of the number 
of radicalized women, reduction of active online pro-jihadist female accounts, 
increase of social well-being and social satisfaction) a new corpus of knowledge 
can be assembled, guaranteeing the continuous improvement of good prac-
tices. 
 
9. An important initiative is the creation of the Digital UMM (Union de Mujeres 
Musulmanas – Union of Muslim Women), which appeals to the female youth 
population by devising digital content that features self-empowered Muslim 
women, that is: women who thrive in their own multi-layered identities (Mus-
lim, born-again Muslim, Moroccan, Spanish, Spanish-Moroccan) and roles 
(personal, professionally), and who are able to overcome negative stereotypes 
by leading through example.  
 
10. Investment in science will further knowledge acquisition on processes of radi-
calization, especially if the learning processes will be based on further collec-
tion of primary data. Radicalization as a social process is transformative in its 
risks, liabilities, challenges and mechanisms. Knowledge valorization could be 
the direct outcome of this strategy, which would allow for the formulation of 
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Women Who Run With The Wolves – Online stories 
and roles of Spanish-speaking jihadist women 
‘Women Who Run With The Wolves – Online stories and roles of Spanish-speaking 
jihadist women’ explores how jihadist women construct and spread online violent 
stories to recruit other women into their networks. Using Facebook as a case study, 
this dissertation demonstrates on one side, the potential of this social media plat-
form to serve as a successful site of digital research. On the other side, the primary 
data collected on Facebook provides a one of the kind glimpse into the entrepre-
neurial female jihadist profiles and their roles within the Spanish Jihadist Network. 
As a matter of fact, it is illustrated here the crucial female function in the man-
agement, connectivity and expansion of jihadist cells. 
From the mechanisms that enable online gender jihadism to succeed, to the de-
scription of the elements, which compose jihadist propaganda aiming at engaging 
women into processes of violent extremism, the results are clearly presented in this 
dissertation. In this context, the interests of the Salafi-jihadist propaganda are par-
amount to understand the online development of female jihadism authority and 
consequent assimilation of violent ideology. 
Following the ideological lead, evidence was also given to sate the relationship 
between the Moroccan migration in Spain and its impact to the growth of Salafi-
jihadist networks in the country. Indeed, blood (family), bonding (friendship) foster 
through social capital the construction of local stories and reinforcement of local 
ties. Together, they are the gregarious agents that explain violent mobilization and 
that have the power to galvanize these individuals to take part in terrorist acts. 
As so, it was proven that the Spanish-jihadist network has a decisive and ex-
tended presence in the phenomena of jihadism in general. However, in particular, it 
is a jihadist group with particular features, determined preferences dictated by local 
settings that distinguish them and that constitute their cultural identity markers. 
These distinctions mediate trust, collaboration and competition among several ji-
hadist groups active around the world. But, once exposed as they were here, these 
features represent a crucial opportunity to identify their recruitment processes and 
to develop efficient counter-terrorism strategies of prevention and combat. 
Currently, Western countries as well as North-African states are at arms with the 
jihadist threat increased by foreign fighters returning from Syria and Iraq. The new 
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and first person account of war stories brought by these returnees may have what 
it takes to persuade other individuals to join jihadist networks. The knowledge ac-
quired by research such as the one presented here, highlights how online stories 
produce online performances and roles that generate terrorism. And, furthermore it 
contributes to a better formulation of public and private policies, in order to antici-
pate, curve and delete online radicalization. 
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